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ABSTRACT
In the fall of 1952, General Dwight D. Eisenhower and Illinois Governor Adlai
Stevenson II faced off in a heated Presidential Election. The reputations of the two
men followed them throughout the campaign cycle. Eisenhower was perceived as
the general who defeated the Germans on the European front of WWII and was also
skilled in managing the press. Stevenson was a relative unknown on the national
stage, but was perceived as an intellectual who helped to reform the State
Government of Illinois, becoming a favorite candidate of the Democratic Party. The
fear of the spread of communism, the looming threat of another global war, and
public perception all played a role in the outcome of the 1952 Election, despite both
candidates holding similar views, so in the end General Eisenhower prevailed. The
General’s victory can be largely attributed to this military record and determination
to end the Korean War quickly, while Stevenson held similar views to those of
Eisenhower but varied in his strategies. Eisenhower was viewed as a strong and
trustworthy leader, making him the most popular candidate among the nervous and
fearful American electorate in 1952.
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Introduction
From the time of the Great Depression, Democrats had occupied the White
House. Republican President Herbert Hoover won election in 1928, following years of
economic success and growth under Republican leadership. However, when the stock
market crashed shortly after his election, launching the Great Depression, Americans
began to turn away from the Republican Party. Hoover was perceived by much of the
American population to be the leader who allowed the market to crash and then did very
little to resolve the issue and help the everyday American. In 1932, the majority of the
American voters turned to Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt to help them. They believed
that the Republicans were not the party to bring them out of the Depression and that FDR
may be the solution. The majority of voters were proven correct, as FDR was elected to
the presidency four times, occupying the White House as the Depression ended and
WWII began. Shortly after his final election, FDR passed away, leaving his Vice
President, Harry Truman, to lead the country into the close of WWII. After an allied
victory in WWII, largely credited to the hotly debated dropping of the atomic bombs in
Japan closing the second front of a 2 front war, the Cold War with the Soviet Union
began. Truman occupied the White House until 1953, facing an onslaught of criticism as
he attempted to navigate the new Cold War culture and level of internationalism now
facing the world. In 1952, he witnessed the election that would bring an end to his time in
the White House.
The presidential election of 1952 paired two candidates against each other who
seemed to have very little interest in occupying the White House. President Truman, who
was unpopular among the American electorate, had decided not to seek reelection in
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1952, because he realized that he was likely to lose. Truman courted both Army General
Dwight D. Eisenhower and Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson II to take his place as the
Democratic Party nominee. Although both initially rejected his recruitment attempts, the
same two men Truman attempted to court eventually ran against each other in the 1952
general election. Stevenson ran as the candidate for Truman’s Democratic Party, while
Eisenhower ran as the Republican candidate. In examining these two candidates it
becomes very important to understand their personal backgrounds and motivations before
delving into campaign analysis. The most vital aspects of the 1952 campaign that
emerged centered on how each candidate would handle the containment or elimination of
communism and his ability to work with leaders from foreign nations on an international
scale in order to prevent further global conflict. These issues were enhanced by the public
perception of the two individuals. The two candidates had similar ideas of the role the
United States should play in the post WWII world order, but they expressed different
paths to reach these goals.
Neither candidate appeared particularly excited about the nomination process, and
felt disinterested in occupying the office of the President, at the onset of the campaign.
General Eisenhower held the position of Supreme Allied Commander of NATO when
both the Democrats and the Republicans began to urge him to seek the nomination for
their respective parties. Eisenhower made it known that he was happy in his NATO post;
he had previous experience working with international leaders during World War II when
he led the coalition of allied forces in Europe. Eisenhower expressed very little desire to
return to a domestic leadership role, as he believed NATO to be vital to maintaining a
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secure and peaceful world order and found himself personally invested in the new
international organization.
While Eisenhower was serving overseas leading the new NATO organization,
Stevenson was coming to the end of his first term as governor of Illinois. Governor was a
position that suited Stevenson, and he had already declared himself a candidate for reelection for that office in 1952. He felt that he still had work left to do in Illinois and that
his job was not yet finished, and his political calling was to his home state. Stevenson had
served in various administrative offices under the FDR administration before returning
home to Illinois, and that was where he felt that he made the greatest impact.
Both candidates had served their nation during WWII, Eisenhower as a
commander in the Army and Stevenson in various administrative roles. The two men met
for the first time in 1943, although neither of them would have foreseen themselves as
rivals in the Presidential campaign of 1952. Eisenhower was in Naples when Stevenson
arrived to work on a study for FDR. Stevenson had been tasked with examining the ways
and means of restoring businesses, farming, and local government in regions of Europe
that had been liberated by allied forces, and Eisenhower often led those forces.1 This
meeting not only illustrated how closely the two individuals careers ran to each other,
while still allowing them to take two very different paths to their party nominations, but it
also fueled the images that would follow them through their political careers. Historians
and even Stevenson biographers unanimously describe Stevenson’s public image as the
“egghead,” most easily defined by Stevenson biographer Bill Severn as an academic who
was too intellectual to be relatable to the everyday American. In his early Washington
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experience, Stevenson was often delegated scholarly, research-oriented tasks by the
administration, tasks which contributed to his image. In contrast to Stevenson’s
“egghead” image, historians paint Eisenhower’s reputation as one of a strong, moral
leader who led forces into battle to physically defeat the enemy, an image only enhanced
within historiography by Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose. Eisenhower’s
distinction was further fueled by his successful D-Day landing in Normandy, creating a
strong sense of trust in him throughout the American population.
Historian John Robert Green argues in his work, I like Ike: The Presidential
Election of 1952, that both Eisenhower and Stevenson were reluctant in the initial days of
the campaign, but they eventually accepted their path within the American political
system. Green also acknowledges that both candidates recognized the importance of the
use of television and news coverage in a changing method of campaigning and
expressing their goals surrounding the containment of communism and bringing an end to
the war in Korea.2 While Green makes strong arguments in discussing the changing of
campaign methods and how the candidates embraced the new style of campaigning, he
also argues that Eisenhower won in a landslide. A landslide victory is absolutely true in
the number of Electoral College votes that Eisenhower received, but to simply take that
stance ignores much of the support that Stevenson had throughout the campaign cycle, as
demonstrated in the much closer vote count in the Popular Vote. Green’s work appears
very supportive of Eisenhower, but the electorate was much more divided than his work
would lead a reader to believe.
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Andrew Johnstone and Andrew Priest published a book in 2017 that addressed the
connections between foreign policy and presidential campaigns, and in this work they
present substantial discussion of the election of 1952. They argue that Stevenson
distanced himself from the Truman administration because of the impact of foreign
policy on the sitting president’s rapidly falling popularity. Instead, Stevenson chose to
focus on “educating and elevating” the American public by selling a positive liberal
program and promoting bipartisanship.3 They argue that Stevenson spent much of his
campaign focused domestically rather than internationally, presenting Eisenhower as the
internationalist candidate who became the logical choice, which is arguable. Stevenson
was the founder of various internationalist organizations and firmly believed in the
internationalist ideas of former President Woodrow Wilson, who had presented the
League of Nations to the world.4 Stevenson focused on international cooperation within
organizations like NATO, but he lacked a plan to bring an immediate end to the Korean
War, which was a major concern for the American voters. The argument that Stevenson
was focused on “educating and elevating” the public may have been derived the
Stevenson’s “egghead” image amongst historians, but the depiction of Stevenson
presented by Johnstone and Priest ignores critical aspects of Stevenson’s internationalist
positions.
Johnstone and Priest also argue that Eisenhower met with Taft prior to his
nomination specifically to address Eisenhower’s concerns with Taft’s foreign policy
ideas. As the two potential Republican nominees could not reach an agreement
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concerning foreign policy, Eisenhower chose to run. The Eisenhower campaign then
went on to battle against the far right critiques of the Truman administration’s policies
while promoting a moderate stance to Cold War global politics.5 The argument that they
present discussing the primaries is logical and falls in line with the presentation of
Eisenhower’s image before the American public in which the general followed his sense
of duty to country. In not believing that Taft’s foreign policy was best for the nation,
Eisenhower felt compelled to challenge the senator for the nomination. However, a
moderate stance considering global Cold War policy was not exactly what Eisenhower
had in mind. He promised the American voters that he would go to Korea to bring an end
to the war himself. The General made NATO a priority from the minute he opened
himself up to the idea of the nomination. These promises do not demonstrate Eisenhower
holding a moderate stance. That may have been the image that the Party sought to
promote, but it was not the reality of Eisenhower’s beliefs considering international
cooperation.
The purpose of this work is to address the electoral impact of key Cold War
factors of communism and the Korean War, while also examining the ways in which
television and public perception led to the election of the most popular man in the nation,
Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower did not win the election of 1952 because he was a
Republican or because of his specific policy views. He won because a large portion of the
electorate viewed him as the strong general who led allied forces to victory in WWII. His
reputation was desirable by the majority of the electorate because they feared the spread
of communism and a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. This narrative is intended to
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discuss who Eisenhower and Stevenson were as people, how they became involved in
such a high profile election, and in turn how the campaign itself unfolded. 1952 was the
first election in which television was used on a large scale, allowing candidates to create
a brand around their image. The candidates’ images were magnified by the fear tied to the
Cold War and the Korean War, as Eisenhower was presented to be the strong general and
Stevenson was presented to be the intellectual who would find a way to discuss solutions
related to containment and Korea.
Much of the information surrounding candidate image came from various
biographies, and all of these biographers appear to have been written in a very positive
manner surrounding their subjects. In particular, Eisenhower biographer Stephen
Ambrose has been openly criticized for inaccuracies in his work, but never failed to
present Eisenhower in a positive light during any period of the General’s life. Biographer
Bill Severn published a biography of Stevenson that openly claims to be warm and
timely, depicting a very positive image of the governor. This biography was published a
year after Stevenson’s death and seeks to describe the positives of his life. Favorable
biographies of the men involved in both the Republican and Democratic primaries are
also used in the chapters describing the nomination process, as biographers tend to put a
positive spin on their subjects. The spin placed on each candidate may be how their
biographers would like the public to remember them.
These images, along with the two candidates’ individual backgrounds, were what
initially led their respective parties to court them for the nomination. Eisenhower
appeared more willing to receive the nomination than Stevenson by the end of the
convention process, but neither man initially sought the nomination of his own accord.
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Initially both parties attempted to draft Eisenhower, but he quickly declined the
Democrats. Eisenhower eventually accepted the Republican nomination, claiming that he
feared a leader from the old right, especially Ohio Senator Robert Taft. By the time the
Republican national convention met in Chicago, Eisenhower and his supporters began
actively attempting to sway delegates in his favor. After Eisenhower declined Truman’s
attempts to run as the Democratic Party nominee, Truman refocused his efforts on Adlai
Stevenson. Stevenson was content to serve as Governor of Illinois, but his party viewed
him as a near perfect balance between Northern Democrats and Southern Democrats.
Stevenson did not want to pursue the presidency, but he also never openly stated that he
would not accept the nomination, allowing himself to be drafted on the third ballot at the
Democratic National Convention. Eisenhower pushed for the nomination within his
party, feeling that he was the best Republican option, while Stevenson felt that others
were better suited to seek the presidency on behalf of the Democrats. Eventually both
men accepted the nominations of their respective parties and began a heated campaign
cycle surrounded by debate over communism, internationalism, and American
involvement in the Korean War.
Much of the evidence related to public perception of the two candidates’ pursuit
of the presidency can be found in 1952 newspapers. Many newspapers from 1952 printed
stories about the election, and the Associated Press often distributed those stories to local
papers. This created a situation in which articles were the same across all geographic
regions of the nation, but the New York Times was often the paper in which many of the
stories originated, as urban reporters documented events that they viewed as important
throughout the campaign. Beyond these unified stories, campaign machines presented
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their respective candidates in television spots, many of which are made available on the
website “The Living Room Candidate” and are included in chapter five of this work.
Campaign speeches provide further information that came directly from the candidates’
mouths, and although these speeches often articulate the candidates’ views and opinions,
they often seem to lack specific details as to how the candidates would reach their
expressed goals.
Eisenhower and Stevenson were selected to pursue the presidency on behalf of
their respective parties because their parties believed them to be strong leaders in the eyes
of the American population. Following the conclusion of WWII, a race began between
the United States and the Soviet Union as to which could amass the largest stockpile of
atomic weapons. The Americans completed their weapons prior to the end of WWII, and
used them on behalf of the allied forces. The Soviets developed their own weapons soon
after. In witnessing the devastation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the American atomic
bombs were used, the general feeling among the American population became one of
fear. The Soviet Union closed off its borders and communications from much of the
western world, keeping communism encased behind an Iron Curtain, as Winston
Churchill famously described Eastern Europe. A reclusive nation with atomic weapons
was an unsettling idea to the American voters. In 1952 they were required to select their
next president, placing their faith in a leader who would protect them from the Soviet
threat.
Americans feared the spread of communism because it was a system of
governance that threatened the democracy many cherished. This fear was fueled by men
like Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy, a Republican who made a spectacle of
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searching for communists in the United States. He was elected to the Senate in 1946 and
pursued communists in such an aggressive and public manner that his tactics even took
on his name. McCarthyism quickly took on a life of its own. The Senator found support
in both political parties, but primarily among his own Republicans. He made wild and
very public accusations of alleged communists, many of whom were members of the
Truman administration. McCarthy attacked Adlai Stevenson on many occasions
throughout the 1952 campaign, but he also put Eisenhower in a precarious position by
denouncing individuals that the general was close with. Eisenhower never approved of
McCarthy’s tactics, but he was also unable to speak out against a member of his own
party during an election cycle.
Even with the challenge of McCarthyism, Eisenhower began the election cycle
with a clear advantage. A Gallup poll from the spring of 1951 showed that forty percent
of Democrats favored Eisenhower, while only twenty percent favored Truman, even as
Eisenhower refused Truman’s request to run as a Democrat. Eisenhower led the polls
among Republican voters with thirty percent, while Taft carried twenty two percent,
Dewey with sixteen percent and Earl Warren lagged behind at thirteen percent.6 The
campaign became heated and competitive, as Republicans fiercely tried to reclaim a
White House that they had not occupied to two decades.
Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose, with his gift for exaggeration, referred
to the 1952 campaign as “one of the bitterest campaigns of the twentieth century, one that
featured the most mudslinging. Few, if any, of the participants could look back on it with
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pride.”7 As the methods of campaigning transitioned and used new technology to
communicate the more negative aspects of a modern campaign, Ambrose is correct. 1952
was a campaign that began with two reluctant candidates quickly became highly
competitive and invaded the lives of the American electorate via television. Once their
respective parties placed them at the top of the ticket, both candidates pursued victory to
the best of their abilities. Many issues surrounding the Korean War and the spread of
communism were the focus of the campaign cycle, but the candidates’ views were not
significantly different, creating a campaign based on reputation and personal image rather
than policy views. However, this campaign did not hold up as one of the bitterest of the
twentieth century. Campaigning has become more aggressive and the candidates have
become more vicious over time, and this particular campaign simply added the
technology of television to traditional tactics.
The November general election, as well as the campaign leading up to Election
Day, came down to a difference in perceived tactics in handling the two most important
issues to the American population. Eisenhower’s grandfatherly image, combined with his
military record, caused many voters to view him as being more relatable than the distant,
intellectual, “egghead” image of Stevenson. The American voters tend to select
candidates who have a more relatable image, not necessarily who will be the strongest
leader. This is not to say that the electorate chose wrongly in 1952, it is simply an
acknowledgement that voters are more likely to chose the more relatable or positively
viewed candidate than to learn about every position each candidate holds. The 1952
campaign was a clear illustration of this phenomenon, but it was hardly the first time that
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it took place. In previous campaign cycles, FDR could not even be photographed in his
wheelchair because it presented an image of weakness before the American electorate.
Image proved once again to override policy with many American voters.
Predictions regarding the outcome of presidential elections are common, but the
1952 election was difficult for anyone to predict. Stevenson himself believed that
Eisenhower could not be beaten, even as he accepted the Democratic Party nomination,
but that view did not stop him from attempting to win for his party. Various groups
attempted to predict the outcome of the election, and their predictions were based on a
variety of factors. University of Louisville economist Carl E. Abner argued in the
Louisville Courier Journal that economics would be the primary indicator of the outcome
in the general election, and in that sense, Stevenson would be the logical victor. Abner’s
research followed trends that linked economic prosperity and political party in the White
House. He argued that no single issue the Republicans could raise would have been able
to override the desire of the American electorate to maintain economic prosperity.8
Abner’s research made sense in theory, but the electorate had voted in favor of economic
prosperity when they selected Herbert Hoover as president, which may have made them
hesitate to vote based on the economy with the memory of the Depression still relatively
fresh in American minds.
Abner’s argument was countered on the very same page of the Louisville Courier
Journal by an article with an election prediction from the U.S. News and World Report
stating: “war and its political effects more than offset the effects of good times.”9 This

Carl E. Abner, "Prosperity is the Key Factor, Says U. of L. Economist Abner in Predicting ‘It’s
Stevenson’," Louisville Courier Journal, (Louisville, KY), October 26, 1952.
9
“The Political Effects of War Will More Than Offset Prosperity, so it Looks Like Ike, Says U.S. News
and World Report Analysts,” Louisville Courier Journal, (Louisville, KY), October 26, 1952.
8
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article argued that war hurts the party in power, indicating that the Republicans had their
first real opportunity for an electoral victory since the conclusion of WWII. American
military involvement in Korea, and the fact that Truman had committed American troops
to a foreign nation without express approval from Congress, worked against the
Democratic Party in 1952. The development and advancement of the Cold War,
combined with the situation in Korea, placed the Democrats at a disadvantage from the
beginning of the campaign because they were the party blamed for the Korean War,
while Eisenhower was perceived to be the candidate who could bring an end to that
conflict. These two articles, while predicting different outcomes, demonstrate that the
media was relatively objective in covering the 1952 election, and that the race was much
closer than the landslide that some historians argue Eisenhower’s first electoral victory
achieved.
Wildly varying predictions regarding the election outcome continued all the way
through the eve of Election Day, when the Tampa Bay Times reported that many states
electoral college votes were still unpredictable. These states included New York, Florida,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Maryland, California, Texas, South
Carolina, and Illinois.10 As some of these states are clearly located in the South, the level
of unpredictability indicated a movement of white southern voters away from the
Democratic Party, although it would take many election cycles to learn if this transition
was due to party platform or simply the appeal of General Eisenhower to many voters
across the nation.11

10
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By the end of Election Day, November 4, 1952, those groups who predicted an
Eisenhower victory from the days before the party national conventions were proven
correct. Eisenhower’s image and reputation overshadowed his weakness in standing up to
more radical members of his own party, leading to the first Republican victory in two
decades. The 1952 campaign took off in a manner that had never before been presented to
the American public as the Cold War unfolded. Eisenhower stumped via train for months
in the traditional campaign manner, but he also took full advantage of television spots in
order to reach a broader swath of the electorate. Stevenson was less enthusiastic about the
use of television, but his campaign staff attempted to create television advertisements on
his behalf to keep him from falling behind. The campaign consumed more time and
money than previous elections, and began earlier than the American electorate was
accustomed to. In that sense, the 1952 campaign took over American lives for the better
part of a year, a trend that would only continue into the future.
By election day on November 4, 1952, it became clear that image and public
perception determined the outcome of the election, as both candidates were qualified and
proven leaders who sought to find a way to end the Korean War and contain communism
both at home and abroad. Eisenhower’s reputation as a victorious general made him more
popular than Stevenson in the eyes of the American electorate who feared the spread of
communism and an extended military conflict in Korea. Stevenson was an intelligent and
logical man, but Eisenhower simply proved more popular among the American voters.
In the coming chapters, this work will examine the background of both
candidates, considering their personal upbringings and career experience prior to
receiving the nominations of their parties. The primaries that led up to the heated
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campaign cycle of 1952 must be considered before examining the issues related to the
general election. Moving beyond the primaries, issues developed by Senator McCarthy
regarding communism, challenges of the Korean War, and the public images of both
Eisenhower and Stevenson will be addressed in order to understand how the threat of
nuclear war and public perception allowed the Republicans to reclaim the White House
for the first time in two decades.
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Chapter 1
Meet the Candidates and Understand the Party Platforms
The individual backgrounds of the two candidates played a defining role in their
eventual presidential nominations and also played vital roles in shaping their individual
positions and beliefs. Both the Republicans and Democrats sought to nominate
individuals who had relatable backgrounds to large segments of the American population,
some level of experience in order to ensure that they were qualified to hold the highest
office in the federal government, and personal beliefs that aligned with their party
platforms. The upbringings, educational backgrounds, and career experience of both
Eisenhower and Stevenson must be examined in order to understand why were nominated
by their respective parties for the presidency in 1952.
Governor Stevenson came from an urban upbringing in Illinois. His wealthy
family was heavily involved with the Democratic Party throughout his entire life,
instilling in Stevenson a strong party connection and interest in politics from a very
young age, as well as a detailed knowledge of the American political system. His family
political ties ran all the way into high-level federal government offices, and Stevenson’s
Grandfather, Adlai Ewing Stevenson, served as Vice President during Grover
Cleveland’s second term as President. He later became William Jennings Bryan’s running
mate in the 1900 Presidential election.12 Stevenson gained his early political experience
on both his father’s campaign, when he ran for Illinois Secretary of State, as well as when
he worked as an errand boy for Woodrow Wilson’s Presidential campaign.13 Woodrow
Wilson was one of the earliest advocates for internationalism to occupy the White House,
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and his ideas of international cooperation clearly influenced Governor Stevenson during
his early years of political involvement.
Eisenhower had a very different upbringing from that of Governor Stevenson. The
General grew up with a modest family in the rural town of Abilene, Kansas. Eisenhower
was focused on sports, particularly football, from a young age, not politics. When a
football injury sidelined Eisenhower, he moved into coaching. His dedication to the game
taught him to focus on teamwork, skills that would later translate into his position as a
general in the Army.14 His success as a general eventually pushed Eisenhower into
national politics.
Eisenhower claimed to not have a political affiliation throughout his military
service, but Stevenson was an active Democrat from a young age. He attended school
with around 200 boys, only three of whom were Democrats. He often engaged in political
arguments with Republican students,15 which helped to prepare him for a lifetime of
supporting and campaigning for the Democratic Party. After completing his secondary
education, Stevenson attended Princeton University for his undergraduate degree, and
went on to Harvard Law School after he graduated from Princeton. Stevenson had
dropped out Harvard due to family issues, but he eventually completed his law degree at
Northwestern University in June of 1926 and became a member of the Illinois Bar.16
Like Stevenson, Eisenhower also wanted to pursue a law degree. Eisenhower’s
ideal school was the University of Michigan, as they had a top football program.
However, instead of enrolling at Michigan, a friend convinced him to attend West Point
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Military Academy. Attending West Point caused Eisenhower to develop a sense of duty
and loyalty to his country. The focus at West Point was more on courage and military
leadership than on intellectual accomplishments, as Michigan law would have been, so
Eisenhower hid his intellectual side to cultivate an image focused on teamwork and
military leadership.17 This image and reputation followed Eisenhower through his
military career and eventually led to his presidential nomination with the Republican
Party. Ultimately this image propelled Eisenhower into the White House.
Prior to World War II, Stevenson had developed clear internationalist views.
These views were enhanced by a trip Stevenson and his friends took through Europe
during a summer break at Princeton. He witnessed firsthand the devastation left behind
by WWI and became further convinced that President Wilson was correct in pushing for
the League of Nations.18 Severn’s description of this trip is the first time that Stevenson is
presented firmly developing his own political views based on his firsthand experiences.
Stevenson clearly felt that some form of international cooperative organization was
required to maintain national security and global peace. His internationalist views were
vital to the Democratic Party platform and contributed to his nomination in 1952.
Following his various trips to Europe, Stevenson served as President of the Chicago
Council on Foreign Relations, as well as the head of the Chicago Chapter of the
Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. Stevenson was set in his convictions
regarding international cooperation, but was often attacked by isolationists for being an
errand boy for foreign nations. Many isolationists felt that the Committee to Aid the
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Allies was a treasonous organization.19 Stevenson paid little attention to the views of
isolationists and continued to international cooperation throughout WWII, believing that
the aggressors in Europe were also likely anti-American. He helped to promote American
involvement in the war and supported programs like Lend-Lease to aid the allied forces.20
Stevenson believed that American isolationism was impossible to maintain in the
increasingly connected global culture and that international cooperation was becoming a
necessity for global peace and prosperity.
Stevenson’s European travels also took him to Russia, where he worked as a
newspaper correspondent after his 1926 graduation from Northwestern Law School.
While in Russia, he discovered poverty filled streets and met Russian citizens in Moscow
who would barely speak to him because they feared prosecution, or even violence from
the Bolsheviks in power. He became convinced that no one should ever follow the same
path as Bolshevik Russia.21 This experience fueled his belief that communism must be
contained and western democracy must be protected, otherwise people around the world
would live in fear like those in Moscow.
Following his initial European travels, Stevenson began to serve in various roles
in Washington. He worked as a special assistant for general council in the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration for several months in 1933, a New Deal organization under
the administration of FDR.22 According to biographer Johnathan Gowden, President
Roosevelt became a role model for Stevenson, and Stevenson returned to the campaign
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involvement that he had engaged in from an early age, this time in support of FDR. The
idea that Stevenson would aspire to be like FDR is a logical conclusion, and was
demonstrated by the fact that Stevenson delivered his first political speech during the
1936 presidential campaign in which he addressed students at Carleton College and
speaking in favor of FDR.23 This speech became the first of many speeches Stevenson
presented in favor of the Democratic Party. After his time with the Agricultural
Adjustment Administration came to an end, Stevenson returned home to Illinois, having
built on his resume in support of the Democratic Party. Stevenson returned to
Washington in 1941 to serve as a special assistant to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox.
He travelled globally in this position to fix issues with supplies or personnel, as well as
write speeches for Knox and helping to work through various legal issues.24 Serving as a
speech writer developed Stevenson’s skills in addressing the public, although by the end
of his campaign in 1952 he was criticized for being unable to find time to write his own
public addresses. These two Washington positions allowed Stevenson to combine his
political experience and ambitions with his law degree, building on both his reputation
within the Democratic Party as fueling the “egghead” image that would haunt him
throughout the 1952 campaign.
In contrast to Stevenson’s extensive involvement in Washington during the FDR
administration, Eisenhower’s Washington experience was more minimal, at least prior to
his service in the European theater. The General’s initial Washington experience took
place while he was serving under General Douglas MacArthur. Eisenhower was with
General MacArthur when President Hoover sent in the military to break up the bonus
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marchers in Washington during the Great Depression.25 This heavy-handed military
response was a public relations nightmare for President Hoover, as the public viewed the
response as denying WWI veterans their benefits during the Great Depression.
Eisenhower documented all of the events that he was involved in with regard to the bonus
marchers, and those documents were later widely circulated with MacArthur claiming
them as his own work in an attempt to justify their involvement in bringing an end to the
protests. As the backlash over dispersing the bonus marchers began, Eisenhower realized
the value of documenting as many events as possible throughout his career.26 This created
a comprehensive collection of documents describing Eisenhower’s personal feelings and
experiences throughout his life, and these documents have since been published to further
our understanding of the general. The breakup of the bonus marchers became a negative
campaign issue used by the Democrats in the 1952 Presidential election. The Republican
Party was already in a situation in which they had to overcome the negative image of
President Hoover, the last Republican President prior to the Democratic administrations
of FDR and Truman, but Eisenhower’s reputation stemming from his WWII service
helped overcome the issue. As the 1952 campaign became increasingly hostile, any
negative issue that could be raised became very public as candidates attempted to tear
each other down.
Eisenhower’s rise to public recognition stemmed from his military involvement
rather than any serious involvement in Washington. When Japan attacked Peal Harbor in
1941 and brought the United States into the war, Eisenhower became immediately
heavily involved in the American military effort as a general. He endorsed the military
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prioritization of Europe over the Pacific, and by April 1942 Eisenhower was given
command of all allied forces in the European theater, not just his American troops. Later
in that same year, Eisenhower met British Prime Minister Winston Churchill for the first
time, and it was at that meeting that Churchill coined the phrase “I like Ike,” that later
became a campaign slogan.27 In describing how the slogan came into existence, it is easy
to see how the Eisenhower campaign could so easily spin his international connections.
Churchill supported the leadership and teamwork ideology that Eisenhower brought to
the Allied war effort and often supported the decisions that Eisenhower made in dictating
the allied troop movements and plans, creating a close working relationship between the
highly regarded general and the British prime minister. Their relationship was the first in
an expansive network of international relationships that Eisenhower built throughout his
military service, NATO involvement, and later the presidency.
Eisenhower’s devoted leadership in Europe created discomfort for his wife back
home, but she did not present any of her challenges before the American public. As
Eisenhower continued developing close relationships with foreign leaders during his time
in Europe, his wife, Mamie, was patiently waiting at home for him. Eisenhower
biographer Stephen Ambrose discussed Eisenhower’s relationship with Mamie
throughout his military service in great detail. Mamie felt personally frustrated by the
press, but hid her distaste for the press well and became as beloved by much of the
American population as her husband. The General worked hard to make her feel
comfortable. In one letter, Eisenhower attempted to assure Mamie that someday he would
retire and they would get a break from public life, Ambrose even quoted Eisenhower as
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staying, “at least no crack-brain has yet started running me for political office.”28 Little
did the General know how wrong he was in his discussions with Mamie. However
displeased she may have been with the press and all of the public attention, Mamie
proved to be an invaluable asset during the campaign, fueling his positive public image of
blissful domestic American life before the campaign kicked off and throughout his time
seeking office. The manner in which Mamie hid her discomfort and presented herself in a
positive light was the key to the campaign, and she recognized that putting on a positive
face for the American people was the best way that she could contribute to her husband’s
success.
Eisenhower’s lack of political affiliation during his military service contributed
to his success as a military leader, and that same success that eventually led him to the
top of the Republican ticket. Eisenhower was able to work with anyone, no matter what
their party affiliation, and helped to reinforce his friendly and relatable image for anyone
he came in contact with. Democratic President FDR specifically selected Eisenhower to
lead the allied troops because of the leadership experience and focus on teamwork that
followed Ike from his football career to West Point. The sitting president never even
considered that one day his selected general would be running for president on the
opposing party ticket. Nearly everyone liked Eisenhower, from American troops to
foreign leaders. Biographer Stephen Ambrose described Ike as FDR’s best option to work
in a coordinated effort with foreign military leaders, and in that description of
Eisenhower, Ambrose was correct.29 Eisenhower was not only a smart and effective
military leader, but he had a likable personality that helped propel his career and political
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relationships forward, as evident in examining his relationships with both political
parties, foreign leaders, and even letters written in his personal papers.
As the war came to a close, the allied leaders agreed on the goal of unconditional
surrender for their enemies. Eisenhower imposed unconditional surrender on the Italians
on September 3, 1943.30 Americans took pride in Eisenhower forcing the Italians into
surrender, but fellow military service members, political opponents, and even everyday
citizens later criticized him for not racing the Russians to Berlin in 1945. Eisenhower
biographer Paul Johnson argues that the General believed that the Russians had made a
vital contribution to the war effort and that racing them to Berlin would appear
undignified.31 This view makes logical sense, but not for the noble reasons that Johnson
would have his readers believe. Eisenhower was focused on international cooperation and
believed that a global coalition was the only way to achieve peace. He made a symbolic
decision in the moment, and demonstrated his positive intentions for international
collaboration, but this decision was diplomatically fueled, not simply a gesture of good
will. He allowed the Russians to experience a major victory after the heavy losses they
suffered at the hands of the German troops and German allies prior to American
involvement in the European theater, a clear demonstration of Eisenhower’s ability to see
the value in long-term international cooperation rather than simply focus on immediate
glory for American forces. The criticism of Eisenhower’s cooperation and consideration
of the Russians in the closing months of WWII later bled into the 1952 presidential
campaign, as the Democratic Party exploited the action as a moment of weakness,
especially as the Cold War unfolded and the Soviet Union became the new enemy.

30
31

Johnson, Eisenhower, 43.
Johnson, Eisenhower, 55.

24

Despite criticisms of how he handled Berlin, his role as the leader of the allied
forces helped Eisenhower to develop public relations skills and an ability to address that
press that followed him for the rest of his career, always working to his advantage.
Eisenhower successfully engaged the press and developed his image before the American
population throughout WWII. His uniform was always freshly pressed, he stood up
straight, held his head high, spoke clearly, and looked directly into the camera.32 These
descriptions of Eisenhower permeate the historical discussion of the General, and the
majority of the American population viewed Eisenhower as a relatable man who was put
together and would be up front and honest with them. Following the conclusion of the
war in Europe, Eisenhower received honors and decorations from around the world,
building on his ties with the international community. Paul Johnson describes that on
June 12, 1945, Eisenhower was given a specially designed ceremonial sword in London,
illustrating the affection and respect that the British had for him.33 This argument of
respect and support from the international community is further reinforced throughout
Eisenhower’s personal documents in his correspondence with international leaders and
diplomats, especially those involved with NATO. Eisenhower’s image as the strong
international leader was pushed heavily on the American electorate in 1952, but it was far
from untrue, he was clearly welcomed into the international community after his
contributions to WWII.
Stevenson did not receive the same types of international honors that Eisenhower
did, but he was no less involved with the development of international cooperation. In
1944, Stevenson returned to Washington again to help head the PR campaign for the
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newly forming United Nations. He ended up smoothing ruffled feathers and was sent to
London to help determine the distribution of power within the early UN.34 This role
allowed Stevenson to develop and demonstrate his skills as a diplomatic leader on the
world stage. Stevenson was involved with the establishment of NATO and cooperation
between nations, but he was never as beloved as Eisenhower around the globe. After the
UN was established, Eisenhower remained in Europe, serving as the Supreme Allied
commander of NATO. In May 1946, once he felt that the UN was successfully
established, Stevenson resigned his position and returned home to his family in Illinois.35
As Stevenson removed himself from international diplomacy, Eisenhower
continued to build on his already strong relationships with European leaders. Eisenhower
was also involved in domestic service after the conclusion of WWII, and he served as
President of Columbia University. The General used his authority at Columbia to further
his ideas of international cooperation, establishing the “Institute of War and Peace
Studies,” as well as the American Assembly that brought together academics and
business leaders along with other opinion formers. These prominent individuals worked
toward the common goal of protecting western democracy from communist influence,
which meant either containing communism to ensure that it did not spread, or finding
ways to eliminate any communist influence in their respective spheres.36 In establishing
these organizations at Columbia, Eisenhower demonstrated his goals of containment or
eradication of communism domestically as well as internationally.
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While at Columbia, Eisenhower opposed the appointment of known Marxists to
teaching positions. Communists were viewed as “unfit” to teach and Eisenhower worked
to prevent appointing them to any position of influence, but he did not actively obsess
over pursuing communists all over the United States.37 Eisenhower was not concerned
with communists living throughout the nation in relatively small numbers, and was
particularly unsupportive of the tactics used by Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy, but
he would do all that he could to prevent known communists from having any influence
over vulnerable populations. Permitting communists to assume teaching positions at
Columbia would give them a platform from which they could influence students with
their personal beliefs, a platform which Eisenhower fought to keep from them. He, and
many others, believed in eliminating communist expansion domestically as well as
internationally. Preventing communists from spreading their views would help to
diminish their domestic influence, a stance that Eisenhower firmly in supported. His
efforts toward containment caused both political parties, as well as a large portion of the
American electorate, to see that Eisenhower would make attempts to manage or eliminate
communism domestically as well as internationally.
As Eisenhower was working full steam ahead to engage as much of the domestic
and international community in his goal of international cooperation, Adlai Stevenson
was moving toward his first true elected office, the position of Governor of Illinois. The
Illinois Democratic Party chose Stevenson as their 1948 Candidate for State Governor as
a relative unknown because they wanted a reformer to make changes and run in their
state. Generally, outside Chicago the state voted Republican, so Stevenson was an
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underdog from the start. Even the Democratic Party machine questioned who he was, as
he had been involved in campaigns but on low levels. Stevenson’s political experience
did not make him a well-known candidate during his campaign for the Governorship, and
even after his election in Illinois he remained a relative unknown nationally, putting him
at a disadvantage in 1952 against the widely known General Eisenhower. His 1948
campaign was consistently out of money and Stevenson was the clear underdog
candidate, lagging behind the well funded and well recognized Republican Party in
Illinois.38
Prior to the 1948 election cycle, Stevenson had no real election experience; he had
only served administrative roles. He originally returned to Illinois after his European
travels following the war with the intention of running for Senate, but the Illinois
Democratic Party machine felt that Stevenson was a better fit for governor. Severn,
continuing with his positive description of Stevenson, explained that Stevenson won his
election by the largest plurality in Illinois history.39 However, his significant victory is
important to discuss because it brought Stevenson into the outside edge of the political
spotlight, demonstrating his ability to win voters without being a well-known candidate
during the beginning of an election cycle. Without his election to Governor, he would
never have been nominated for the presidency in 1952 because no one would have known
who he was, nor would anyone have ever expected him to have a chance of defeating
Eisenhower in 1952. In this sense, Severn is right to draw attention to the large victory in
Stevenson’s first election. As Stevenson brought a new face and new image to the
Democratic Party in Illinois, even in the rural areas that had previously voted Republican,
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he moved voters toward the Democrats. The shift that he began helped to carry the entire
state of Illinois for Truman in his 1948 campaign, as well as creating a trend of continued
contributions to the Democratic Party nationally.40 Stevenson, while lagging behind
Eisenhower in the arena of public recognition, had proved himself as a candidate who
could promote himself and win over voters without a pre-existing reputation. The
Democrats needed someone who could win over voters in 1952 if they wanted to have
any hope of defeating the popular Republican candidate.
Eisenhower began his political career without much less enthusiasm. While
Stevenson pursued the office of Governor, Eisenhower maintained the stance that he had
no interest in seeking elected office. As the war efforts in the United States began to
slow, General MacArthur told Eisenhower that one of them would someday become
President. Johnson describes Eisenhower’s response to MacArthur as strong and firm,
stating that he did not feel the military had any business in politics.41 This position can
easily contribute to the image of the reluctant candidate, and may have been true of
Eisenhower’s personal beliefs at the time, but it did not stop him from requesting a retired
status in 1952 in order to pursue the Republican nomination when he determined that he
should attempt to defeat Senator Taft. Eisenhower turned down various offers of political
positions following WWII, including a push for him to run for the United States Senate in
New York. He was more drawn toward military appointments, and accepted the position
of Supreme Allied Commander of NATO.42 Eisenhower was already recognizable and
influential on an international level, but this was the most political of any appointment he
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held previously, which permitted him to further explore his belief in international
cooperation in order to prevent global conflict. His strong belief in international
cooperation drove the General’s desire to continue with his NATO involvement rather
than seek any domestic political office.
Eisenhower’s political career began to develop while he was serving in the early
stages of NATO. The old right of the Republican Party remained generally opposed to
NATO, making Eisenhower’s presidential nomination even more unexpected.
Eisenhower was clear in his belief that international cooperation was the only way to
maintain global security, making the possibility of a president from the old right even
more terrifying in his eyes. On February 1, 1951, Eisenhower addressed a joint session of
Congress to discuss the needs of Europe. He was given credit for presenting NATO to
Congress better than any member of the Truman administration, which drew members of
both political parties to push the General to run for the presidency on behalf of their
party. His successful presentation of NATO continued to demonstrate his strong belief in
international cooperation, but also pushed him into the political spotlight. Eisenhower
went on to deliver addresses internationally while leading NATO, including addressing
the English Speaking Union at Grosvenor House in London. This particular speech only
added to Churchill’s admiration for the General, as he called the address “one of the
greatest speeches delivered by any American in my lifetime.”43 Eisenhower found
himself accepted and admired by nations friendly towards the United States on a major
international scale, which emphasized not only his military leadership abilities but also
his foreign relations and public relations knowledge.
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Eisenhower remained dedicated to the success of NATO, even as the Republican
Party began pushing for him to run for the presidency in 1952. Eisenhower made his
loyalty to the new international organization clear in a letter to Canadian Diplomat Lester
Bowles Pearson on May 30, 1952, when he wrote “wherever I go and whatever I may do,
you may rest assured that I will always follow with the closest interest the progress of
NATO. I shall always remember with pride my association with this great collective
effort of the free nations to remain free.”44 This letter was a strong indication that even if
Eisenhower were to accept the nomination to run for President, NATO would remain a
key priority within his administration. The wording may have been strong in order to
ensure foreign leaders that Eisenhower would continue to support them even if he
became president, and it was later proven true as Eisenhower continued to support
international cooperation throughout his presidency. He held strong beliefs in
international cooperation and NATO was a key component to his goals of maintaining a
peaceful and cooperative world order.
As Eisenhower’s political prestige began to develop, both political parties courted
him, recognizing his growing status and prominence around the world. As the 1952
campaign season began to approach, President Truman recognized that his popularity
amongst the American electorate was not strong enough to support a bid for reelection.
Historian Barton J. Bernstein published a comprehensive collection of essays describing
American presidential elections, in which he explained that many voters blamed Truman
for American involvement in the Korean War, Chinese aggression, the spread of
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communism, high taxes, and inflation in the American economy.45 With the onset of the
Cold War following WWII, the dissatisfaction that the majority of the American
electorate felt toward their sitting President logically pushed him to withdraw from
consideration. Truman approached Eisenhower to run as his successor on the Democratic
ticket, believing that with Eisenhower at the top of the ticket the Democrats could
continue to extend their twenty year hold on the White House. Eisenhower refused
Truman’s offer, not only because he did not believe that the military had any business in
politics but also because he believed himself to be a lifelong Republican. Eisenhower had
never registered with a political party, nor had he voted in a federal election, but he held
personal beliefs that were more in line with the Republican Party.46 He supported fiscal
responsibility rather than strong welfare programs, aid to European allies, and a quick
end to the Korean War. His views were firmly in place and supported throughout his life,
as most of his friends and family were Republican, as well as many of his fellow military
leaders. The General felt much more comfortable with the Republicans and that comfort
was a necessity when Eisenhower finally did agree to run. He would not have run for any
political office that did not permit him to pursue his personal beliefs.
After Eisenhower declined Truman’s offer to run as his successor, the Democratic
Party was forced to look elsewhere for a candidate. In January of 1952, Truman told
Adlai Stevenson that he would not be seeking reelection and expressed his desire that
Stevenson run as the Democratic Party candidate.47 Stevenson, like Eisenhower, refused
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Truman. On January 5, 1952, Stevenson announced, “after long and prayerful
consideration I have decided to be a candidate for reelection as Governor in 1952.”48
Clearly the Governor wanted to remain in his home state, making what he believed to be
positive change in Illinois. He was not ready to step onto the national stage, nor did his
public recognition come close to the recognition of Eisenhower.
In contrast to Eisenhower, Governor Stevenson was a registered member of his
political party, had served on various campaigns prior to 1952, and was already serving in
a political office. Stevenson also failed to make any public statement that he would not
accept the nomination for president by the Democratic Party; his key public
announcement was that he sought reelection for governor. He was eventually drafted by
the Democratic Party, when leadership entered his name was entered in the Oregon
primary and he won. Even after Stevenson found his name on the ballot for the
nomination process, he stated publically that, “he wished he had to the right to
withdrawal it.”49 This public statement demonstrated how much Stevenson wanted to
continue serving as governor and that he felt that his work was not yet complete in
Illinois. He had already declared himself a candidate for Governor, and he firmly
believed that if Eisenhower received the Republican nomination, no Democrat could beat
the respected war hero.50 Stevenson was clearly aware of the fact that public image and
reputation could play a role in the general election, and if that were the case, Eisenhower
would be difficult to defeat. Stevenson insisted that his desire was to remain in state
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government, not pursue the Presidency, but the Democratic Party would not accept his
response.
Just as Stevenson was committed to his role of Governor, Eisenhower was
committed to his position in NATO. The General wanted to stay with NATO and further
the development of international cooperation, which would have permitted him to
continue his military service. However, he had a tightknit group of friends who began to
push him to run as the Republican nominee. They advocated for the idea by explaining
that the presidency was the next step in his duty to his country. While the idea of duty to
country played a factor in Eisenhower’s eventual acceptance of the Republican
nomination, he also feared the idea of Senator Robert Taft in the White House.
Eisenhower and his supporters believed that Taft, who held more isolationist views than
either Eisenhower or Stevenson, would lead a more reactive administration that did not
work smoothly on an international scale. Johnson describes Eisenhower’s supporters’
beliefs that Eisenhower would be able to balance the budget, be firm with the Soviets
while not furthering conflict, and protect democracy.51 While many of these factors were
true, none of them were the reason why Eisenhower finally committed to run. The
debates with Senator Taft ultimately became the factor that pushed Eisenhower to seek
the nomination, as he remained firmly committed to the ideas on international
cooperation and did not believe that Senator Taft would continue on that path.
Eisenhower polled well as he entered the Republican Primary. In July of 1952,
Gallup polls predicted that Eisenhower would be able to defeat Stevenson in the general
election with fifty-nine percent of the vote. If the Democrats selected Stevenson’s biggest
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competition, Senator Estes Kefauver, Eisenhower was predicted to win with fifty-five
percent of the vote. In contrast, if Taft were to win the Republican nomination, either
potential Democratic nominee would have defeated him, creating a situation in which the
Republicans were likely to continue to lose in the general election. Stevenson polled at
receiving forty-five percent, to Taft’s forty-five percent, a virtual stalemate, while
Kefauver was predicted to win fifty-five percent to Taft’s forty-one percent.52 Although
early polls have always been faulty, Eisenhower was clearly the more popular choice for
the Republican Party in both the primary and general elections, creating the most likely
scenario for a Republican victory in nominating Eisenhower to run against either
Democrat. The Republican Party remained divided up through the Republican National
Convention in July of 1952, with the eastern Republicans who disliked Taft supporting
Eisenhower, while mid-western Republicans were generally more conservative and more
supportive of nominating Senator Taft. Eisenhower agreed to run after some debate over
international cooperation with Taft, but the general could not campaign for the
nomination himself while still in an active military status.53
Eisenhower did not protest the nomination in the vocal manner that Stevenson
did, but he did not actively campaign to become the candidate until after he was placed
on retired status with the military. He also did not speak about the nomination until the
Republican National Convention, where he became to official nominee.54 Eisenhower
allowed the Republican Party to nominate him in the New Hampshire Primary in March
of 1952, nearly entirely because he did not want to sit back and allow Taft to become the
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nominee. Eisenhower won the New Hampshire Primary without campaigning, leading the
Republican financial donors to shift their funds to the Eisenhower campaign.55 His
national appeal was quickly recognized by much of the Republican Party, which led to
the shift in finances. Eisenhower was less polarizing than Taft, and this realization
benefitted Eisenhower throughout the nomination process.
Stevenson was not nominated as quickly as Eisenhower, but he immediately
distanced himself from the existing Democratic administration under Truman after
receiving the nomination on the third ballot of the Democratic National Convention. Like
the Truman administration, Historian John Diggins argues that Stevenson wanted to
balance the budget and speak out in opposition to Senator McCarthy’s red baiting tactics,
but beyond those similarities Stevenson wanted to run his own campaign with minimal
ties to Truman and his advisors.56 Diggins was right in that Stevenson began to work to
develop his own identity within the national Democratic Party, apart from unpopular
Truman, but Stevenson also permitted Truman to campaign in his favor. As Truman was
so unpopular, in some cases the support of Truman hurt the Stevenson campaign.
Following the Republican National Convention, the Eisenhower campaign took
off on their own quick trajectory, as the General promised to end the war in Korea and
lead the American people in the movement against communism.57 One week before the
election, Eisenhower promised the American electorate at an address in Detroit,
Michigan that he would go to Korea himself.58 This speech became a defining moment in
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the Eisenhower campaign, and voters did not need an explanation as to how Eisenhower
would end the conflict in Korea; they simply trusted that a successful military leader
would be able to easily bring an end to the stalemate.59
While clearly affiliating himself with the Republicans, Eisenhower demonstrated
respect for former Democratic President FDR. The Republican nominee spoke highly of
FDR when he discussed WWII, expressing, “I admired him as a world leader. The man
exuded an infectious optimism; indeed, the thought of defeat apparently never crossed his
mind, despite the fact that we were fighting two great wars simultaneously on opposite
sides of the earth.”60 Eisenhower made it clear that the popular president and the popular
general were on the same side. This tactic was clearly political, as Eisenhower would
need to win voters over from the Democratic Party if he wanted to win the election. The
relationship between the two men bled into their families as well, FDR’s family favored
Eisenhower prior to the nomination process, and in 1948 FDR Jr. joined the movement to
draft Eisenhower to run as a Democrat. Even though that movement failed, the two
families remained supportive of each other, tying Eisenhower, the Republican nominee,
to a prominent family of Democrats. This is not to say that Eisenhower believed FDR
was perfect, but he did seek to learn from FDR’s mistakes. He felt that Truman was unfit
to take over after FDR’s death, which contributed to the level of unpopularity Truman
found. In order to avoid similar issues, Eisenhower wanted to involve his running mate,
Richard Nixon in all policy-making councils as to avoid a similar situation in his own
administration.61 While the argument presented by William Leuchtenburg in favor of
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including Nixon in policy-making councils was accurate after Eisenhower’s 1952 victory,
the two men were often separate during the campaign and did not discuss personal views
or goals to fulfill promises made during the campaign.
Beyond connections and the grueling nomination process, anti-communism
remained a driving force during the election cycle of 1952, as fears of the global spread
of communism permeated the American public. Senator McCarthy had repeatedly
attacked the Truman administration, blaming them for setbacks against communism, as
well as the communist infiltration into the American government.62 Stevenson made
himself a prime target for the Senator when he vetoed a bill during his time as Governor
of Illinois that required teachers and state officials to sign oaths swearing that they were
loyal Americans and not at all affiliated with the Communist Party.63 Cold War historian
Melvyn Leffler argued that Eisenhower viewed McCarthyism as detrimental to the
American image abroad and contributed to feelings of doubt in the American institution
of democracy.64 While Leffler’s argument is accurate, in this particular work he does not
go into great detail in discussing how Eisenhower handled the red baiting Senator.
Eisenhower struggled to manage the McCarthy issue, as he could not openly denounce a
member of his own party during an election year. Instead of taking on the support or open
disapproval of McCarthy, Eisenhower allowed that aspect of the campaign to fall on his
vice-presidential nominee, Richard Nixon. McCarthy supporters did not think that either
candidate was firmly on their side, but Eisenhower managed to appeal to McCarthy’s
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supporters with his quiet position on the issue, while Stevenson repelled those voters with
his outspoken disdain for the Senator’s tactics.65
Republicans were divided on the issue of McCarthyism, which stemmed from
their own party, but they did attempt to present a unified platform. Bernstein’s work on
Presidential elections specifically lays out the Party Platforms. The Republican Party
platform in 1952 focused on anti-communism, military preparedness, and aid to Europe,
all strengths of General Eisenhower both in the public eye and in his personal beliefs and
experience. The Republican Party accused Democrats of permitting corruption in highlevel government offices, shielding traitors, appeasing communism, and entering a war
without congressional approval. They also blamed Democrats for allowing Mao to take
power in China. The fall of China to the communists projected an image that the
Democrats were not only soft on communism, but they allowed it to expand. Senator
Taft, while blaming the Democrats for not preventing the fall of China, was also
outspoken when voicing his disapproval of Truman and the Korean War, as the president
had gotten involved in foreign conflict without an official declaration of war from
Congress.66
As they made their views of anti-communism known, Republicans also promised
military preparedness at a lower cost than Democrats and they endorsed collective
security.67 Eisenhower’s NATO involvement further fueled the collective security idea
that the Republicans were pushing forward, even as the old right opposed internationalist
organizations. The Party platform was enhanced with the selection of General
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Eisenhower as the Republican nominee, and his reputation of a strong and successful
military leader preceded his own campaign. His record of positive interactions with
foreign leaders, as well as his NATO involvement provided to experience required by the
Republican Party to support their platform positions regarding preparedness and security.
The Republican platform was vague in its pledge to provide aid to Western
Europe. They simply addressed that eastern European nations who the United States
failed to help fell under the influence of the Soviet Union. The Republicans never
specified exactly what that aid would look like, but the promise of some form of aid
fueled the anti-communist ideals held by the majority of the electorate to prevent even
more nations from falling under communist influence. If a foreign nation was left in
tatters after the conclusion of WWII, that nation would be more likely to succumb to
communism or accept Soviet aid, which would inevitably permit Soviet intervention.
Many American voters looked upon any indication of American assistance overseas as a
strong anti-communist position. The Republican Party took a middle of the road stance
with in policy involving Asian nations, openly criticizing the Truman administration’s
involvement in the Korean War without a clear plan to pursue victory, but also refusing
to endorse General MacArthur’s strategy of bombing China, a nation that had already
fallen to communism.68 In bombing a communist nation, Americans risked angering the
Soviet Union, potentially leading to the feared nuclear war.
The Democrats faced a different set of issues from the Republicans, as only
candidates who had distanced themselves from the Truman administration stood a chance
in establishing themselves as independent from the existing Democratic leadership.
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Stevenson distanced himself from the administration quickly after the Democratic
National Convention, knowing that Truman’s unpopularity would have a negative impact
on his own campaign. The Illinois governor had established his own identity within the
Illinois State Democratic Party and sought to do the same on the national stage. He had
served under FDR in a variety of administrative roles and sought to draw on his ties to
the beloved recent president rather than fall in line with the Truman administration, while
drawing on similar ties to FDR that Eisenhower had used. Both candidates wartime
service allowed them to claim connection to FDR.
The Democratic Party platform adhered to New Deal liberalism, including the
extension of social security and unemployment compensation, as well as implementing a
public housing program.69 In the realm of foreign relations and anti-communism, the
Democrats took a slightly different stance from the Republicans. They did not seek an
immediate end to the Korean War, instead pursuing a “fair and effective peace,”
appearing softer on communist aggression in Korea than the stance of the Republican
Party. Any appearance of being soft on communism pushed away a large segment of the
American electorate, many of whom believed that Eisenhower would quickly end the war
in Korea. The Democrats countered their own, less aggressive stance on the war in Korea
with a greater emphasis on collective security than even Eisenhower and the Republicans
had taken. The Democrats sought a balanced military force, rather than a stronger
emphasis on the Air Force. They also strongly endorsed collective security through
programs like NATO, the Marshall Plan, and the Japanese-U.S. military alliance of
1951.70 Their focus on collective security harkened back to President Woodrow Wilson’s
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14 Points and the creation of the United Nations following WWI, but this time with clear
American involvement in these institutions. Adlai Stevenson had served on the Woodrow
Wilson campaign in his younger years, and he had demonstrated his belief in a higher
level of collective security for the majority of his adult life.
While Eisenhower attempted to lean into his ties to a popular former president,
the Democrat Franklin Roosevelt, the Democratic Party sought to draw on the reputation
of former President Herbert Hoover, the last Republican to occupy the White House and
the man often blamed for the Great Depression. Democrats communicated to voters that
they would be the party to fight inflation, while Republican Hoover had simply allowed
the economy to crumble and inflation to continue, creating a depression.71 Bernstein’s
discussion of Hoover feels almost too soft. Following the depression, Hoover was toxic
to nearly any Republican campaign. Hoover occupied a behind the scenes role with the
Republican Party for the rest of his life.
The two political parties shared the goals of ending the conflict in Korea and
preventing the spread of communism, but clearly supported different tactics in order to
achieve those goals. Any plan that had been devised under the Truman administration
was subject to intense criticism, which gave the Republicans the clear advantage when
addressing strategies to reach these goals, countering the Democratic attacks revolving
around Hoover and the economy.
In considering an aggressive campaign strategy, Eisenhower’s life experience as
an athlete and a fighter pushed him into a more successful position than Stevenson.
According to Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower though nine years
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older than Stevenson, appeared during the campaign to be more energetic. He travelled
more, spoke more, held more press conferences, and always appeared fresh. Stevenson
sometimes appeared exhausted along the campaign trail.72 In comparing the campaign
papers of both Eisenhower and Stevenson, it is clear that Eisenhower did travel and speak
more, although it is impossible to determine public perception of exhaustion or energy
from written documents and schedules. However, Eisenhower’s military training likely
provided him with greater stamina throughout the campaign cycle than Stevenson’s
various administrative positions. Eisenhower ran on the image of being the great moral
authority and avoided open clashes with the Democrats, which ensured that the election
would come down to a decision based on personality rather than ideological differences,
in which Eisenhower prevailed.73
Eisenhower’s clean reputation nearly took a hit when it was discovered that VicePresidential candidate Richard Nixon had been receiving secret payments from wealthy
California donors. This challenge initially caused Eisenhower to distance himself from
his running mate, as the General never wanted the appearance of any immorality tied to
himself or his campaign. After Nixon delivered his famous “Checkers Speech,” in which
he pled his case for the forgiveness from the American people, the voters rallied behind
Nixon, viewing him as the relatable family man who was just trying to get by.74 This
view is reinforced by news stories and phone calls following the televised address.
Eisenhower quickly returned his support to Nixon, believing that the American people
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had a figure that they could relate to in their Vice-Presidential candidate, which would
help his campaign.75
Eisenhower also enhanced his image through interactions with the press. The
General was more successful in relating to the press than Stevenson throughout the 1952
campaign, and in addition to his positive image in press conferences, he hired experts to
make the best possible use of television. Eisenhower taped 40 twenty-second long
television spots in which he addressed key campaign issues to ordinary voters.76 These
spots, archived on the website “The Living Room Candidate,” continued to make
Eisenhower more relatable to the American electorate, while Stevenson did not appear in
television commercials and continued to be viewed as less relatable by the American
population. Stevenson felt that television spots were a cheap way for a candidate to sell
themselves to the public, much like a pack of gum or a tube of toothpaste. A variety of
individuals spoke in television spots on his behalf, but Stevenson did not take advantage
of what could have been a very valuable opportunity to present himself as more relatable
to the American electorate.77
Stevenson’s best chance to win votes was in the South, where the Dixecrat revolt
had begun, but a large portion of the electorate continued to vote Democrat. The
Republican Party essentially wrote off the African American vote before the campaign
cycle of 1952 ever began. They wanted to bring African American voters into the Party,
the logical desire of either political party, but Republicans were more concerned with
winning the white southern vote, which had recently begun to slowly shift in their favor
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with the Dixiecrat revolt, than they were with recruiting black voters. Therefore, the
Republican Party made it clear that they would not impose any extensive federal power
with regard to civil rights issues. They made public suggestions that the states should
control their own domestic institutions, including racial divisions, but with the caveat that
the federal government should have the right to take supplemental action to further just
employment practices.78 However, as the campaign kicked off, Eisenhower refused to
simply ignore the white southern voters, even though the region traditionally voted
Democrat. He began his formal campaign in September of 1952 with a trip through the
South.79 This departure from the traditional Republican thinking regarding the South is
one of the many factors that made Eisenhower stand out to the electorate and shifted
some southern white voters away from the Democratic Party.
Before the campaign could get underway, both candidates would have to endure a
grueling nomination process. While neither candidate initially sought to pursue the
nomination, both men eventually received their party nominations and fought to win the
general election. General Eisenhower was reluctant to leave NATO in the beginning of
the nomination process, but as he realized that Senator Taft would not support the level of
international cooperation the General felt was necessary for global security, he decided to
pursue the Republican nomination. In order to understand the two men’s varying
opinions, it is important to understand the different factions within the Republican Party,
all of which will be examined in Chapter Two.
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Chapter 2
The Old Right Faces Off Against The Moderate Conservative
In the early months of 1952 the Republican Party was severely divided, leading to
one of the most heated Republican National Conventions in American history. The party
faced a split between Eastern Republicans, who were moderate conservatives, and their
more extreme right leaning Midwestern Republican counterparts. The Eastern
Republicans respected many of the existing New Deal programs that had been providing
aid to a large segment of the population, although they would have preferred to see
stricter restrictions imposed on those programs and their funding. While they did not
approve of a large federal budget, they believed there was value in some spending in
order to strengthen the economy. These Eastern Republicans also supported ongoing
defense of Europe, and many members of the party felt western European security to be
vital to American security interests.80 These two factions of the Party were most clearly
illustrated in the opposition between Ohio Senator Robert Taft, a representative of the old
right of the Midwestern Republicans, and Army General Dwight D. Eisenhower,
representing the transition from the old right to a more moderate conservative stance,
even if just in 1952. In the culture of Cold War America, Dwight Eisenhower was to
emerge the logical Presidential candidate in 1952, initially overtaking the representative
of the Old Right, Senator Taft, and eventually Democratic nominee Adlai Stevenson II in
the general election.
In contrast to the Eastern Republicans, the Midwestern segment of the Republican
Party, represented by Taft, was composed of more far right leaning conservatives. They
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felt that the New Deal was anti-capitalistic and they were opposed to big government
spending for a variety of reasons. These Republicans also believed that labor unions were
anti-capitalistic, and that made them a natural enemy to the Midwestern Republicans.
This segment of the party held onto a laissez-faire belief system regarding the economy.
Conservatives representing the old right believed in a free market that did not include
imposing strict government regulations on business. With regard to Europe, this faction
of the Republican Party opposed using America’s limited resources on commitments that
did not directly impact American interests.81 This opposition indicated that the old right
felt the U.S. should be concerned about protecting its own interests with the looming
threat of nuclear conflict, not spending its funds on nations halfway around the world. In
many cases, this opposition extended to the North Atlantic Treaty Association (NATO).
Eisenhower held the position of Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, and many of the
representatives of the old right opposed his nomination because they did not support
strong international cooperation.82
With campaign season looming, the Republican presidential nomination for the
upcoming election of 1952 naturally became a polarizing issue for the party. The
Republican National Convention was to take place July seventh to the eleventh, 1952, in
Chicago, Illinois.83 A candidate needed to secure a majority of votes from convention
delegates in order to receive the nomination, not simply have more votes than any other
member of the Republican Party seeking to be placed at the top of the ticket.
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In 1952, Presidential nominees were not selected using a modern national primary
system that awards delegates based on votes in state primaries. Only thirteen states held
primary elections, meaning that only thirty-nine percent of delegates at the national
convention had their votes determined by the Republican Party electorate in their state.84
The votes of delegates representing states that did not participate in primary elections
were determined in one of two ways. The state party caucus, essentially party leadership
without consent of the everyday voters, could determine how their delegates would vote.
This meant sending them to the convention with a decision already made for at least the
initial vote. If the initial vote did not result in a majority for any candidate, they would
either have a second choice determined by their state party leadership or have the
freedom to select another candidate.
The final group of delegates consisted of a system that Taft, already a successful
politician, could use to bury Eisenhower. Delegates were sent to the convention to be
persuaded and wooed behind closed doors prior to the convention vote.85 They were
selected by the state party based on their views and which candidate they publicly
supported but were not given a specific voting strategy. In addressing those delegates,
Eisenhower and his supporters had their work cut out for them in order to offset the
political network that Taft had developed throughout his time in Washington. While
General Eisenhower had been overseas rather than engaging in domestic political
involvement, Senator Taft had learned firsthand the how party politics functioned in
Washington. Even if he did not know the individual delegates personally, he knew how to
negotiate and persuade individuals to vote in his favor after serving in the Senate.
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Beyond the battle between Eisenhower and Taft there were other Republicans
who sought the nomination, and their convention delegates went on to play a decisive
role in the nomination process. Their views and the sides they took along the evergrowing rift in the Republican Party allowed them to play a vital role in the campaign and
election process. They could throw their support behind either the General or the Senator,
and with that support their delegates representing states without a primary voting system
could also be persuaded to vote for their preferred candidate if they decided to remove
themselves from the nomination process.
One of the other moderate Republicans seeking the nomination was California
governor Earl Warren. He was the frontrunner for the nomination early in the campaign
season. The governor had been Thomas Dewey’s running mate in 1948. Warren, from a
Western state, shared many of the moderate views of the Eastern Republicans. In the
early discussions, when Eisenhower’s candidacy was an uncertainty, those backing
Warren realized that his only chance to win the nomination was if Eisenhower did decide
to run, as the party would be split.86 Senator Taft did not support Warren as a candidate,
believing him to be too moderate to maintain what the old right believed to be
conservative ideals. Taft biographer James Patterson described Taft as anything but timid
when it came to expressing these opinions, stating “it is hard for me to see how any real
Republicans could be for Warren today. He certainly represents all the New Deal
principles, and does not even recognize that there is any difference in principle.”87 In
driving this point home with a harsh quote expressing Taft’s opinion on Warren,
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Patterson was able to clearly convey that Taft and his Midwestern counterparts felt that
the New Deal supported liberal programs that Republicans should never approve of,
making the Governor the enemy of what they believed the Republican Party represented.
Taft’s opposition to Warren for being too liberal was very similar to his opposition of
Eisenhower. The fact that both parties attempted to court Eisenhower early in the
campaign cycle and Taft’s accusations levied against Warren for not being a “real
Republican” demonstrated how similar the two potential nominees really were. The
Warren supporters were likely very wrong in their prediction that Warren’s only real
chance at the nomination was if Eisenhower entered the race, as Taft supporters would
have remained with Taft, while Warren and Eisenhower would have split the more
moderate segment of the Republican Party. This type of split would have created a
victory for Taft, not Warren.
The other two key men vying for the Republican nomination demonstrated early
in the process that they were not viable contenders for the top of the ticket. The potential
candidates were former Minnesota Governor Harold Stassen and former Republican
nominee Thomas Dewey. Dewey had run at the top of the Republican ticket in 1944 and
1948, losing both elections. Stassen had been a friend of Senator Joseph McCarthy, but
they split due to a dispute regarding trade with communist nations.88 Anyone who openly
opposed McCarthy risked losing the support of the Republican Party, and Stassen was no
exception. The Party response to this dispute served as an early warning to Eisenhower
that he could not openly oppose McCarthy. Stassen held more moderate views than many
conservatives in the Midwest and threw his support behind General Eisenhower when his
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own dreams of the nomination were dashed, in turn tying more of the Republican
delegates to Eisenhower.
Thomas Dewey was initially considered for the nomination, likely because he had
run previously, but it became clear that he was not the candidate who could win the
White House for the Republicans. He was not a strong enough presence, as already
demonstrated in his losses to both Roosevelt in 1944 and to Truman in 1948. Dewey was
a moderate Eastern Republican and an established party rival of Taft. With his beliefs
that a moderate position was the future of the Republican Party, Dewey turned his focus
to Eisenhower, redirecting his efforts to support the Ike nomination. He also advocated
for Californian Richard Nixon as Ike’s running mate in order to balance the ticket with
regard to age and geography, demonstrating the knowledge that he had gained during his
two failed campaigns. Historian Michael Bowen argued that Stassen and Dewey
overcame the fact that they had been rivals for the Republican nomination during the last
two election cycles in order to rally their delegates behind Eisenhower because they, like
the general, feared that Taft’s isolationist policies and fiscal positions would be
detrimental to American interests within the context of the Cold War.89 In presenting this
argument, Bowen is accurate. Had any of the more moderate forces within the
Republican Party remained divided, Taft would have received the nomination from a
unified old right. Fragile alliances of moderate republicans were an absolute necessity in
order to ensure an Eisenhower nomination. As moderate members of the Republican
Party embraced this realization, the most competitive early candidates began to support
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Eisenhower as they exited the nomination process themselves, leaving Taft and his
supporters in the minority of the Republican Party.
In removing these three men from the discussion for the Republican nomination,
two very different potential options for the top of the Republican ticket remained, Senator
Taft and General Eisenhower. The available scholarship discusses that Eisenhower had
no partisan political experience to speak of prior to the 1952 primary, but the Dewey
faction of the Republican Party propelled him forward.90 Eisenhower had never voted in
any election and his experience in Washington was limited to the scope of his military
service. In contrast, Taft had been elected to the Senate in the 1938 mid-term elections,
when Republicans were struggling in Washington under the New Deal.91 Taft’s election
during a challenging time for the Republican Party demonstrates the support he had
within his home state of Ohio, a Midwestern Republican stronghold. Eisenhower made it
clear that he did not think politics had any place within the military service, and he often
kept his views to himself in order to ensure he never spoke views that conflicted with
military policy or image. Taft was open and clear with his positions and made
Eisenhower’s silence and lack of political experience key points in his public
statements.92 Since his arrival in the Senate, Taft made clear his opinions of what the
Republican party stood for, articulating his convictions better than many within his party,
according to conservative thinker Russell Kirk.93 While Kirk phrased Taft’s outspoken
behavior kindly, Taft primarily spoke for those Midwestern Republicans who supported
more right leaning policies and views, which alienated much of the more moderate
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segment of republican voters. These clearly stated Eastern Republicans, who made peace
with the New Deal and simply believed that Republicans would administer the programs
better than the Democrats, did often not support Taft’s views, especially considering
foreign policy and the economy.
Eisenhower’s Washington experience stood in stark contrast to Taft’s. The
general served in Washington at the request of President Truman in 1948-1949. The
Department of Defense had recently been organized as part of the post World War II
military and budget restructuring plans, with James Forrestal serving as the first Secretary
of Defense. Truman requested that Eisenhower advise Forrestal in his new role for a
period of two to three months, which was an indication of the respect that Truman held
for Eisenhower and his leadership abilities. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington
battled for a larger share of the new postwar budget, Eisenhower continued to serve in an
advisory role. After two years in Washington the budget related battles became too
frustrating for Ike, especially when considering his strong belief that politics had no place
in the military organization. He was eventually pushed to his breaking point, excusing
himself from his advisory position. As he departed, Eisenhower stated that he was
“convinced that Washington would never see him again except as an occasional
visitor.”94 General Eisenhower left Washington and exited the country yet again to return
to his role as Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, a role that he never anticipated
leaving in order to seek the presidency.
Eisenhower attempted to avoid politics as a military man, but various
representatives of both parties often courted him. As he did not vote, he did not have a
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history with either party, allowing leadership on either side of the aisle to believe they
had a chance to sway him. President Truman approached Eisenhower and attempted to
convince him to run on the Democratic ticket in 1952.95 There was not an obvious choice
for the Democratic Party nominee, and it was widely accepted, both in 1952 and in the
current scholarship, that the general credited with coordinating the Normandy invasion on
D-Day and winning the war in Europe would be nearly unbeatable. Eisenhower declined,
as he felt more comfortable with the policies of the Republicans and did not feel that he
would be suited to represent the Democratic Party. The Democrats spending and social
policies were simply too liberal for his views.96
The Republicans also recognized that the decorated general would be a difficult
candidate to defeat in the general election. In the fall of 1951, Massachusetts Senator
Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. traveled to Paris to meet with Eisenhower. Lodge, along with
other supporters of a moderate conservatism like Dewey, believed that those in charge of
the Republican Party, including Senator Taft, were not the men who would be able to
lead the nation in the direction he felt was appropriate, especially considering the global
climate where nuclear conflict caused by communist aggression was on everyone’s mind.
The Dewey segment of the Republican Party believed that a leader with diplomatic
experience who had also proven himself in times of war would be an ideal leader during
this period of uncertainty. The old right conservative positions did not appeal to the
moderate party members, nor would they persuade independent voters who did not
necessarily feel loyalty to either the Democrats or Republicans. Lodge felt that the only
person who had a chance of saving the Republican Party, which had not occupied the
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White House since Herbert Hoover had left office in 1933, was Eisenhower. Lodge
became a leader in the “Draft Eisenhower” movement and sought to convince
Eisenhower to seek the Republican nomination in 1952.
Eisenhower showed no interest in running for political office, even from the
earliest rumblings of a potential nomination. During his time in NATO, Eisenhower
stated in his personal diary on October 4, 1951, “The temptation grows to issue a short,
definite statement saying No (in almost arbitrary language) to all the arguments that seek
to convince me that I should accept (if offered) the Republican nomination for the
Presidency.”97 This diary entry was firm, but it was also very early. Eisenhower
eventually reconsidered his firm stance on the matter, but largely due to his level of
protectiveness over NATO and his ideas of international cooperation. The General had
very little interest in pursuing the nomination prior to his realization that Taft would not
support NATO. Eisenhower demonstrated his gradually changing views in a letter to his
son in May 15, 1952. He stated “I have a very tough time trying to keep my own personal
feelings and hopes from dominating all my thinking with respect to this political
business. On the personal side, I should like to see the Republicans nominate someone
else on the first ballot. On the more objective side, I can not disregard the convictions,
beliefs, and efforts of literally thousands and thousands of citizens that I admire.”98 Ike
was coming around to the idea of the Presidency but was still not enthusiastic about
leaving his position with NATO in order to campaign, as evident in sharing this
sentiment in a private letter instead of a public statement. This letter also illustrates
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Eisenhower’s concerns, as the Dewey segment of the Republican Party shared the same
internationalist beliefs that Eisenhower felt were so important. The potential of someone
else being nominated by the Republicans, and while Eisenhower would have been
supportive of the idea of a moderate republican from the Dewey faction, he was also
concerned that Taft could become the nominee, a possibility that never felt acceptable to
Eisenhower.
Eisenhower eventually stopped shrinking from political demands as he realized
that the Republican Party would not give up on this prospect of his nomination. The
General was driven by his desire to serve, but he was even more driven by his strong
focus on internationalism in order to maintain global security. Eisenhower grew to
embrace the political process as the campaign progressed. He also recognized the
likelihood of a Taft nomination if he did not agree to campaign. Holding political office
was a different form of service the country compared to Eisenhower’s lifelong career
with the Army, but his desire to maintain international cooperation was jeopardized by
Senator Taft’s views. This change in the military leader’s position because of Taft’s firm
stance on international involvement pushed him toward the nomination.
In the early months of 1951, Senator Taft claimed that he would not actively
pursue the nomination: “I don’t say I wouldn’t take the nomination if it were offered to
me, but I shall make no campaign to get it.”99 Taft’s political ambitions were immense, as
evident by the way he spoke of his opponents within the party. He was already serving in
the Senate and viewed the presidency as the next logical step in his political career. The
Senator was an intelligent man who realized that if Eisenhower were to be considered for
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the nomination, he would be incredibly difficult to defeat and worked to secure his own
support before a challenge by the General could complicate the nomination process.
Strong personal ambition was not an attractive quality in a leader during the era of
potential nuclear conflict, especially after the nation witnessed the horrors of ambitious
individuals like Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin when they rose to power in Europe. The
European leaders allowed personal feelings combined with power to corrupt their
administrations, leading to the death of many people in their respective nations. The
American electorate appeared to desire strong leaders who could stand their ground
against leaders of communist nations, but feared potential corruption within their own
government if the person they elected became too entrenched in their own ideas. Taft
shared these beliefs with much of the American population, stating in his foreign policy
works, “recent wars have not been started by poverty stricken peoples, but by prosperous
peoples, as in a Germany led by dictators.”100 He believed that poverty did not spread
communism and violence, corrupt leadership did. This statement provides an example of
the old right position that providing financial aid to struggling nations was not the best
course of action to keep communism from spreading. Allowing communists to achieve
leadership roles, much like Mao in China, fueled the spread of communism in the eyes of
the old right. Maintaining a level head and demonstrating a sense of devotion to the
American way of life were the keys to political success in the United States, ensuring that
potential candidates did not demonstrate anything resembling the level of personal
ambition held by the feared European dictators. Eisenhower’s resistance to campaigning
for the Republican nomination were clear demonstrations of those qualities, and Taft
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attempted to use the very same strategy in order to make himself more appealing to the
American electorate than if he had openly stated his political ambitions from the early
months of the campaign.
On October 16, 1951, Taft held a press conference to announce his candidacy for
President. He stated that the majority of the Republican Party “really desire me to be the
candidate of their party.”101 Taft announced his candidacy relatively early, but it was
hardly shocking, and his statement about the majority of the party depicts a sense of
confidence that remained unshaken until the Republican national convention. Taft’s clear
political ambitions overtook his statement that he would not actively seek the nomination,
realizing that he would have to make himself and his views known, especially within the
conservative wing of the party and deeply conservative states. Winning the nomination
over Eisenhower would require strategic thinking and planning by Taft and his
supporters, which meant starting to campaign early.
It took nearly three months for Senator Taft’s worst fears to be confirmed. On
January 7, 1952, General Eisenhower finally announced that he would accept the
nomination from the Republican Party if it were offered to him.102 While the General still
had no intention of actively campaigning for the nomination personally, he had a team of
people from the Dewey machine of previous election cycles behind him who would do
just that. Eisenhower did not have the same strategy as Senator Taft, and did not
demonstrate the attitude Americans had come to expect of a candidate. In a letter to
Eugene Collins Pulliam, publisher of the Indianapolis Star and News, Ike stated, “I have
no intention of dwelling upon a number of details that may be considered to have vote-
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catching appeal.”103 Eisenhower would not make public statements simply to attract
votes, but he did demonstrate throughout the campaign that he had strong options
regarding internationalism and the Korean War. As strong as his views were, and as
firmly as he believed that they were right for the nation, the General often did not
articulate his specific plans for reaching his goals. Knowing exactly where Eisenhower’s
priorities fell provided a sense of comfort to a population that was already on edge. He
knew that his best chance to win the nomination was to embrace his image as a
straightforward leader with a strong understanding of military strategy, a strategy he
could execute throughout the campaign.
While Taft was campaigning to convince voters that his old right views would
lead the nation in what he believed to be the proper direction, Eisenhower remained
focused on his military service rather than making public statements regarding his
political positions. Eisenhower was not a member of the very traditional segment of the
Republican Party and he was not interested in changing his positions in order to appeal to
their more traditionalist views. Ike was more concerned about his position with the Army
than politics, as well as any harm that his campaign may bring to the image of the
military. He requested to be placed on retired status with the Army on May 28, 1952,
before he attended the Republican National Convention.104 Retired status relieved
Eisenhower of his fear that campaigning would alter the image or perception of the
Army. However, in requesting retirement just before the Convention, he was unable to

103

Letter to Eugene Collins Pulliam, May 21, 1952, in The Papers Of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. Louis
Galambos (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 13:1234.
104
Letter to Robert Abercrombie Lovett, May 28, 1952, in The Papers Of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed.
Louis Galambos (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 13:1238.

59

personally campaign, based on his own values regarding politics and the military. He
knew that even without pushing for the nomination himself, he had a good chance of
receiving the Republican nomination and put his military obligations in order
accordingly; the Dewey machine took care of the campaigning for Eisenhower while he
was still in an active military status. Eisenhower was willing to accept the nomination if
he were selected, but he maintained his efforts to keep his military career and budding
political career separate.
Image and public perception became an important factor during the race for the
Republican nomination. In his push toward the nomination, Senator Taft began to make
his positions in line with the old right very well known to the rest of the Republican
Party, appealing to the Americans who did not support international cooperation. The
public continued to view Eisenhower as the victorious general of World War II, the man
who was able to maintain strong international ties using his position as Supreme Allied
Commander of NATO forces, all while presenting a comforting grandfather image to the
American electorate. Eisenhower had an image and reputation that he strategically
cultivated in a manner that propelled his campaign forward without as much active
campaigning as traditional politicians. This perception reached as far back as April of
1950, when a Gallup pole demonstrated that thirty seven percent of Republican voters
would favor Eisenhower if he were to seek the candidacy, compared to Taft at seventeen
percent. Additionally, thirty three percent of independent voters said they would vote for
Eisenhower if he received the Republican nomination, demonstrating a clear appeal to
voters outside the Republican Party.105 Taft knew that he had an uphill battle before him
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if he was going to engage in competition with Eisenhower for the nomination, and he had
to fight for the support of his divided party.
Historian David Oshinsky argued that in the early months of 1952, Taft made
clear his support of theatrical Senator Joseph McCarthy, believing that he would appeal
to both the right wing of the Republican Party and to working-class Democrats.106
McCarthy was a polarizing figure in American politics, often making accusations of
communism or communist infiltration within various government agencies and
departments. While some of the population in both parties appreciated McCarthy’s
attempted to ensure the security of the American government by chasing down potential
communists, others opposed his tactics, believing he went too far and was simply
destroying the reputations of those he did not agree with. It would not be long before he
would be levying the very same accusations against Democratic political opponents
throughout the 1952 campaign cycle. Olshinsky’s argument minimized Taft’s realization
that even though he sometimes felt McCarthy went too far, alienating him or his
supporters would bring an end to any of Taft’s hopes for the Republican nomination,
while fully embracing him would drive those who opposed McCarthy away from his
nomination. Taft was forced to manipulate his discussions of such a polarizing figure in
an effort to tie McCarthy’s followers and those who opposed him to his campaign, while
Taft himself was sometimes, but not always, in agreement with McCarthy. McCarthy
became a political pawn throughout the primaries and even more challenging during the
general election.
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As Taft fought to rally the Republican Party behind himself, Eisenhower
continued with his military tasks, including his leadership of NATO, demonstrating the
two potential nominees’ differing views on internationalism. Senator Taft, in opposition
to General Eisenhower, made his views as a non-interventionist known. The debate
between American involvement in foreign nations or remaining focused on domestic
security created a situation in which the two Republican nominees had distinctively
different positions. Taft did not want to see the war in Korea continue, or any conflict
involving foreign nations, but also did not want to simply withdraw American troops and
admit defeat. Eisenhower believed that a swift victory in Korea was vital, and that
international cooperation was the key to preventing similar conflicts in the future. These
differing positions became a key focus of the campaign as Americans sought to maintain
the safety and security of their nation, fighting against the threat of both communist
ideology and nuclear conflict.
The differing positions considering domestic focus and internationalism played
directly into the party divisions between Eastern and Midwestern Republicans. Taft,
desiring to focus on American interests rather than European security, opposed NATO
entirely. In 1940 he delivered a speech in the Senate opposing the extension of the
draft.107 Patterson argued that Taft’s beliefs were based largely on his fiscal position, as
the Senator denounced excessive military spending and felt that temporary deficit
financing while the defense production program was operating at a high level was
unacceptable.108 While Patterson is correct in stating conservative fiscal beliefs, it would
be misleading to believe that members of the old right would not permit deficit spending
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in times of crisis, such as WWII. Some voters believed that if the war in Korea did not
end soon, it would have the potential to escalate into a larger conflict in which greater
government spending would be necessary. Spending for the sake of peace would have
been beneficial to Taft’s campaign.
In 1951, Senator Taft published his beliefs on foreign policy; making it clear that
quality of life for the everyday American was far more important to him than the security
of rest of the world. In this work he stated that “we cannot adopt a foreign policy which
gives away all of our people’s earnings or imposes such a tremendous burden on the
individual American as, in effect, to destroy his incentive and his ability to increase
production and productivity and his standard of living.”109 In discussing incentive within
his own foreign policy documents, Taft alluded to issues of communism, and an
increased standard of living in a truly capitalistic society, the opposite of communism.
Taft did not want Americans to sacrifice their lifestyle in order to protect other nations.
Popular scholarship conveys that Taft firmly believed that it was not the duty of the
United States to spread democracy to foreign nations, primarily because he was unwilling
to extend American commitments abroad.110 This belief is further demonstrated in his
own foreign policy statements, painting the picture of views deeply rooted in the ideals of
the old right.
The conservative Midwestern segment of the Republican Party rallied behind
Taft’s opposition to extending American commitments abroad. This non-interventionist
view had deep roots among old right conservatives, and not always for fiscal purposes.
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Non-interventionist views prevented Americans from immediately becoming involved in
both World War I and World War II. In 1952 these views were exacerbated by memories
of the Great Depression as well as fears of communism and nuclear conflict, driving
Republican voters to firmly support either Taft’s non-interventionist views or
Eisenhower’s support of international cooperation. The two viewpoints were very
opposite ends of the same spectrum, and compromise was difficult to reach when
addressing international involvement.
As the disputes between the factions of the party grew more pronounced, Taft and
his supporters began pushing away the Eastern Republicans and moderates who believed
that military defense spending was an absolute necessity in a world where the Soviet
threat could become nuclear war at any moment. However, as the 1952 Republican
National Convention approached, Taft began to begrudgingly embrace some level of
international involvement. He maintained that NATO would drag the United States into a
conflict without the support of the Senate and that a large defense budget would be
harmful to the American tax base. Bowen argues that Taft began recognizing that foreign
policy and security were areas in which he struggled to draw support, and he embraced
the idea of military air defense, which required a relatively smaller budget and less troops
than more traditional national defense methods.111 Bowen’s argument that Taft was
willing to adapt and embrace some form of military security was an indication that Taft
recognized that his foreign policy views could cost him the nomination. As this was as far
toward international cooperation as Taft was willing to move, his specific ideas
surrounding NATO demonstrated his clear opposition to Eisenhower’s internationalist
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beliefs. Taft’s firm non-interventionist views became the issue that eventually cost him
the nomination.
While Taft believed that aid to Europe would do irreparable damage to the
American economy, Eisenhower finally began to make his views regarding international
support clear before the American electorate.112 The General believed strongly in the
importance to NATO. He demonstrated his support in a letter to former Secretary of the
Army Kenneth Caliborne on April 7, 1951, “I am so convinced that the safety of the free
world depends on development of sound, practical, and effective cooperation among us
all… that I do not see how any man can fail to respond to anything that has even the
appearance of a call to duty.”113 While this letter was intended for a former bureaucrat
who Eisenhower had a previous relationship with, it continued to reinforce the argument
that Ike had international cooperation at the forefront of his mind. All of his statements
discussing NATO illustrate his belief that in order to prevent conflict, various nations
would be required to work together. With the tense global situation developing alongside
the Cold War, a firm stance tied to any plan that could provide safety to the free world
appealed to Eastern Republicans, moderates, and even moderate Democrats who were
already supportive of internationalist policies. This stance could potentially swing some
Democrats to vote for a Republican nominee, particularly if that nominee were
Eisenhower. The goal of preventing nuclear conflict was shared throughout the nation,
and a candidate with a clearly expressed method to prevent that conflict was appealing to
the broader American population.
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Eisenhower so firmly believed in the importance of NATO to global security
interests that he even agreed to take himself out of the running for the nomination if Taft
would agree to support NATO and the idea of collective security. Taft refused his offer,
remaining committed to the idea that isolation was best for the nation.114 At the time of
this offer the General still felt that his work in the new international organization was not
complete, and he did not want to leave NATO until he felt the alliance was stable.
However, this offer to withdraw his name from consideration for the nomination
illustrated how committed the General was to the idea of international cooperation. He
would remain with NATO if Taft would support the organization, otherwise he would
challenge Taft in order to ensure that the United States supported international
cooperation. Eisenhower was a successful military leader with strong global ties, which
made it clear to the American electorate that an alliance like NATO was how he believed
nuclear conflict and the spread of communism could be prevented.
Eisenhower believed in global cooperation to secure the world from the nuclear
threat, but he also realized that the Soviet Union also sought to avoid war as much as the
United States. Eisenhower often communicated this belief in clear statements to those
around him, once saying that “I do not believe that the Soviets would in their own best
interests, deliberately provoke global war. I believe that war is possible; moreover I
believe that we can expect a continuance of various kinds of satellite conflicts in certain
of our sensitive areas. Consequently I feel that we should figure out our strength
objectives and push toward them steadily, but always having in mind that we should
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retain a strong and solvent economy.”115 In making this statement, the General clearly
demonstrated his view that the Soviets did not want to engage in a global conflict, but
satellite conflicts regarding ideology, such as the ongoing war in Korea, were likely to
continue. From Eisenhower’s point of view, Americans should focus internally on
growing their economy and the strength and technology of the military, but international
cooperation must be continued at the same time in order to minimize the development of
proxy wars around the globe while simultaneously bringing an end to the Korean War.
As Eisenhower began finally speaking up, making certain that the American
people knew he believed in both military strength and a strong domestic economy in
order to maintain national security, Senator Taft was battling to remove the United States
from the world stage. Taft made it clear that he did not support proxy wars like that in
Korea, or the Korean War itself, but he was even more strongly against these conflicts if
the United States was perceived to be losing. Taft supported General Douglass
MacArthur, who had proven to be a large part of the reason for American World War II
victory in the Pacific theater with his exceedingly aggressive tactics. After World War II,
as conflict developed in Korea, General MacArthur was sent to lead the American Forces
on the ground. In Korea, the strong willed General proved himself to be difficult to
control; President Truman was eventually forced to bring MacArthur home.116 Senator
Taft was a part of the group of congressmen who entertained the idea of impeaching
President Truman after he fired General MacArthur.117 Taft’s support for impeachment
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demonstrated his desire to ensure that if Americans were involved in military conflict, it
would be a conflict they were sure to win, and he viewed MacArthur as a winner.
MacArthur’s reputation overshadowed his rogue tactics in Korea and Taft was not going
to stand by and watch him be removed from the battlefield.
In further demonstration of his non-interventionist tendencies, Green argued that
Senator Taft believed that the President had no right to commit troops to any foreign
nation without a formal declaration of war from Congress, a common old right view.118 In
considering this strong stance regarding when the military could be used, Green clearly
illustrated a division placed before the Republican electorate. Green presents the obvious
choice, Republicans had to choose between a commander in chief who would not deploy
forces without first working through the bureaucracy of Congress or a military general
who understood the functions of the Army better than most of the American leadership,
had strong NATO ties, but may act without first seeking Congressional approval. In a
period of potential global conflict, this distinction was glaring. If nuclear war were to
become a reality, a quick thinking military leader in the White House could appeal to the
American electorate in a much more favorable manner than a leader who would likely
find himself tied up in bureaucracy.
Moving beyond the distinct differences in global security, domestic policies were
a key concern of the American population. In the arena of domestic policy, Taft had the
opportunity to separate himself from Eisenhower, as Ike had the clear support of the
population due to his military service. The Senator realized that he would have to win
over the white southern voters if he wanted to win the 1952 Presidential election,
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something Republicans had not managed to accomplish in previous elections, and he
began campaigning in the South before the primaries ever took place.
Patterson argues that Taft demonstrated strong views in support of limited federal
interference in individual states, an argument that he was strongly able to support in
examining Taft’s Congressional actions. He denounced a strong Fair Employment
Practices Commission and opposed federal action against racial segregation in primary
schools.119 In an era that was not only driven by fear of the Cold War but also by white
concerns about the growing Civil Rights Movement, Taft’s stance appealed to the white
southern voters who often associated civil rights with communism. His position
supporting limited federal intervention bolstered his support among white southerners,
where the white population wanted to be sure that African Americans were kept in a
subordinate status.
The Ohio Senator’s support in the white South came largely from his agreement
with “separate but equal” policies. He stated that Republicans “have a very difficult
problem with the Negro vote” and that the party should “fundamentally oppose excessive
government regulation and excessive federal interference with states.”120 Demonstrating a
very traditional old right Republican view, Taft made it clear that limited federal
government should not only apply to American aid in Europe, but also at home.
Eisenhower had not yet made his views regarding the developing Civil Rights Movement
known, which provided Taft with the opportunity to win over support from the southern
states where maintaining segregation was potentially as important to the white population
than international cooperation and security. The Civil Rights Movement increased the
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fear of communist ideology, especially with considering the leaders within the
movement. Civil Rights historian Mary Dudziak argued that if any African American
spoke up against any form of American policy, they were branded a communist, a
common challenge for any American who promoted ideas outside of the mainstream.121
While many civil rights leaders were members of the communist party, there was not a
clear racial line that tied African American leaders to the communist party. Open
opposition to those activists who were potentially communists could sway voters toward
Taft both in the primaries and the general election.
Despite Senator Taft’s best efforts, the first of the thirteen states to hold primary
elections did not bode well for him. The New Hampshire Primary demonstrated that Taft
was more popular with party leadership than he was amongst the Republican voters of the
general population. General Eisenhower took fifty percent of the vote in New Hampshire,
while Senator Taft only received thirty eight percent. The low vote totals that Taft
received were not for his lack of effort. In addition to campaigning for himself, Taft
enlisted many prominent conservatives, including Douglas MacArthur, Herbert Hoover,
Joe McCarthy, and Joe Martin to advocate for him.122 While Oshinsky presents this
coalition of strong old right leaders, he does not mention that these men clearly did not
depict the desires of the majority of the American electorate, as evident by Eisenhower’s
victory.
The collection of individuals supporting Taft represented a strong sense of duty to
county, anti communist beliefs, and a far right conservative ideology, but they were not
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enough to capture the votes Taft needed. McArthur was polarizing, because despite his
reputation during WWII, his removal from Korea had left people questioning his methods
and tactics. Herbert Hoover was the Republican President under which the stock market
crashed and the Great Depression began, and memories of the Depression had the
potential to make him radioactive to any campaign; Americans were not quick to forget
the dire situation that they faced before the onset of WWII. Joseph McCarthy and his
anti-communist crusades, while appreciated by one segment of the American population,
alienated others. Joe Martin led a conservative coalition in the House of Representatives,
pushing away moderate Eastern Republicans. Beyond these four men, Taft did not excel
at bringing in strong individuals to be part of his campaign staff. Additionally, Taft failed
to recruit some of the more progressive eastern Republicans, which meant that he did not
do much to prevent these individuals from backing Eisenhower.123 Taft appealed to his
extreme conservative end of the Republican Party, as well as conservative southern
Democrats, but not to the electorate as a whole, and the primary numbers demonstrate
that he did not appeal to the majority of the Republican voters. This lack of appeal to
moderates proved to be his downfall.
By the time of the New Hampshire primary, General Eisenhower had not
campaigned heavily for himself or made much effort to be a part of the race.124 Available
scholarship explains that the Dewey machine handled the campaigning on behalf of
Eisenhower before his military retirement, and this explanation defines the only probable
reason why Eisenhower found success in the nomination process. In the wake of the New
Hampshire primary, Eisenhower realized that a large portion of the American electorate
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had the desire to see him campaign for the White House. He began to transition from his
role of military leadership to one of a presidential hopeful. The New Hampshire primary
proved to be the spark that began the campaign of Dwight D. Eisenhower for President in
1952. The Republicans did not want a nominee who struggled to appeal to moderates,
which was the scholarship suggests was the very definition of Senator Taft. They sought
a candidate with an established reputation of strong leadership, and that quality was only
enhanced with a smile and perceived image of a happy grandfather like the one presented
by Eisenhower. The divided party spoke at the very first primary, when Eisenhower
emerged victorious in New Hampshire without even being in the country. The
nomination was yet to come, but this primary proved to be the catalyst that pushed
Eisenhower to begin campaigning for himself. The Republican voters in New Hampshire
had selected the general, and Eisenhower believed that the rest of the nation shared their
beliefs.
From the time of the New Hampshire primary until the Republican National
Convention met in Chicago, Eisenhower officially settled into retired status with the
Army. Retirement permitted Eisenhower to transfer his focus to receiving the
nomination, although he still resisted the idea of campaigning. Eisenhower no longer
objected to the idea of running for office following his New Hampshire victory, because
he believed that he could win. Taft and his team had believed that they had an
opportunity to win the New Hampshire primary, only to suffer a disappointing defeat at
the hands of Eisenhower, a candidate who did not even campaign for himself.125 While
encouraging the General to join the campaign, the New Hampshire primary also planted
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the seeds of concern in the Taft camp. Eisenhower earned the first fourteen delegates that
were up for grabs in the nomination process.126 This single victory illustrates both the
early views of a segment of the American electorate as well as the encouragement needed
Eisenhower to pursue the White House.
Even with the encouragement of the New Hampshire Primary, along with taking
second place in the Minnesota Primary as a write in candidate, Eisenhower did not return
to the United States immediately. As the primaries began to swing in Taft’s favor,
especially in Wisconsin and Illinois, Eisenhower’s team began to push him to return
home. The Dewey machine was concerned that without campaigning, the General would
enter the Republican National Convention in a significant deficit in delegates. Upon
requesting to be placed on inactive status with the Army until the Republican National
Convention and an announcement of an estimated return to the United States, the
Eisenhower wave began to crest again in the primaries. New Jersey was the first primary
after the announcement, and the General captured thirty-one of the thirty-eight delegates
from the Garden State.127 This reaction to the promise of Eisenhower’s return home
demonstrated how quickly voters rallied to support him, ripping potential delegates away
from Taft.
When all was said and done, all of the Republican primary votes had been
counted, and the delegates at the Republican National Convention were seated,
Eisenhower defeated Taft in the race for the Republican Presidential Nomination in 1952.
While Eisenhower’s supporters were naturally thrilled, and a large segment of the
Republican Party held fast to the realization that Eisenhower was their best chance to win
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the general election, Taft’s supporters were livid. Many felt that the liberals were taking
over the Republican Party, removing the far right Midwestern Republicans from control
of the party.128 In this era of a divided party, the more moderate Eastern Republicans, and
their candidate, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, had won.
The moderate faction of the Republican Party began to redefine the image of the
right, a vitally important task after the perceived failure of their last President, Herbert
Hoover. Conservative ideals and the Republican Party had to be redefined if Republicans
wanted to retake the White House after nearly two decades. General Eisenhower, with his
strong military background and positive public image, was that leader. The Republican
Party finally had the opportunity to redefine itself, to start anew, especially since there
was no clear nominee for the Democratic Party to replace the unpopular Truman. Both
the Democrats and the Republicans had attempted to court Eisenhower, and at the end of
the day the Republicans gained the advantage of his strong leadership and support for
international cooperation. Eisenhower would be the Republican nominee for President in
1952. The next challenge would not arise until the Democrats selected their candidate
later in July of 1952, which will be examined in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Who Will Replace President Truman?
After the Republican Nation Convention nominated General Eisenhower, the
Democrats found themselves in a bind. Eisenhower was easily the strongest candidate
that the Republicans could have nominated, and he had strong poll numbers throughout
the nation to prove that. President Truman’s preferred candidate, Illinois Governor Adlai
Stevenson, had already indicated that he did not want the Democratic nomination. The
South had been a reliably Democratic stronghold, but the early portion of the Dixiecrat
revolt had begun, in which some Democrats changed the affiliation to the Republican
Party, had weakened the Democratic hold over the South. A nominee from the north had
to potential to continue alienating the Southern Democrats, costing the Party votes, while
a Democratic nominee from the South would be a gamble for Northern voters. Many
Southern Democrats opposed the Fair Employment Act and bringing an end to
segregation, while Northern Democrats generally supported these ideas. The Democratic
Party faced a difficult decision.
In late July 1952, the Democrats met in Chicago to determine their own nominee
for the general election. As the governor of the host state, Adlai Stevenson II delivered
the welcome address to his party, but he had already indicated that he would run for
reelection as governor, and not for the presidency. Stevenson’s public addresses repeated
his statement that he had not completed his work as governor in a single term, and he was
very outspoken in stating that he was not interested in being considered for the
Democratic nomination, something that he and Eisenhower had in common. The
leadership of Stevenson’s party would not accept this response, much like the Dewey
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segment of the Republican Party would not accept the reluctance of Eisenhower. They
pushed for Stevenson to submit his name for consideration. Much like General
Eisenhower and the Republican Party, Stevenson was pushed toward running without the
initial genuine ambition to run himself, eventually finding himself at the top of the
Democratic Party ticket. Stevenson accepted the nomination upon realizing that his party
lacked a logical alternative candidate who had national appeal, and that was a similar
situation to the one Republicans encountered as they decided between Eisenhower and
Taft.
Stevenson did have to endure the process of multiple votes in order to receive the
nomination, but he did not experience nearly the same level of competition or hostility
that took place between Eisenhower and Taft throughout the Republican National
Convention. His biggest competition, as illustrated by very early poll numbers, came
from Democratic Senator Estes Kefauver, who had served in both the House and the
Senate prior to seeking the Democratic Presidential nomination. Kefauver was best
known for his very public investigation of organized crime, one that linked prominent
gangsters to the Democratic city machines.129 Initially, Kefauver received more votes at
the Democratic National Convention than other nominees, but as other candidates
removed themselves from the running their delegates often moved to support Stevenson
due to Kefauver’s polarizing reputation.
Estes Kefauver was a forty-eight year old junior senator from Tennessee who
became a household name because of his campaign against crime and the broadcasting of
his criminal hearings on television. Prior to serving in the Senate, he had served in the
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House of Representatives for ten years; the people of Tennessee elected him to the Senate
in 1948. Because Kefauver linked gangsters to Democratic Party machines, many
powerful men in the party opposed his nomination. The opposition among leadership
eventually led to his defeat that the Democratic National Convention, largely because
without Party support Kefauver struggled to gain delegate votes.130 The lack of support
from Party leadership indicated a view that if Kefauver was not going to protect
prominent party leadership from prosecution, that same leadership did not believe that he
would have the best interest of the party in mind. Painting members of his own party as
criminals could easily be interpreted as a driving factor in alienating Kefauver from a
large portion of the Democratic Party, making him a polarizing figure that stood very
little chance of receiving national support. Personal morality was never to be held above
Party interests, especially if Party members were brought down in the process.
Kefauver biographer Charles Fontenay describes the television coverage of
Kefauver’s hearings as unprecedented, propelling him to greater public recognition than
many other candidates among the American population.131 Fontenay does not downplay
the early importance of television, and this coverage was the first of a campaign that
would rely heavily on television as the election drew closer. Kefauver’s supporters felt
that he was the best chance the Democrats had to defeat Eisenhower’s glamorous
reputation if he were to receive the Republican nomination because of his criminal
investigation and television coverage.132 Kefauver’s national recognition, presenting
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himself as a politician who battled corruption domestically, was not as extensive as
Eisenhower’s, but his television coverage made him the most widely recognized
Democrat pursuing the nomination. Both of Eisenhower and Kefauver had found national
prominence that led to electoral support on their own terms, and that recognition placed
Kefauver as the early frontrunner for the Democratic nomination.
Kefauver faced multiple other opponents from within the Democratic Party. Vice
President Alben W. Barkley briefly pursued the nomination, as well as liberal Minnesota
Senator Hubert Humphrey, Oklahoma oil tycoon Robert S. Kerr, Alabama Senator and
future Vice Presidential nominee John J. Sparkman, and Georgia Senator Richard Russell
Jr. Russell and Stevenson would prove to be the downfall of Kefauver, while the other
men were merely distractions until the time President Truman announced that he would
not be seeking re-election.
Vice-President Alben W. Barkley served during Truman’s second term and was
oldest man to ever occupy the office of Vice President. Truman threw his support behind
Barkley when he gave up on recruiting Stevenson, believing that Barkley could unify the
fractured Party following the Dixiecrat revolt.133 Northern and Southern Democrats
varied in priorities, a division largely defined by segregation and the Civil Rights
Movement in the South. Prior to holding the office of Vice President, Barkley served as
the House Majority Leader during the New Deal. In 1950, Barkley campaigned on behalf
of Democrats in the midterm elections, stepping up to help the Party while Truman was
preoccupied with the Korean War and demonstrated his ability to speak up on behalf of
his party. Popular scholarship presents the concern that by 1952, the Vice President was
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viewed as too old to seek the nomination at 74 years old.134 No party had ever put
forward a man of his age, and he was suffering from failing eyesight but attempted to
hide it. In addition to his advanced age, Barkley was the distant cousin of Adlai
Stevenson, who was seen as his biggest competition for the Democratic nomination, even
though Stevenson expressed no interest in becoming the Democratic nominee.135 While
Barkley’s age was a factor in his eventual withdraw from the campaign, he also faced an
insurmountable challenge in his clear ties to President Truman. Truman’s unpopularity
would have followed Barkley into the general election, likely leading to his defeat.
President Truman told Barkley at the Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner on March 28,
1952, that he would not seek reelection, in front of a crowd of people at a volume that no
one could hear. After this announcement, Barkley was forced to make a quick decision
and stated that he was available to run for office in 1952, while not actively pursuing a
nomination. “While I am not a candidate in the sense that I am actively seeking the
nomination, I have never dodged a responsibility, shirked a duty, or ignored an
opportunity to serve the American people. Therefore, if the forthcoming Chicago
convention should choose me to lead the fight in the approaching campaign, I would
accept.”136 Barkley is historically presented as subscribing to the same school of thought
of Eisenhower and Stevenson; political office was not something to pursue, but any of
these men would serve if the public called them to. While this perception of Barkley can
be accepted with some level of truth, Barkley was a career politician. He did not
campaign for himself because, at his age, it was not the ideal time to actively pursue
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higher office. He was reaching the end of his career. Vice President Barkley would not go
on to seek any political office after 1952, although he was not opposed to being
nominated for any elected office. While very experienced, his age and failing eyesight
were key factors in his gradual withdraw from public service.
The Democratic Party leadership believed that Barkley could appeal to both the
North and the South, but labor bosses blocked his nomination, fearing that Barkley was
too old and that the big business forces would back him, securing too much influence
within the party.137 Labor bosses maintained a secure hold over the Democratic Party in
1952, allowing them to influence which nominee would ultimately occupy the top of the
ticket. The party was already fractured, with Southern Democrats concerned about the
Civil Rights movement while organized labor bosses were more concerned about big
business owners finding support amongst the Democrats and hindering their bargaining
power. In addition to general divisions between North and South, business owners and
labor bosses, struggling individuals in both rural and urban areas were concerned about
the continuation of the New Deal programs that were keeping their families financially
afloat.
Barkley biographer Libbey argues that early in the nomination process Barkley
and his supporters strategized that by allowing Kefauver, a New Deal program supporter,
and Russell, a big business supporter, to knock each other out of the nomination process,
and the door would be open for Barkley to step into the nomination.138 This plan did
eventually knock both Kefauver and Russell out of the nomination process, but Barkley
had already withdrawn his name from consideration by that point. On July 21, 1952 after
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organized labor spoke out against him, the Vice-President withdrew from the nomination
process. Barkley told the voters, “If by taking myself out of this race, I have contributed
to the progress of the Democratic Party and the future welfare of the United States, and,
thereby, have rendered a service to my country, then I am most happy.”139 In his
withdraw address, Barkley expressed his desire for a nominee who would be able to
defeat Eisenhower and unify the Democratic Party as a whole. If he was not the person to
do that, he was happy to step aside.
Organized labor did not only fear the nomination of Vice-President Barkley, they
also viewed Oklahoma Senator Robert S. Kerr as a potential threat to their interests. Kerr
was the first native born governor of Oklahoma and went on to be elected to the United
States Senate. In 1952, Kerr was a junior senator from Oklahoma and a millionaire
partner of an oil firm, Kerr-McGee. He wore a button for his company in the Senate, and
often voted to further the interests of his company.140 This open demonstration of his
company ties can be interpreted as a presentation of where his loyalty was focused. The
organized labor faction of the Democratic Party was certainly uncomfortable with the
idea of his nomination. Kerr, however, promised to withdraw if Truman decided to run,
and announced his candidacy in March of 1952 after Truman withdrew and not long after
Vice-President Barkley announced that he would accept the nomination if the Party
selected him. Newspaper articles leading up to the Democratic National Convention
indicated that Truman had not given any public support to Kerr,141 although Kerr
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supported most of Truman’s foreign and domestic policies.142 Kerr found his downfall in
putting the interests of Oklahoma first, neglecting high visibility issues like anticommunism and Civil Rights. His strong focus on his home state and his own business
hindered Kerr’s appeal among Democrats outside of his home region.
While organized labor feared the nomination of both Barkley and Kerr, there were
two even less competitive Democrats considered in the early months of the nomination
process. These men were Minnesota Senator Hubert Humphrey and Alabama Democrat
John J. Sparkman. Humphrey ran in the Minnesota Democratic primary in 1952. He was
Minnesota’s favorite son and he was seeking to take delegates away from Kefauver, the
only initial challenger of President Truman. Humphrey biographer Sheldon Engelmayer
explains that Humphrey supported Truman’s ideas and policies; he was not seeking the
nomination for himself.143 After emerging victorious in the Minnesota Primary,
Humphrey still did not view himself as a legitimate contender for the nomination, he
simply ran as a stand-in for President Truman in Minnesota because he did not support
the idea of Kefauver challenging him. Humphrey’s sole goal in running was to keep
Kefauver from winning Minnesota’s delegates. After Truman removed himself from the
nomination process, Humphrey was not sure which candidate he would support, but he
even made it clear to newspaper reporters that he did not believe that he was in a position
to win the nomination for himself.144 Humphrey clearly recognized that he was too liberal
to appeal to a national audience, in addition to his general support of President Truman
hindering his public support.
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Humphrey biographer Sheldon Engelmayer argues that Humphrey was loyal to
his party. For his brief period as a candidate for the nomination, Humphrey stated that he
would “remain faithful to a Democratic Party political platform committed to the foreign
policy of the administration and a domestic program of parity and progress for
agriculture, full and equal civil rights for all, public power… , development and
conservation of our natural resources, free and collective bargaining and defense
mobilization.”145 Humphrey’s statements demonstrated that he never believed that he was
a legitimate contender for the Democratic nomination, but this particular statement
conveyed his feelings of uncertainty as to which candidate would align with his views
and positions. Direct association with the Truman administration would not benefit any
candidate due to Truman’s level of unpopularity, and Humphrey supported their policies,
associating him with a failing administration. Humphrey’s press coverage demonstrated
that he was the most liberal of the potential democratic nominees as he fought for Civil
Rights and equal opportunity for all Americans.146
In contrast to Humphrey’s liberal views stood Alabama Senator John J.
Sparkman. A Southern Democrat, Sparkman served in both the House and the Senate
before becoming Adlai Stevenson’s running mate in 1952.147 Sparkman aligned himself
with Republican Senators in opposition to Truman’s defense plans, believing that his plan
would increase inflation. This single position made it impossible for him to receive the
Democratic nomination, as those who were more liberal would never support Sparkman’s
alignment with Republicans on any issue. He also alienated those who were still loyal to
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President Truman, like Hubert Humphrey, after Sparkman demonstrated that he would
vote with Republicans if their views were more suited to his own. His ventures across the
aisle painted an image of a Democrat who could potentially join the Dixiecrats that
revolted against the Party. Sparkman’s moderate stance worked to his benefit when it
came time to balance the ticket, as he was chosen as Stevenson’s running-mate the day
after the convention.148
With the men who were not supported by large segments of the Party eliminated
from contention, the Democrats were left to decide between Senator Kefauver and his
biggest rival, Richard Russell Jr., as Governor Stevenson continued to resist the
nomination. Stevenson remained committed to his re-election as Governor of Illinois.
Truman promised his support to Stevenson, although Stevenson continued to show no
interest in the White House.149 Stevenson repeatedly stated, “I want to run for governor of
Illinois – and that is all. And I want to be re-elected Governor – and that is all. And I
want to finish some work we have under way here in Illinois – and that is all.”150 This
particular statement was made the very same day that President Truman announced that
he would not seek reelection, further reinforcing Stevenson’s position of remaining in
Illinois and not making the move to Washington. Remaining governor was a desire that
Stevenson expressed in many public addresses prior to the Democratic National
Convention, making it clear that he felt loyal to his state government and was not ready
to move onto a national stage.
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Stevenson’s political experience was not strictly reserved to Illinois. He had a
variety of experience working with Washington officials during the FDR administration,
but he never held elected office prior to 1948. The variety of offices that Stevenson
worked for allowed him to claim a portion of credit for New Deal programs, developing
credibility within the national Democratic Party. He had also served as Assistant
Secretary of the Navy and Assistant Secretary of State, adding experience in foreign and
military affairs to his resume. These positions provided Stevenson with experience in
international cooperation that he was able to emphasize throughout his campaign in the
general election. Like Kefauver, Stevenson had a reputation for cleaning up political
corruption in Illinois, of being a reformer, and was known for his ability to work
effectively with Party leadership.151 Unlike Kefauver, Stevenson did not televise his
cleanup within state government, preventing the level of resistance that faced Kefauver
from impacting the Stevenson nomination.
Stevenson was well aware of the “Draft Stevenson” movement to nominate him.
He acknowledged that he would accept a nomination if he were drafted, but also begged
the Party not to recruit him.152 His resistance to being drafted was made clear in all of
Stevenson’s public addresses stating that he wanted to remain in his position as
Governor.
Prior to the kick off of the Republican nomination process, Stevenson hoped that
General Eisenhower would run as the Democratic nominee. In a private letter to Alicia
Patterson, Stevenson indicated that he would like to see Eisenhower as the Democratic
nominee and that he believed Ike could defeat Taft in a general election, if Taft were at

151
152

Bernstein, “Election of 1952,” 3236.
Bernstein, “Election of 1952,” 3238.

85

the top of the Republican ticket.153 This letter demonstrated that Stevenson did not
support Taft, but he could see himself backing Eisenhower in a general election. This
letter also provides evidence that Stevenson believed Eisenhower would emerge
victorious in the general election, and supports the fact that Stevenson did not desire to
seek the presidency for himself.
As clear as Stevenson made himself in stating that he wanted to remain in his
position as Governor, national political pressure still found him as early as 1951. On
September 26, 1951, University of Hawaii President Gregg M. Sinclair wrote to
Stevenson stating that he would like to see Stevenson follow in the footsteps of his
grandfather and become Vice President. Truman had not yet removed himself from the
1952 election; there were already rumbles that Stevenson would be considered for
Truman’s running mate if he did decide to run again. Stevenson wrote a letter in response
stating that Sinclair’s “proposals did not coincide with either the realities here of my own
ambitions. I have found Illinois about as much as I can handle, and then some!”154
Stevenson’s repeated statements that he was best suited to be Governor of Illinois paint a
clear argument that he did not have any desire to enter the national political arena.
National pressure continued to be placed on Stevenson into 1952. On Jan 28,
1952, Time Magazine published an editorial story about a secretive conference between
Stevenson and Truman, seeking to draw Stevenson into the spotlight as either Truman’s
vice presidential candidate or even to become to presidential nominee himself. The
magazine speculated if Truman was actively attempting to recruit Stevenson to run as his
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vice presidential candidate or if Truman was asking Stevenson to run on the Democratic
ticket as he stepped aside. The article concluded with a clear statement supporting
Stevenson, writing that, “in a cold season for the Democrats, Adlai Stevenson is
politically hot, and Harry Truman feels the need for a little warmth.”155 Time magazine,
along with other forms of media, were pushing Stevenson toward the national political
arena, regardless of if he wanted to enter national politics of not, especially to aid Truman
as his popularity fell. The Illinois Governor was becoming the only hope for the
Democratic Party, although Kefauver and Russell attempted to derail the Stevenson
movement.
When Truman announced that he would not seek re-election, reporters mobbed
Stevenson to see if he would be the candidate Truman supported. Stevenson repeatedly
emphasized in public statements that he wanted to remain Governor of Illinois. When
asked if he would consider becoming a candidate, Stevenson responded “I’ll cross that
bridge when I come to it.”156 This statement further fueled the “draft Stevenson”
movement, and hindered Stevenson’s own stance against running in the presidential
election because he did not explicitly say that he would not accept the nomination.
Stevenson fought against his potential nomination by the Democrats, but
Kefauver and Russell continued to push their way forward. Their relationships with
President Truman varied. Kefauver did not openly oppose Truman, and he generally
supported most of Truman’s programs. Any indication that Kefauver may seek the
Presidency could have been viewed as a personal challenge, so the Kefauver primary
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campaign had to be handled very carefully. Truman was irritated with Kefauver because
he could not keep the Democratic Party out of the organized crime investigations.157
Despite Truman’s irritation with him, Kefauver had a personal meeting the Truman on
January 15, 1952. At this meeting, Kefauver informed the sitting president that he would
like to run, but only if Truman was not seeking reelection. This discussion illustrated
Kefauver’s party loyalty, even though party leadership did not support his investigations.
Truman admitted that he was undecided on seeking re-election, and Kefauver informed
him that he intended to run as a “good Democrat,” and hoped that Truman would not take
his campaign personally.158 This conversation demonstrated that Kefauver had national
political ambitions but he did not want to undermine his own party in order to achieve his
personal goals.
Kefauver never campaigned against Truman personally, but he did offer his
alternative views on how to handle the conflict in Korea and how be believed that
corruption in government needed to be addressed.159 Kefauver wanted the UN to set
terms for a truce in Korea, giving the communists a deadline to come to an agreement,
and invade Manchuria if they did not comply.160 This stance demonstrates Kefauver’s
dedication to international cooperation, much like both Eisenhower and Stevenson, but he
was more aggressive in defeating communists in his threats to invade Manchuria. This
aggressive position helped to build Kefauver’s popularity among the American electorate
because, even if they did not believe that this idea was the correct course of action, at
least Kefauver had a plan to do something to resolve the stalemate. The Truman
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administration had yet to offer a solution to the problems facing American troops in
Korea.
In contrast to Kefauver’s attempts to run without personally offending President
Truman, newspaper reports from 1952 presented Georgia Senator Richard Russell Jr. as a
candidate who was primarily encouraged to run by anti-Truman southerners who sought
to keep Truman from being re-elected.161 White Southern Democrats generally opposed
Truman because of his efforts to end segregation, beginning with the military, while
Dixiecrats sought to preserve their segregated way of life, leading the Southern press to
promote a Democratic nominee from their region. Russell had served as Georgia
Governor before being elected to the Senate. Russell biographer Gilbert Fite presented
the Georgia Senator as not interested in running for President, much like Eisenhower,
Stevenson, and even Vice-President Barkley. Russell believed that he could better serve
the South from the Senate and that even if he received the Democratic nomination it was
not the right time for a southern Democrat to win the White House, largely due to the
varying opinions related to Civil Rights in the North and South. The Georgia Senator
predicted that Eisenhower would win regardless of which party placed him at the top of
the ticket, which was proving to be a common view amongst all potential candidates.
Despite Russell’s reluctance, on January 30, 1952, the Georgia House of Representatives
unanimously passed a resolution urging him to seek the Democratic nomination.162
Russell pursued the nomination primarily because Southern Democrats pushed him
forward, but knew that the national party viewed him as uncompetitive because of his ties
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to the Deep South.163 Because Russell supported segregation he became a candidate who
alienated Democratic voters in the North, but carried strong appeal to voters in the South.
Historians acknowledge that Russell opposed many liberal positions. He was an
archenemy of the Fair-Deal, one of the most powerful men in the Senate as head of the
Southern Caucus, and chairman of the Armed Services Committee. He maintained a
connection to the Republican Party as he blocked Truman’s domestic programs and
reform policies, putting him into the same moderate category as Senator Sparkman.164
His willingness to work across the aisle with Republicans created a situation in which
both potential nominees were not always viewed as loyal to the Democratic Party. The
fact that they were Southern Democrats made these compromises even more problematic;
Democrats had witnessed the Dixiecrat revolt in recent years and did not want to
nominate potential candidates who may convert to the Republican Party like many of
their southern cohorts.
While Russell worked to block many of Truman’s policies, he did generally agree
with the Truman administration’s foreign policy, but would have modified their tactics.
He believed that the U.S. should be providing less military and economic aid to free
nations resisting communism, but he did support strategies of resistance and containment.
He sought “new methods” to end the Korean War, but never specified what those
methods might be. It was not until February 28, 1952, that Russell formally announced
his candidacy for the Democratic nomination. He called himself a “Jeffersonian
Democrat,” emphasizing local and states rights over federal authority. This focus on
states rights allowed him to avoid openly mentioning Civil Rights in the nomination
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process. However, his voting record against the Fair Employment Practices Commission
and similar legislation found itself quickly picked up by reporters, who made his views
on Civil Rights openly known to the entire Party, as well as the electorate.165 Northern
Democrats who supported Civil Rights legislation hesitated to support a candidate who
permitted states to make their own decisions, believing that Russell would likely hinder
progress toward Civil Rights.
With the exception of his views on Civil Rights, Russell was more in line with
mainstream Democrats than many other Democrats from the South.166 Russell worked
hard to keep his positions on Civil Rights to himself, but his voting record illustrated his
views for him, ultimately costing him the 1952 nomination. He remained loyal to the
Democrats after the Dixiecrat revolt in 1948, but his candidacy was little more than a
ploy to gain leverage with the party for southern interests.167 Russell fought the image of
being entirely focused on southern interests throughout his campaign, telling various
reporters that he had the best interests of all Americans at heart, and although he believed
that the south had some issues that were misunderstood by the rest of the country. Much
like Kerr’s focus on Oklahoma’s interests, Russell was perceived nationally as being
focused solely on Southern interests, upsetting Northern Democrats. Civil Rights
continued to play a key role in a region still wounded by the Dixiecrat revolt,
undermining Russell at practically every turn. Fite described Russell’s potential
nomination as an issue for labor and minority groups to overcome, not a viable candidate
for the Party nomination, and he was unable to overcome that image to win the
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Democratic Primary.168 In that sense, Fite was correct; Russell’s southern appeal worked
against him all the way through the Democratic National Convention, but because he had
such strong support in his home region, he did not withdraw.
As Russell worked to eliminate the impact of Civil Rights and the labor
leadership’s efforts to derail his campaign, Estes Kefauver was busy entering various
primary races across the nation. He managed to defeat President Truman in the New
Hampshire Primary, winning 19,800 votes to Truman’s 15,927. This primary loss was the
initial push that ultimately led to Truman withdraw from the race, and it confirmed his
unpopularity in an election rather than a pre-election poll.169 1952 newspapers believed
that Kefauver would emerge victorious in the Wisconsin primary. Truman withdrew
himself from consideration shortly before the primary took place, leaving the door wide
open for Kefauver to maintain a stronghold over those delegates, as reported in 1952
newspaper coverage.170 This early coverage was accurate and Kefauver emerged
victorious in many of the primaries, even winning in Adlai Stevenson’s home state of
Illinois. Stevenson still would not commit to run but many simply wrote him in for the
nomination, resulting in a Kefauver victory with 526,301 votes while Stevenson won
54,336 write in votes.171 Stevenson’s numbers were substantial for a write in candidate
who indicated that he did not want to run, but Kefauver was emerging as the next
presidential nominee for the Democratic Party, while Russell struggled to remain
competitive throughout the nomination process.
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While Kefauver gained stream within the electorate, Stevenson’s resolve began to
crumble. In a letter to Charles S. Murphy, Special Council to President Truman,
Stevenson wrote that if, under extraordinary circumstances, he were to run for President,
he believed that “I think the inconsistency and insincerity of my candidacy for Governor
would be quickly apparent,” demonstrating both a shift in Stevenson’s dedication from
the position of Governor and into a that of a potential presidential nominee.172 Stevenson
recognized that he would need to withdraw from the race for Governor if he were to
pursue the Presidency, or risk appearing insincere in running for both offices.
Stevenson’s repeated statements of his devotion to Illinois demonstrated that he clearly
did not want to withdraw from the race for Governor. In the same letter, Stevenson stated
that if Truman did not run and could not come up with a suitable alternative, he would
accept the nomination, but likened himself to Ike in saying “I will reach a prompt
decision if he wants me, but a la Eisenhower, I can’t sincerely and consistently go out and
campaign for the nomination.”173 This statement made Stevenson’s view, as well as the
public perception of the Eisenhower campaign, abundantly clear; neither man showed
any interest in seeking their Party’s nomination, but if it were given to them they would
pursue the Presidency with every ounce of effort they could muster. Just as Eisenhower
was happy and satisfied in his NATO post, Stevenson was content to remain Governor of
Illinois and did not want to compromise his dedication to his state with a run for the
presidential nomination.
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The Illinois Governor did not support the “draft Stevenson” movement. At a press
conference in Houston, during the annual Conference of State Governors on June 30,
1952, he made his opposition to this movement clear. “I have not participated, nor will I
participate, overtly or covertly, in any movement to draft me. Without such participation
on my part, I do not believe that any such draft can or will develop. In the unlikely event
that it does, I will decide what to do at that time in light of the conditions then
existing.”174 Stevenson was not openly stating that he would not accept the nomination at
his press conference, but he did tell voters that he had no desire to be considered. What
the rest of the Democratic Party felt about the situation would be left to their discretion,
Stevenson did not see himself as the future President of the United States. His public
statements were intended to tell not only the Democratic Party leadership, but also the
American voters, that he wanted to remain in state government.
Stevenson’s indifference to his own nomination continued through the opening of
the Democratic national convention on July 21, 1952. As the Governor of home state of
the Democratic National Convention, Stevenson delivered the welcome address. To his
surprise, this address drew even more Democrats to him and added fuel to the fire for
drafting him. Stevenson entered the convention without having declared himself a
nominee, but he had the support of sitting President Truman, the Democratic Party
leaders, and organized labor.175 Stevenson continued to resist into the convention, and it
was not until July 24th, the third day of the convention, when he finally decided to
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become a candidate. Truman returned his public support to Stevenson immediately,
indicating that he was clearly Truman’s first choice for the nomination.176
Stevenson’s official declaration threw the Democratic National Convention into a
whirlwind of a nomination process, all in the Governor’s favor. Estes Kefauver won more
votes than anyone else on the initial ballot, but without the majority he did not secure the
nomination. This left the door open for delegates to begin to shift their support, much as
they had during the Republican Primary earlier in the same month. Kefauver’s
antagonism of party leadership, tied to the very issue that put his face all over American
televisions, built him public recognition, and helped him to victory in many state primary
elections was exactly the issue that undermined him when the convention arrived.177
Senator Russell met a similar fate to that of Kefauver. He was competitive on the
first ballot, receiving only five fewer votes than Stevenson and 72 fewer than Kefauver,
but by the second ballot many of the delegates began shifting toward Stevenson. Russell
knew that he had lost the nomination as delegates pulled away, but the scholarship
addressing Russell makes it clear that he never expected to win.178 Russell’s supporters
had encouraged him to remain in the nomination process for the first ballot in order to
deadlock the nomination process between Kefauver, Stevenson, and Russell, the same
strategy that Barkley’s supporters had encouraged immediately following President
Truman’s announcement to not seek reelection. The majority of party members who
supported Russell vehemently opposed the nomination of Kefauver and his lack of party
loyalty. If Russell were to remain in contention in the early ballots, he could take
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potential votes from the Kefauver camp and keep Kefauver from receiving the
nomination of the first ballot. Eventually, as the delegates began to shift, they supported
Stevenson, allowing the Illinois governor to emerge as the nominee over Kefauver.179
The supporters of Russell, along with those who were a part of the “draft
Stevenson” movement, saw their plan come to fruition. After three ballots, candidates
gradually withdrew from the nomination process, leading to the unanimous nomination of
Stevenson.180 Stevenson delivered his acceptance address on July 26, 1952. The
Governor remained humble as his party pursued and selected him to occupy the top of the
ticket for the Democrats. After stating that he did not seek the Presidency, Stevenson
made his position clear: “I revere the office of the Presidency of the United States. And
now, my friends, that you have made your decision, I will fight to win that office with all
my heart and soul.”181 While he claimed to not want the nomination, he had been loyal to
the Democratic Party all of his life and was not about to let them down. He would push to
defeat General Eisenhower on behalf of his Democratic Party and those who fought to
nominate him.
Stevenson took a moment during his acceptance address to “pay my humble
respects to a very great and good American, whom I am proud to call my kinsman, Alben
Barkley of Kentucky.”182 This simple statement further presented Stevenson’s party
loyalty. He was the nominee, but Barkley had proven himself a loyal Vice-President and
supporter of President Truman. Even as Barkley removed himself from the nomination
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process he made it known that he was stepping aside because he believed that it was in
the best interest of the Party and the nation. Stevenson sought to model himself after
Barkley, who he felt illustrated everything he believed a loyal Democrat should be, and
throughout the campaign he appeared to attempt to follow in the footsteps of respected
Democrats like Woodrow Wilson.
After Stevenson was selected as the Presidential nominee, Frank McKinney,
chairman of the Democratic National Committee, along with several other prominent
Democrats, approached Russell to see if he had interest in being Stevenson’s runningmate. Russell firmly declined, but he did recommend John J. Sparkman, who would end
up on the ticket; Sparkman was also Truman’s choice for Vice-President.183 This
combination of a two moderate Democrats, one from the North and one from the South,
created a balanced ticket in which Stevenson, a northern Democrat who came from a well
known and well connected political family was paired with a Southern Senator who
supported the ideas of segregation, earning the support of white southern voters. The
team of Stevenson and Sparkman was the best chance that the Democrats had at holding
together two very different segments of their Party.
Stevenson and Sparkman were about to enter a heated political campaign.
Television began taking a prominent role in American life, leading to television coverage
of a campaign that the nation had never seen. Candidates debated the onset of the Cold
War, the fear of Communism fueled by Joseph McCarthy, and the Korean War in public
speeches, press conferences, and television advertisements. The variety of challenges
facing the nation created a nervous electorate, particularly considering the fear of
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communism. Communist ideology was linked to the threat of nuclear war, a terrifying
thought for the American people, and became an issue that both Stevenson and
Eisenhower would have to navigate before the American electorate.
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Chapter 4
The McCarthy Problem
With the rising global concerns tied to the Cold War at the forefront of the
election, both candidates were forced to quickly address issues related to communism.
Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy was a leading figure in the United States anticommunist movement, but he exercised extreme tactics in his efforts to find and
prosecute communists throughout the nation. His biggest targets were often political
opponents, and this made him a complicated figure in the eyes of the electorate. Both
Eisenhower and Stevenson were required to address the McCarthy problem quickly, but
Stevenson had an easier time than Eisenhower in confronting the controversial Senator.
Eisenhower and McCarthy were members of the same Party, creating a situation in which
Eisenhower had to use caution in handling the Senator’s attacks.
Both candidates began to face an onslaught of attacks from opponents, and
Senator Joseph McCarthy naturally became one of the leading figures. McCarthy was
initially elected to the United States Senate in 1946, as a traditional Midwestern
conservative from Wisconsin. Ellen Schreckler’s work about McCarthyism suggests that
red baiting was a common tactic used by the Republican Party in 1946, so his campaign
did not stand out. Attempts to find and eliminate communists from government, or any
position of influence, rose to prominence quickly in the American public eye. McCarthy
served as the face of anti-communism in America, and he knew how to get his message
on the front page of the newspapers better than most of the other anti-communist
government officials.184 Historians widely and correctly acknowledge that he was a loud
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and controversial figure who made accusations of communists in the State Department,
President Truman’s administration, and the U.S. Armed Forces.
In the months leading up to the election of 1952, McCarthy and his supporters
grew more vocal. McCarthy advocated the firing of many high-level government officials
prior to the election of 1952, including Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, a friend
and mentor of General Eisenhower, and he called for the impeachment of President
Truman. Even though McCarthy was a Republican senator, his anti-communist ideas
appealed to voters of both parties, creating a situation in which General Eisenhower and
Governor Stevenson had to both exercise caution in managing their efforts to challenge
his ideas and tactics. Making their own views known while not offending the electorate
proved more challenging to Eisenhower than Stevenson, and the Illinois Governor
navigated the troubling waters of McCarthyism in a more clear and decisive manner than
Eisenhower could ever hope for himself, primarily due to the General’s political
affiliation.
Eisenhower learned very quickly to proceed with caution when addressing the
Senator and his supporters. The General avoided challenging McCarthy in public,
although historians acknowledge that it was common knowledge that he despised
McCarthy. Eisenhower believed that McCarthy’s attacks on government personnel were
simply name-calling, not accusations based on facts.185 These beliefs are supported both
in Eisenhower’s personal papers and the secondary literature on McCarthyism. The
Republican Party, particularly the more traditional members of the old right, followed up
the Republican National Convention in questioning Eisenhower’s Party loyalty almost
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immediately because of his views on McCarthy. Eisenhower was asked if he would
support red-hunters like Senator McCarthy, and the Republican nominee stated that he
would endorse all GOP candidates, but would not support the unjust damaging of
anyone’s reputation.186 This position of not speaking in open opposition to red bating
while also not denouncing the Wisconsin Senator’s tactics created a situation in which
Eisenhower often appeared to waver on the issue, his largest weakness during the
campaign.
Eisenhower’s strategy in addressing McCarthyism began to fail from practically
the second he began to address the issue. He spoke up against communist infiltration in
the government, but also against character assassination. Newspapers addressed the fact
that Eisenhower never called McCarthy out by name but also did not encourage his
tactics.187 The Republican nominee did not plan to visit Wisconsin at the onset of the
campaign cycle, but he quickly recognized that avoidance was not an option. Eisenhower
needed to campaign in McCarthy’s home state, which meant that he had no choice but to
take a firm position regarding the Wisconsin Senator and his tactics. Eisenhower’s rival
from the Republican National Convention, Senator Taft, further illustrated the differences
between himself and Eisenhower through his encouragement of McCarthy and his tactics,
believing that if one case against a political opponent did not work out, he could simply
bring up another case.188 While Eisenhower disagreed with Taft’s position and
McCarthy’s tactics, he was also well aware that the Republican nomination process was
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much more contested than the Democrats, and party unity was a requirement in order to
win the general election. Eisenhower had to be cautious and not alienate the “Old Right”
segment of the Republican Party, and they were the voters who supported Taft and
McCarthy. Eisenhower did not speak against McCarthy by name because his election
strategy was “to do everything possible, from personal appeal to public endorsement, to
appease the extreme right wing of the party,” as documented in a 1952 Midwestern
newspaper.189 Without the support of the old right, Eisenhower’s chances of winning the
White House were doomed, and he clearly understood that as he tried to balance the
McCarthy problem with his own personal views.
Eisenhower cautiously attempted to make it clear in private, to his personal
friends, that he did not support what he believed to be smear tactics; while continuing to
not openly criticize McCarthy or other Republicans. Eisenhower wrote in a private letter,
“I am never going to condone smear practices that are not only un-American, but are
unjust and repugnant to our sense of fair play. Even though we may condemn the
practices of some individuals who have been nominated by the Republicans in certain of
our states, the fact remains that every candidate who is on the Republican slate had been
placed there by some legal process with presumably reflects the will of the Republican
citizens of his state or district.”190 This letter demonstrated Eisenhower’s respect for the
American electoral system, and even the voters themselves. Eisenhower did not even
mention McCarthy by name in private correspondence, although he often expressed that
the name-calling accusations made without evidence were nothing more than attempts to
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destroy a public figure’s image. This concern clearly alluded to redbaiting politicians like
McCarthy, but also demonstrated the General’s desire to avoid open disagreement with
members of his own Party.
Eisenhower kept this opinion largely to himself in the public eye, but he discussed
it privately with those he trusted. Eisenhower also made it clear in correspondence that he
was aware of the desires of the electorate. In another personal letter, Eisenhower said that
“if a Wisconsin primary names an individual as its Republican candidate and I should
oppose him on the ground that he is morally unfit for office, I would be indirectly
accusing the Republican electorate of stupidity, at the least, and of immorality at the
most.”191 This letter provided further evidence of Eisenhower’s awareness that he needed
to appeal to the entirety of the Republican Party, and he was walking a fine line, having
to work exceptionally hard not to alienate voters. In an already heated election cycle,
losing votes from members of his party was simply unacceptable. Eisenhower needed to
maintain all of the Republican votes possible, as well as sway some independents and
some Democrats to his side if he wanted to find himself in the White House.
Eisenhower’s position on communism was tied to the “McCarthy Problem.”
Opposition to McCarthy’s tactics bridged party lines, just as his supporters spanned both
parties. Many influential Eastern Republicans opposed McCarthy’s tactics; if Eisenhower
endorsed McCarthyism he would alienate the people who put him at the top of the
Republican ticket. Taft endorsed McCarthy, which meant that if Eisenhower spoke
against him he would risk alienating Taft supporters, a necessary voting bloc. In taking a
firm stance on either side of the McCarthy issue, Eisenhower could potentially deter
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independent voters who he needed in order to win the general election.192 While some
independents, and even Democrats, supported McCarthy and feared communist
infiltration within the United States, others thought that the tactics of red baiting went too
far and could ruin the reputation of any individual accused of communism. Those voters
who opposed redbaiting were aligned with Eisenhower’s personal views, but he could not
afford to alienate those on the other side by speaking up in clear agreement with the
opposition. Eisenhower found himself in a delicate balancing act that could potentially
cost him the White House if he did not manage the situation correctly.
The biggest challenge that Eisenhower faced when dealing with Senator
McCarthy was McCarthy’s attacks on General George C. Marshall. General Marshall had
been a friend and mentor to General Eisenhower throughout his time in the Army, but
Marshall had also served as Secretary of Defense under President Truman, making him a
target for Senator McCarthy. McCarthy leveled accusations against Marshall largely
because of his position within the Truman administration as China fell to communism
and the war in Korea began, although Marshall was never an advocate for communism
and fought for the tactics and methods he believed would best protect American interests.
Eisenhower was left with a dilemma. Historians acknowledge that Eisenhower wanted to
defend his friend and mentor, but he had to find a way to do so without publically
criticizing McCarthy, knowing that he would alienate a large portion of the Republican
Party if he spoke out against the Senator.193 The scholarship related to Eisenhower and
Marshall supports the fact that Eisenhower distanced himself from his Army mentor.
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This challenge became most evident when Eisenhower campaigned in
McCarthy’s home state of Wisconsin. Eisenhower initially drafted a speech to deliver in
Green Bay in 1952, a speech that included a paragraph in defense of Marshall, but
omitted it from the final version to avoid challenging McCarthy. He had delivered the
same speech with the endorsement of Marshall in other cities, but in Milwaukee he
omitted that segment. When omitting his defense of Marshall, Eisenhower presented a
speech that discussed communist subversion in government and created a public
perception that the General endorsed McCarthy and his tactics. Endorsing McCarthy was
not Eisenhower’s intent, as evident by many of his private letters, but the crowd loved the
speech and the handshake between Eisenhower and McCarthy that followed, a gesture
that was interpreted as unity and understanding between the two men.194 McCarthy later
spoke to New York Times about Eisenhower’s Milwaukee address, informing the press
that he “told the Republican nominee that he had no particular objection to General
Eisenhower’s saying anything that he wished to say, but that he believed a defense of
General Marshall probably could be made better before another audience.”195 McCarthy’s
statement demonstrated that he was not one to be swayed by anyone’s opinion of his
tactics, but he also recognized the benefit to his own political position if a Republican
occupied the White House. It would also strengthen his position if he did not see a
candidate with the level of public recognition that Eisenhower maintained rejecting his
tactics in his home state, which had the potential to cause voters to question his methods
and ideas.
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After giving the speech and omitting the segment in defense of Marshall,
Eisenhower found himself in a vulnerable position regarding McCarthy. The press
discovered the changes to the speech, as well as the meetings between Eisenhower and
McCarthy regarding campaign strategy and how Eisenhower would approach endorsing
Senator McCarthy in his reelection campaign. The press did not know that the decision to
omit the Marshall segment of the speech came from Eisenhower’s advisors who felt that
the elimination of that segment of the speech would be what is best for the party as a
whole, not simply for the Presidential campaign. They assumed that the communist
hunting senator had swayed Eisenhower’s views. According to Oshinsky, Eisenhower
later regretted his decision because it felt degrading to both himself and his supporters.196
Eisenhower did not appear to have many regrets in his campaign, but his lack of clarity
with McCarthy was clearly a challenge. In a letter to Harold Stassen, Eisenhower
discussed three factors that persuaded him to eliminate his paragraph about Marshall. His
staff was united in pushing him to omit that segment of the speech for party benefit as
well as personal, the discussion of anti-communism and methods used to find
communists were well balanced without defense of Marshall included in that paragraph,
and “a considerable amount of argument was presented to show that Senator McCarthy
has never made the flat allegation that General Marshall was traitorous in design”197
Eisenhower, a self proclaimed inexperienced politician, used this letter to claim
ignorance, expressing that he was simply following the advice of his campaign advisors
and staff in maintaining his appeal to the party as a whole. In having little political
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experience, the General was open to accepting advice when he was uncertain of how to
manage campaign issues.
Eisenhower felt that omitting his defense of his mentor was the right decision
based on the previously mentioned factors, but the press presented the speech as a
concession to McCarthy and his supporters. Eisenhower wrote to his running mate
Richard Nixon, “I have always defended General Marshall’s patriotism and sense of duty.
In doing so I have not endorsed any errors of judgment he may have made while
occupying posts in China or elsewhere subsequent to VJ Day in 1945.”198 Eisenhower
made his belief clear with this letter; he felt that Marshall always had the best interest of
the nation as a whole at heart, although Eisenhower did not always believe that
Marshall’s tactical decisions were correct, particularly when considering China and
Korea. The Republican nominee was clear that he did not support the McCarthy
discussion of Marshall as a communist or communist sympathizer, but remained aware
that defending his friend was a political gamble that he was not prepared to take during
the campaign.
Eisenhower’s running mate spoke for him when addressing the endorsement of
Senator McCarthy for re-election, as Nixon stated that both he and Eisenhower would
support any Republican candidate for the House and Senate, regardless of if their views
or methods conflicted with Eisenhower or Nixon’s personal beliefs. 1952 newspapers
reported on Nixon’s pledge to campaign for McCarthy if he were nominated in
Wisconsin’s primary.199 With Nixon supporting McCarthy for reelection, Eisenhower
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was able to step back from the polarizing Senator and attempt to balance what views he
made public in order to preserve support from voters who both agreed and disagreed with
McCarthy’s tactics.
On the opposite side of the campaign, Governor Stevenson was more clear and
vocal in stating his views of Senator McCarthy. Stevenson described McCarthy’s
behavior as irresponsible and believed that McCarthy’s tactics would create a police
state, not a democracy. As Eisenhower waffled in his position on McCarthy, Stevenson
made clear objections. On this issue where Eisenhower appeared at his weakest before
the American electorate, Stevenson was strong. He delivered a public statement that the
Republicans have “adopted a policy of ‘smear the innocent, prejudge the accused, twist
the truth and make cynicism the first rule of politics.’” Stevenson’s statement was a clear
expression of his disapproval of McCarthy’s tactics. Eisenhower’s position regarding
domestic communism was tied to the “McCarthy Problem.” Opposition to McCarthy’s
tactics bridged party lines, and Stevenson took a clear and decisive position.200
Stevenson’s outspoken opposition to McCarthy quickly made him a target for McCarthy.
The Wisconsin Senator announced that Stevenson was associated with various far left
organizations, claiming in a public statement that he had “the complete endorsement of
the Communist Party.”201 McCarthy’s statement demonstrated his standard tactics in
order to undermine the Democratic nominee’s campaign, and the Stevenson camp rushed
to his defense. Stevenson’s Vice-Presidential candidate John Sparkman publicly rebuffed
McCarthy’s accusations as a “pathetic smear” and a “last ditch defense of the Republican
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old guard.”202 Sparkman was the closest Democrat to Stevenson to defend him, but the
party as a whole believed that Stevenson’s opposition to McCarthy would work to their
advantage. The Democrats understood that McCarthy’s opposition to Stevenson would
help rally voters who opposed redbaiting tactics across both parties. The Party as a whole
presented a united front against McCarthyism, even as the electorate remained divided on
his tactics.
McCarthy quickly responded to the Democrats attempt to win votes with their
opposition of his tactics. He attacked Stevenson and his entire team, quoting a New York
Times article from December 11, 1949, in which Arthur Schlesinger, Stevenson’s speech
writer stated, “I happen to believe that the Communist party should be granted the
freedom of political action and that communists should be allowed to teach in
universities.”203 When McCarthy delivered this speech, he was careful to omit the end of
the statement by Schlesinger, which said “so long as they do not disqualify themselves by
intellectual distortions in the classroom.” McCarthy manipulated the article in order to
portray the Democrats as sympathetic to communists, not as supporters of the freedom of
political expression. This distinction was required for McCarthy’s tactics in order to
allow the Senator to paint the Democrats as potential communists and prevent their
electoral success.
Stevenson’s rebuke of McCarthy did not simply end with the Senator and his
supporters. Stevenson brought his opposition of McCarthy into the campaign when The
New York Times reported on Stevenson’s accusation that Eisenhower did not have a
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backbone, which was demonstrated as he failed to put his personal beliefs before party
loyalty. Stevenson also proclaimed that the General essentially endorsed McCarthy
without using McCarthy’s name, and allowed people like Taft to run the campaign and
dictate Eisenhower’s policies and positions.204 The General, who had enjoyed a public
image of strength following his military success, was weak when addressing the
McCarthy problem, and the Democratic campaign was quick to exploit the lone
demonstration of weakness they could find in Eisenhower. Stevenson was not alone in
this view of Eisenhower, which complicated the situation for the Republicans; many
voters in both parties shared Stevenson’s view. In a New York Times article speaking to
voters across the country, Miss Ruth McEvoy, a librarian from Milwaukee and an
independent voter, told the paper, “It looks like General Eisenhower sold out to Senator
McCarthy.”205 Another voter, Clifford Grigsby, a printer and independent voter from
Albuquerque, New Mexico, was even more extreme when he responded to The New York
Times. Grigsby told the paper, “I hadn’t announced how I was planning to vote, but after
Eisenhower put his arm around that witch hunter McCarthy I got sick of the whole
outfit.”206 These voters demonstrated that many everyday Americans were either making
decisions or shifting their support based on how the candidates handled the McCarthy
issue, and many believed that Stevenson was correct in taking a firm stance. Voters saw
Eisenhower as weak in his attempt to walk a fine line down the middle ground of his
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Party. The Eisenhower balancing act created a situation in which he appeared weak,
embracing a stance that could easily backfire on Election Day.
Stevenson continued to attack not only Eisenhower, but the Republican Party as a
whole for its support of Senator McCarthy and his tactics. Stevenson denounced
McCarthy, and in turn the entirety of the Republican Party leadership in stating that their
claims to pursue morality were actually “smear the innocent, prejudge the accused, twist
the truth, and make cynicism the first rule of politics,” as reported by The Detroit Free
Press.207 This was an illustration of how Stevenson felt about the McCarthy tactics.
Stevenson continued his attacks on McCarthy and his supporters as he stated that the old
guard of the Republican Party controlled Eisenhower, which became the only reason why
the General continued to endorse McCarthy. The Democratic nominee was driving home
his position that McCarthy’s tactics were nothing more than an attempt to destroy the
reputations of his political enemies, not a legitimate effort to eliminate communist
influence in the United States government, and the electorate supported him. Eisenhower
was perceived as undecided about McCarthy at best, leading to a weak position that
pushed away both supporters of McCarthy and those who opposed him. Stevenson
presented himself as the clear candidate for those who opposed the tactics of McCarthy.
Stevenson pushed Eisenhower on the subject of McCarthyism, as he believed that
Eisenhower proved himself stronger in war than he was to fight members of his own
party who he disagreed with. Stevenson was quick to focus in on Eisenhower’s failure as
a friend. Although Eisenhower stopped short of denouncing his friend and mentor
General Marshall, their contact throughout the campaign became limited. Eisenhower
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pandered to party leadership, sacrificing friendships that he made during his military
service, his relationship with General Marshall never recovered. This split was ironic
because Eisenhower’s military service is what catapulted him to a nationally recognized
position in which both parties attempted to recruit him for the nomination. Stevenson
went so far in his attacks of the Republican Party as to say that the Republicans were
“focused on finding communists in small agencies, like the Bureau of Wildlife and
Fisheries rather than support those who were resisting the real threat of communism in
Europe, and that they were too busy mourning the fall of China to work to save India.”
India was experiencing a rift that Stevenson feared would result in another nation falling
to communist rule, although Stevenson never expressed a plan to protect the populous
nation. He boldly stated in New York City, “they would rather fight democrats than
communists any day. And, like the communists, their favorite sport is prophesying our
imminent doom.”208 Stevenson was vocal in his stance during this speech, emphasizing
his belief that the tactics of McCarthy and his supporters were not an effective strategy to
contain or eradicate communism, they were simply an effective political strategy to
defeat the opposing party.
Eisenhower did not fight back as hard as he could have against the Stevenson
accusations, likely because he realized that Stevenson was right and the General was
attempting to walk the fine line of not offending either side of his own party. While
Eisenhower did not fight back, McCarthy did push back against Stevenson, potentially
harder than many of his other political foes. McCarthy’s favorite action to attack was
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Stevenson’s veto of a state loyalty oath bill twice during his time as governor of Illinois.
Stevenson made clear in his veto the he believed the purpose of the FBI was to provide
counter balance to the more radical anti-communists like McCarthy. The Illinois
Governor stated that a true communist would have no problem lying and swearing an
oath.209 This veto was a clear emphasis of Stevenson’s opinions, and was often cited
when McCarthy spoke out against the Governor, claiming that Stevenson would allow
communists to rise to positions of authority. However, many voters agreed with
Stevenson; it was not be shocking to believe that a communist would lie about his or her
affiliation with the communist party in order to gain access to a position of influence.
McCarthy’s efforts to discredit Stevenson by discussing his veto failed, as voters believed
communists to be untrustworthy and easily capable of lying. The electorate saw what
Stevenson saw, that an oath would not dissuade a communist because the oath would not
mean anything to the person who swore it.
McCarthy gave a speech directed at Democrats, the very members of Stevenson’s
own party whose support was required to win the election, saying that loyal Democrats
who love America just as much as they hate communism will not have a party in
Washington with Stevenson at the top of the Democratic ticket.210 McCarthy’s address,
among other accusations, sought to convince the opposing party that they had selected the
wrong candidate by nominating Stevenson rather than other, more suitable candidates,
and that they should instead vote Republican in the general election. If they voted for
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Stevenson, they were either voting for a communist or a communist sympathizer, and
they would end up without anyone to accurately represent their beliefs on the capital.
Stevenson opposed McCarthy in a politically effective manner, and this
opposition was an aspect of the campaign in which he outshined Eisenhower. The Illinois
governor was much quicker to state his own positions than to simply engage in a back
and forth with McCarthy, and often when he spoke in opposition to McCarthy he did not
even mention the Wisconsin senator’s name because the electorate knew who he was
speaking about. In his speech to the American Legion Convention, Stevenson, stated that
patriotism was based on tolerance. This particular address was said to be a “talk on
fundamentals to be followed to achieve peace and freedom in contrast to the foreign
affairs address of his Republican opponent, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower” by the New
York Times.211 Stevenson told the American Legion that, “communism is abhorrent. It is
strangulation of the individual; it is death to the soul.”212 Rather than engage in petty
public fighting with McCarthy, Stevenson used this address to make his own views
regarding communism very clear. He went so far as to describe communism as “worse
than cancer, tuberculosis, and heart disease combined.”213 Stevenson used such strong
language to convey to voters that communism was toxic to the American system of
democracy and communists must be eliminated from positions of authority, along with
communicating the fact that he was not a communist. He again emphasized his
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disagreement with McCarthy by using strong language to oppose communism, but not by
making baseless accusations for an individual’s own political gain.
Like Eisenhower, Stevenson was advised not to attack McCarthy, as he was
popular with people of both parties.214 While Eisenhower had a greater challenge with
this issue because he and McCarthy were both members of the same party, leaving him to
walk a line that would not offend the old right or his more moderate supporters,
Stevenson could simply attack McCarthy without ever using his name explicitly. In the
same address to the American Legion, Stevenson demonstrated his ability to speak out
against McCarthy without using his name as he said, “What can we say for a man who
proclaims himself a patriot – and then for political or personal reasons attacks the
patriotism of faithful public servants? I give you, as a shocking example, the attacks of
which have been mode on the loyalty and the motives of our great wartime Chief of Staff,
General Marshall.” Stevenson defended the man whom Eisenhower didn’t, even though
they did not have the same level of personal connection. Later in the same address,
Stevenson referred to these accusations as the “last refuge of scoundrels.”215 Stevenson
used his address to support Secretary of Defense Marshall when Eisenhower backed
away from defending his friend and mentor. The electorate was not blind to this
distinction between candidates. Stevenson continued in this address to explain that, “It is
never necessary to call a man a communist to make political capital. Those of us who
have undertaken to practice the ancient but imperfect art of government will always make
enough mistakes to keep our critics well supplied with standard ammunition. There is no
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need for poison gas.”216 Stevenson used this address to make his position explicitly clear
to the voters, politicians had enough opposing views to attack each other without
stooping to the level of McCarthy, even likening the McCarthy’s tactics to attacks used
on soldiers during both world wars with a reference to poison gas. In short, the
accusations were petty and unnecessary.
While McCarthy and his tactics were only one element of a heated campaign
cycle, the issue was far more important to many voters than other issues impacting the
nation. Eisenhower attempted to create a sense of balance to appease all members of his
own party, but it backfired, ultimately making him appear weak before the electorate.
Lucky for Eisenhower, he knew how to play his strengths in addressing the Korean War
and international cooperation. In contrast, Stevenson was clear in his views that red
baiting and baseless accusations were morally inexcusable. The Illinois governor
presented himself as a candidate who would make a his strong opinions known for the
electorate, and from that point they could make their own decisions about him. These
opinions worked in his favor when he spoke against McCarthy, but on nearly any other
issue the respected reputation of General Eisenhower overshadowed him. McCarthy did
more damage to the Eisenhower campaign than he did to the Stevenson campaign
because he made his own Republican Party appear weak and indecisive, if not secretive
and manipulative.
If anti-communism and Senator McCarthy had been the only polarizing issue in
the general election of 1952, Eisenhower would have likely been defeated because of his
inability to take a firm public stance the way that Stevenson had. Stevenson did have a
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sizable amount of support as Election Day approached in November of 1952. As luck, or
fortunate circumstance would have it, the General was able to run on his military success
during a period where the Korean War overshadowed his tiptoeing around McCarthy.
Eisenhower’s running mate, Richard Nixon, also helped to alleviate some of the concerns
held by the old right with his open support of the Wisconsin Senator and his harsh tactics.
If Stevenson won the battle against McCarthy, Eisenhower would have to win the war
with his views on Korea and his military reputation, as well as his generally likeable
public image. Beyond the singular issue of the McCarthy problem, image and reputation
defined this campaign, and Eisenhower had the clear advantage. His television
promotions made him relatable and likable to the American voters. His war experience
made him the clear choice in the eyes of many voters who believed that ending the War
in Korea was a primary goal. Even his running mate, Senator Nixon, enhanced the image
of the Eisenhower ticket as he clawed his way out of financial scandal and became
likeable to the American electorate. While Stevenson had won over voters who believed
that the McCarthy issue was the most critical of the election, those voters were clearly
outnumbered by those who were concerned with the Korean War, or those who simply
believed that Eisenhower and Nixon composed a more relatable ticket than Stevenson
and Sparkman. Television spots, campaign speeches, and discussions of the Korean War
from the Eisenhower campaign ultimately overpowered the McCarthy problem
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Chapter 5
How Television, Korea, and Public Perception Changed The Campaign
Beyond the issues raised by Senator McCarthy, the campaign of 1952
largely came down to public image and perception. In the broad scope of
positions and issues, Eisenhower and Stevenson were largely similar, creating a
situation in which one party must exploit the smallest differences in order to gain
some type of edge over the other. The main issues throughout the campaign
remained ending or containing communism, finding a peaceful resolution to the
war in Korea, and the elimination of alleged corruption in the federal government.
These were not single party issues, and made public image and the presentation of
the candidates the final decisive factor in the election. With the exception of his
weak position regarding Senator McCarthy, Eisenhower maintained the edge in
appealing to the American electorate. He was a successful general, and had
national recognition. Stevenson struggled because he was a relatively unknown
single term Governor from Illinois with previous experience behind the scenes in
Washington. These two candidates sought to increase their recognition and
likability among the American population with everything from television ads to
their Vice-Presidential nominees, but the Korean War is what finally put
Eisenhower over the top and led to his victory in 1952.
Eisenhower’s campaign advisors convinced him that television spots
would make him increasingly well known and recognizable to the American
electorate. Television had not been used to promote candidates in prior election
cycles, creating a situation in which both candidates were wary of its
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effectiveness. The development of television throughout the 1952 campaign
fueled a change in the American system of campaigning long after the conclusion
of the election. Eisenhower was willing to try new methods of campaigning in
order to win the 1952 election, and was the first to allow televised campaign
advertisements. Many of his television spots spoke to the fact that Eisenhower
came from humble beginnings and grew up to become a strong military leader.
His military leadership allowed him to promote himself as strong and trustworthy,
while portraying the Democrats as unsuccessful in containing communism or
emerging victorious in Korea.
In some television spots, the Eisenhower campaign spoke about the
General with minimal direct involvement from the Republican nominee himself.
This was best demonstrated in television advertisement titled, “The Man From
Abilene.” This particular television promotion depicts Eisenhower as coming
from a small, rural home life, growing up to lead American troops to victory at DDay and then to peace at VE Day. The only time Eisenhower was shown in that
particular spot was in a brief interview, where he stated that America is not ready
for another war if one should arrive, and that it is “time for a change.” This
discussion fueled the image that Eisenhower was the great military leader who
could defeat any other nation if a war should arise. The advertisement also stated
that “Eisenhower knows how to deal with the Russians,” showing an image of
him standing with Stalin. This simple phrase drove forward the idea that the
Republican nominee had preexisting relationships with European leaders,
especially those that he had collaborated with during WWII, and went on to show
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a clip of Eisenhower with Churchill to further drive home that point. The
television spot closed with the saying, “vote for peace, vote for Eisenhower,”217
encouraging voters to support the victorious military general who went on to lead
the NATO in their efforts to maintain international peace.
Beyond the rather comprehensive “Man from Abilene” television spot, the
Eisenhower campaign developed a series of “Eisenhower Answers America”
commercials. This series presented Eisenhower responding to citizens’ concerns
in quick, twenty-second television spots. The brief promotions were intended
more to sell Eisenhower’s personality than to explain positions, as the time was so
limited. These advertisements further fueled Eisenhower’s friendly grandfather
image, an image strongly presented by Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose,
while not giving the public any great detail as to what Eisenhower would actually
do to fix the issues that the citizens expressed to him.
Historian Stephen C. Wood addressed the “Eisenhower Answers
America” in his research. This work argues that 1952 was the first campaign in
which television advertisements were a viable option, and that each party paid
between 2 million – 6 million dollars in cost solely for television airtime, a large
expenditure for the campaigns. The two parties engaged in different strategies, not
only in the context of their advertisements but also in the airtime purchased. The
Stevenson campaign bought up 30 minute slots well in advance, at a lower cost,
intending to earn greater public recognition for the Democratic nominee. The
Eisenhower campaign strategy was more costly, as they bought up airtime during
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prime programing hours in hopes of maximum exposure. Wood argues that
research performed in the early months of the 1952 campaign indicated that the
American electorate retained more information from short television spots than
from long speeches. Wood’s discussion of retention makes it clear that
Eisenhower’s short spots were more effective than Stevenson’s televised
speeches. The frequency at which these spots were aired increased in the final
weeks of the campaign, increasing Eisenhower’s exposure before the American
public. If a voter already have a firm understanding of who Eisenhower was, they
did by the end of the campaign because of the “Eisenhower Answers America”
television spots.218
Eisenhower’s running mate, Richard Nixon, was also included in the
campaign’s television sports. Nixon had his own advertisement in which he
informed the American people that he and Eisenhower would eliminate corruption
in Washington to create a trustworthy federal government.219 The corruption
accusations were often focused around business interests in the federal
government, which were tied to men like Oklahoma Senator Kerr, a previously
considered Democratic presidential hopeful who wore a button for his own
business around the capital. While Nixon did not carry the same level of likability
with the American public that Eisenhower presented, he was able to reach the
American people because he was tied to the General’s campaign and appealed to
some members of the Republican Party who did not think that Eisenhower was far
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enough right. With the variety of television spots promoted by the Republican
campaign, the Eisenhower image of being both a strong military leader and a
comforting grandfather figure was further stamped into the minds of the
American voters.
In contrast to Eisenhower, Governor Stevenson did not agree with the
concept of promotional television spots. The Democratic Party had to create their
own television advertisements, even though Stevenson was often not directly
involved in their creation. Without television promotions, the democrats would
have been completely overshadowed by Eisenhower’s television presence. The
Democrats refused to give up, even without Stevenson’s participation, and began
with the release of an advertisement entitled “Love the Gov.” This television spot
consisted of an attractive woman singing about how Stevenson had rid Illinois of
crooks and corruption and that he will do the same for the rest of the nation.220
The Democrats used this ad as an attempt to emphasize how much Stevenson had
cleaned up Illinois in his single term as governor, as well as how he was not going
to fall into the same accusations of corruption that were made against the Truman
administration simply because he was a member of the same political party.
Unfortunately for Stevenson, any television spot that expressed how he would
eliminate corruption without him appearing in the advertisement itself limited its
impact on the American voters because it did not contribute to a more likeable
public image.
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The Democrats were undeterred by Stevenson’s refusal to participate and
continued to create promotional spots without using the Governor himself. In the
ad entitled “Endorsement, Women,” a woman spoke to her belief that Stevenson
was a “new kind of man in American politics,” someone whom she was excited to
vote for. She stated her believe that he stood for all people and had made a strong
statement for civil liberties in the south; to her, Stevenson would represent the
farmer, the veteran, the businessman, and the workingman.221 This advertisement
was an attempt to make Stevenson as relatable to the public as Eisenhower was in
his twenty-second “Eisenhower Answers America” spots, appealing to a broad
swatch of the electorate.
Wood successfully argues that election predictions, even up to the night
before Election Day, presented an uncertain outcome. He also addresses the fact
that historians who call the 1952 election a landslide victory for Eisenhower are
incorrect, as the polls demonstrated a variety of potential outcomes. Some polls
did have Eisenhower winning in a landslide, while others had Stevenson winning
by a narrow margin. The Republican Party was not blind to the fact that
Democrats had occupied the White House for twenty years and they were well
aware that taking the presidency for their party would not be an easy task. Wood
argues that the time and monetary cost of Eisenhower’s television spots was a
necessity in the eyes of the Party.222 The Republican Party viewed the frequent
television spots as a necessity to further Eisenhower’s image and public
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recognition, but they failed to recognize the lasting impact that the cost and
exposure would have on the American campaign system.
The Stevenson campaign continued to battle the short Eisenhower spots
with voter centric advertisements, further demonstrated in the spot titled, “The
Same God Made Us All.” In this advertisement, a Stevenson voter discussed how
Stevenson’s statement that “The Same God Made Us All” demonstrated that he
supported equality for everyone,223 which was a valiant attempt to appeal not only
to white male voters, but instead create an effort to sway entirety of the south in
his direction, however misguided that goal may have been. If the white Southern
voters supported a candidate, it was unlikely that the black voters would support
the same candidate. The 1952 campaign was the first in which the South seemed
less predictable than elections preceding the Civil War. When the south held
slaves, white southerners believed that Republicans did not have their interests at
heart, and would free those slaves. The Stevenson campaign felt it necessary to
make some kind of stand in order to keep whites voting for the Democratic Party
while also trying to sway the black vote away from the Republicans, who many
blacks still viewed as “the Party of Lincoln.”
Unlike the Eisenhower campaign, the Stevenson campaign took direct
shots at their opponent in television spots. Stevenson himself did not initiate these
attacks, but the advertisements were clearly designed to dissuade voters who may
have supported Eisenhower. A Democratic advertisement titled, “Ike…Bob”
insinuated that Eisenhower and Taft had become one in the same and that Taft
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and members of the Old Guard of the Republican Party would control Eisenhower
if he were elected.224 The commercial itself was simple, and it was catchy enough
to stick in a voter’s mind and remind them that Eisenhower and Taft were far
more similar than the heated Republican primary would have them believe.
Stevenson had argued throughout his campaign addresses that Stevenson had lost
his backbone and fallen under the influence of Taft, and this ad further drove that
point into the minds of the electorate.
The Democrats continued to pick at the image of the Republican Party
with their “Platform Double Talk” advertisement, which depicted a member of the
Republican Party with two heads giving completely opposite positions on vital
issues like Korea and the UN, alluding to the disparity between Eisenhower and
the old right.225 That disparity is exactly what created such a contentious
Republican National Convention, but Eisenhower and Taft reconciled shortly
after the convention came to a close. Even with these television spots attempting
to paint Eisenhower as a puppet of the old right within the Republican Party,
Stevenson’s campaign could not overcome to support that Eisenhower had
developed by promoting his image rather than cutting down the other party.
Eisenhower continued to be viewed as the relatable candidate, while Stevenson,
failing to be filmed for television spots, fell further behind in public recognition.
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Wood argued in his discussion of the “Eisenhower Answers America”
television spots that the Democratic spots were elusive.226 Nineteen years after
Wood’s work was published, the “Living Room Candidate” website has provided
researchers with access to a selection of Democratic Spots, but none of these spots
include Adlai Stevenson himself, or are nearly as memorable as the Republican
television spots. The time and money invested by the Republican Party to
promote their candidate on television is clearly demonstrated in their
advertisements and had a clear impact on the campaign of 1952, although voters
were likely not swayed by the substance of the ads themselves. Television Spots
allowed the candidates, and even Vice-Presidential nominees, an opportunity to
become more recognizable and relatable to the American electorate, and in that
sense, the Eisenhower team emerged superior in their use of television media.
Choice of Vice Presidential candidate also became a key issue for the
nominees, especially when promoting public image. Eisenhower’s military
success and grandfather image was great for the Republican Party, but he was also
much older and grew up in rural Kansas. The Republican Party decided to bring
in junior senator Richard Nixon in order to balance to the ticket to please the old
right supporters of the Party and offset Eisenhower’s shortcomings. At only
thirty-nine years old, Nixon brought youth to the ticket in order to offset the
grandfather image of Eisenhower. His California roots provided geographic
balance to Eisenhower’s rural upbringing in the center of the nation. Additionally,
Nixon had a record of opposition to corruption and was a crusading anti-
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communist, and created a sense of security for those members of the old right
who supported Senator McCarthy while Eisenhower kept his distance. Nixon
appealed to the Taft wing of the party for his anticommunist views, while also
being accepted by the Eisenhower wing for his support of the Truman Doctrine,
the Marshall Plan, NATO, and troops in Europe.227 Historians Ambrose and
Green both agree that Nixon was the perfect balance to Eisenhower because the
pair brought something for everyone within the electorate. Nixon appealed to the
old right within the Republican Party, while Eisenhower could appeal not only to
his own party (especially moderates), but to independent moderate voters as well.
When discussing Nixon, Eisenhower wrote to his friend Paul Hoy Helms, “I
wanted him as my running mate because he is dynamic, direct, and square.”228
Eisenhower attempted to be honest and straightforward with the American people
whenever possible, and he wanted a running mate who would be the same, even if
they did not share identical views, which was proven throughout the campaign.
Selecting Stevenson’s running mate presented a more complicated choice
than the selection of Senator Nixon by the Republican Party. After some debate,
John Sparkman became Stevenson’s Vice Presidential candidate, as he was the
only option viewed as inoffensive to various aspects of the Democratic Party,
which would help to preserve the Dixiecrat voters who may not have supported
Stevenson, the Northern Democratic candidate. Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver
came with the risk of antagonizing the South, while Georgia Senator Richard
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Russell risked alienating the North, and, as previously mentioned, Russell did not
want to accept the Vice-Presidential nomination. The debate selecting a running
mate resulted in an appeal to the South with a relatively moderate southern
Democrat, Alabama Senator John Sparkman, as Stevenson was a moderate
Northern Democrat.229 The selection of Sparkman further illustrated the
Democrats efforts to maintain their strong southern voting bloc that seemed to be
less certain in the early years of the Dixiecrat revolt.
Sparkman was liberal in his views on economics, fighting for price
controls and increased public housing. He backed the Truman administration of
foreign policy, supporting the Marshall Plan, NATO, and arms and troops to
Europe, issues that both the Democrats and Republicans supported throughout the
campaign cycle. However, he did not satisfy liberal Democrats when addressing
Civil Rights. Sparkman was not openly racist, but he did struggle within the Party
to defend segregation. Like Stevenson, Sparkman adhered to New Deal
liberalism, as he supported the extension of social security and unemployment
assistance, as well as the implementation of a public housing program.230
Stevenson was enthusiastic about his running mate, but when the
discussion of Civil Rights arose he had to exercise the same level of caution as
Eisenhower addressing the McCarthy problem. Stevenson explaining to voters at
the New York State Democratic Convention that he felt Sparkman was a great
Vice Presidential candidate, proclaiming that, “to me he is somehow the physical
embodiment of the social and economic progress of the past two great decades of
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Democratic leadership.”231 Stevenson used his address to promote his support for
Sparkman’s social and economic positions, but simply stayed quiet on
Sparkman’s views on Civil Rights, glossing over them as he told the voters that,
“he is a leading representative of the new liberalism which is changing the face
and the folkways of the South.”232 Stevenson advocated for support of his
running mate, but avoided the issues that would polarize the electorate in order to
limit any challenges by either Northern or Southern Democrats.
Creating balanced tickets pushed each candidate toward a public image
that appealed to the electorate, and they also began to attempt to tear their
opposition down. Eisenhower wrote to U.S. Army Commander Albert
Wedemeyer, “The Democrats have chosen a leader who is the creature of the
entrenched machine. But all signs prove that we are facing a very tough fight and
to win will require the teamwork and cooperation of all elements within the
party.”233 Eisenhower used this letter in an attempt to explain to a fellow general
that the divided Republican Party, from Taft supporters to Eisenhower supporters,
would have to work together to defeat Stevenson and the Democrats, who had
experienced two decades of control in the White House and were attempting to
remain united and firmly in place. Eisenhower also wrote to Republican
supporters Walter Williams and Mary Pillsbury Lord that, in contrast to
Stevenson and the entrenched Democratic Party, “ours is the cause of honest
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government against backroom rule of cynical machines. It is the cause of a
government responsible to the people against the practice of catering to political
self-interest. It is the cause of peace against policies which are misleading us
toward a third world war. It is the cause of a government based on confidence and
faith against a political regime too long in power, seeking to perpetuate itself by
the creation of doubt and fear.”234 Eisenhower attempted to make his views very
clear, and he used extreme language in his letters in order to convey those beliefs.
He believed Stevenson to be closely linked to Truman, and included in every
mistake that the Democrats had made since WWII. Eisenhower never conveyed
that the Democrats had malicious intent, and he presented a stance in proposing
his belief that Truman’s Party acted on what they believed was best for
themselves as individuals and as a Party, not what was best for the American
people as a whole. Eisenhower’s letters and speeches convey his feelings that the
Democrats had been in power for too long and were leading Americans down the
wrong path, one that would lead to another major war, potentially stemming from
the conflict in Korea. Eisenhower wanted to create change to the policies that the
Democrats had put in place.
Eisenhower’s Vice-Presidential candidate, Richard Nixon, supported him
in his criticism of the Democratic Party. Historians are clear in their assertion that
Nixon quickly became one of the toughest critics of Stevenson, making bold
statements in a speech in Indiana such as, “somebody had to testify for Alger
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Hiss, but you don’t have to elect him President of the United States.”235 This
statement was in reference to Adlai Stevenson testifying as a character witness for
Alger Hiss, an American government official who was convicted of espionage for
the Soviet Union and the communist party. Nixon used his public platforms to
assert that the country was in danger and the only person who could save it was
Eisenhower. In Nixon’s view, the Truman administration had led to corruption
and casualties both in nations falling to communism and the literal loss of
American lives in Korea. In his “Checker’s Speech,” Nixon emphasized his
opinion that Eisenhower would be able to clean up the State Department and help
to eliminate communist expansion, while Stevenson would defend Truman policy
and allow the corruption in Washington to continue.236
In response to the attacks by the Eisenhower campaign, Stevenson began
to shift slightly right. While he had previously opposed anti-communist decisions
like insisting that teachers and government employees swear a loyalty oath in
order to maintain employment, he began supporting ideas like Truman’s loyalty
program as well as the firing of Communist teachers.237
Stevenson also developed a tactic of baiting the Republicans into creating
issues to argue about amongst themselves, such as ensuring that the Democrats
would appeal to bipartisan ideas on foreign policy, allowing the Republicans to
make non-partisan issues into partisan ones. Stevenson wrote a letter to Truman to
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discuss this campaign strategy, telling the sitting president that, “If there is
sabotage, let it come from them.”238 In enacting this plan, Stevenson would not
have to succumb to dirty campaigning, simply allow the Republicans to make
themselves look bad and create the image that he would rise above the fray.
President Truman campaigned on behalf of Governor Stevenson, and in
the latter months of the campaign, gave Eisenhower credit as an outstanding
general. The New York Times addressed how Truman gave this credit to
Eisenhower along with a statement that he believed the General should remain in
that position. Truman stated that Eisenhower had been out of the country for a
long time and didn’t know much about government.239 In this speech, Truman
attempted to convey to the public that the experience Stevenson had as Governor
of Illinois, and even serving in a variety of New Deal programs under FDR could
make Stevenson the more logical candidate. Truman’s address seemed to ignore
the fact that Eisenhower had been working with NATO and had developed strong
international ties that were inherently political. Unfortunately for Stevenson,
Truman’s popularity was very low in the latter months of the campaign cycle,
which inhibited his campaigning abilities; his efforts on behalf of the Governor
were minimally effective, if not harmful. John Sparkman also campaigned on
behalf of his own ticket, and stated that Columbia University, where Eisenhower
served as University President, was responsible for producing more communists
than any other school in the U.S.240 These accusations should logically have
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turned voters away from Eisenhower, but they did not seem to have much impact
on the general election or the public perception of Eisenhower.
Eisenhower began to seem untouchable, until a major scandal broke
involving his running mate, Senator Nixon. On September 18, 1952, The New
York Post broke a story of allegations that Nixon received a private “slush fund”
from California businessmen. Nixon and Eisenhower had been charging
Democrats with corruption and scandal, and they had both had promised eliminate
corruption in Washington when Nixon became embroiled in scandal.241 This
scandal was a gift to the Democrats and a potential end to the political career of
Richard Nixon, but he managed to spin it in favor of their campaign.
On the very same day that the story broke, Nixon confirmed that he had
accepted about $16,000 dollars for mailing and other political expenses. While
some Congressmen used official allowances for these purposes, Nixon believed
they “should not be charged to the federal government.” In his affirmation of
having the fund and claims to use it for political expenses, Nixon discussed the
alternatives to such a fund “as an alternative I might have resorted to the use of
tax paid facilities, free government transportation, or I might have put my wife on
the Federal payroll as did the Democratic nominee for Vice President.”242 Not
only did Senator Nixon use this address to spin the slush fund story in his favor
almost immediately by claiming that the fund was to keep him from spending
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taxpayer money, but he managed to turn the tables on Senator Sparkman’s
spending habits, bringing him into the discussion of the scandal.
Nixon made a nationally televised speech in order to discuss the fund on
September 23, 1952. In this national address he made it known before the voters
that he was not keeping the fund a secret and that an administrator named Dana
Smith managed it, so he did not have any access to those funds to use them for
expenses beyond the scope that they were designated for. In explaining that the
fund had an administration, Nixon hoped that the American people would trust
that the funds were used appropriately, although they could not have known if the
administrator was honest or embroiled in scandal. Nixon was proving himself to
be an excellent manipulator before the American electorate. Nixon told the voters
that the fund was used for political business that did not directly benefit the tax
payers, stating, “the taxpayers shouldn’t be required to finance items which are
not official business but which are primarily political business.” In furthering the
pledge made by both Eisenhower and Nixon, the Senator spoke to the American
public with what they could only believe to be full transparency. He told the
nation that “this is unprecedented in the history of American politics, I am going
to at this time give to this television and radio audience, a complete financial
history, everything I’ve earned, everything I’ve spent, everything I own. And I
want you to know the facts.”243 In allowing the American electorate into his
personal finances, Nixon presented himself as a relatable member of the
Eisenhower team before the eyes of the American public, who seemed to
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generally accept his explanation at the time of the speech without hard evidence,
which was presented later in the campaign.
Nixon gave the American voters what he called the facts, all the way back
to his childhood. He began his summary by describing his family upbringing, then
described his military service and that he and his wife had just under $10,000
between the two of them at the end of WWII, all in government bonds. Nixon
then painted a picture before the voters of how he had earned his Congressman’s
salary and around $1500 a year in nonpolitical speaking engagements and
lectures. He and his wife had a small inheritance from her grandfather that they
used to purchase a house. He confessed that he owned no stock in any company,
so no businesses could have influence his decisions, and presented his personal
debts in both his mortgage and what he owes his parents. He claimed that every
dime they had and every bit of debt they owed was honestly theirs.244 In laying
out the details of his financial situation before the American electorate, the voters
began to see Nixon as a more relatable figure that shared in many of the struggles
that they undertook on a daily basis.
After explaining his personal financial situation to the general public,
Nixon went on to appeal to the hearts of the American people in admitting that he
accepted one gift from a donor, a donor who was not even from his home state of
California. A man in Texas heard Nixon’s wife mention on the radio that the kids
would like a dog, and he sent them a little cocker spaniel. “The kids, like all kids,
love the dog, and I just want to say this, right now, that regardless of what they
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say about it, we’re going to keep it.”245 In this moment, after full financial
transparency, Nixon pulled himself away from the negative images associated
with scandal and created a situation in which the American voters saw him as a
caring man and a compassionate father who would do anything to make his
children happy. With the presentation of this speech Nixon narrowly avoided
destroying his entire political career, simply by telling the public about his
children and their dog.
Nixon did not stop at simply winning the empathy of the American voters.
Instead, he used the Checkers speech to take a personal dig at Stevenson about his
financial situation. Nixon claimed that he didn’t believe that you should have to
be a wealthy man to run for political office, as he believed himself to be a man of
modest means, but “that it’s fine that a man like Governor Stevenson, who
inherited a fortune from his father, can run for President, but also that it’s
essential in this country of ours that a man of modest means can also run for
President, because, you know, remember Abraham Lincoln, you remember what
he said: ‘God must have loved the common people, he made so many of
them.’”246 By invoking the most beloved Republican President of all time, a man
who came from very little and received credit for ending the Civil War, Nixon
used this address to place himself and General Eisenhower in a position that
seemed far superior to that of Governor Stevenson. He claimed that since
Stevenson came from a political family with large amounts of money, it was
natural for him to run, while the everyday man was the logical leader for the
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nation. Nixon wanted people to see him as the everyday man after the nearly
destructive financial scandal that he manipulated in his favor.
Eisenhower handled the Nixon scandal in much the same way that he
handled issues with Senator McCarthy throughout the campaign cycle, very
cautiously. The General was not quick to take a firm stance either in support or
defense of his running mate, instead he decided to allow Nixon to manage the
situation as he saw fit and make his decision following whatever Nixon chose to
do in response to the allegations. Eisenhower stated publically to an audience in
Kansas City that he believed Nixon would not compromise his morality and that
the fund was in fact for political expenses. Eisenhower presented a weak defense
of his running mate, and both The Washington Post and The New York HeraldTribune, two outlets that supported the Republican ticket, called for Nixon’s
resignation.247 The editorial press was divided over if Nixon should have removed
himself from the campaign or not, but the majority of the press did absolve
Eisenhower of any blame. The press was quick to fall into the belief that
Eisenhower was as moral as anyone could hope for in a candidate for political
office, and they believed that he had no knowledge of Nixon’s fund. The New
York Times referred to the entire scandal became a source of embarrassment for
Eisenhower, illustrating the support that Eisenhower had among the press.248
Nixon received support from all sides of the campaign. Eisenhower wrote
a private letter to Nixon, which was never sent, probably because they spoke on
the situation. In this letter, Eisenhower asked Nixon to quickly make the facts
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known to the public by publishing “all documentary evidence including amounts
received in funds, all payments from it and exact nature of speeches, letters,
addresses and documents for which expenses were met out of the fund.”249
Eisenhower’s request that Nixon present all of his personal documents indicated
his confusion, much like the American people felt, but he would not make a
decision on dropping or keeping Nixon on the ticket until he had all the facts. In a
personal letter to William Robinson, Eisenhower told his friend that, “without full
knowledge of the facts, I am not willing to prejudge any man.” Eisenhower was
going to maintain faith in Nixon until he was given proof of a reason not to.250
This letter demonstrated Eisenhower’s hesitance to drop a politically experienced
running mate who he understood balanced his ticket, but he could not simply
support Nixon unconditionally if he was not a moral figure. Nixon also received
support from Senator Taft, leading to a situation in which much of the Republican
leadership backed him remaining in the ticket, although many voters wondered if
he was the best choice for the Vice-Presidency.
In addition to support from his own party, Democratic Nominee Adlai
Stevenson also supported Nixon. Stevenson believed that there was no issue with
accepting financial assistance as long as no favors were given in return, a further
demonstration that Stevenson’s views would often cross party lines.251 Stevenson
urged the public not to judge Nixon’s campaign fund until all the facts were

249

Draft of Letter to Richard Nixon, September, 19, 1952, in The Papers Of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed.
Louis Galambos (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 13:1358.
250
Letter to William Edward Robinson, September, 20, 1952, in The Papers Of Dwight David Eisenhower,
ed. Louis Galambos (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 13:1360.
251
Bernstein, “Election of 1952,” 3243.

138

brought to light. He expressed his belief that the Republican Party would find and
make public all the necessary information on the issue and that “condemnation
without all the evidence, a practice all too familiar to us, would be wrong.”252
This discussion of condemning candidates or opponents without evidence
indicated a subtle dig at McCarthy by Stevenson, as McCarthy, supported by
Nixon, had made accusations against Stevenson without evidence. Stevenson
clearly desired to avoid being depicted as a hypocrite for making baseless
accusations against his opponents. The New York Times also reported that
Stevenson’s running mate, Senator Sparkman, also refused to pass judgment on
the Nixon fund, although he did make it known that if it had been him receiving
the fund he would not have used it.253 Sparkman and Stevenson were more on the
same page than Eisenhower and Nixon, they often found themselves unified, or at
least similar, in many campaign issues and positions, even when discussing the
opposing party.
After the accusations were levied against Senator Nixon, Stevenson
released his financial records for the previous ten years in order to avoid having
any similar issues levied against his own campaign. Nixon had called for both
Stevenson and Sparkman to release their own financial records in his Checkers
Speech, attempting to find scandal among the Democratic candidates. Stevenson
had allowed businesses to pay supplementary salaries to state employees and
Sparkman had his wife on the payroll, both things that Nixon knew going into his
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national address.254 Nixon urged the American people not to judge these men until
they released their statements and to give them the opportunity to prove that these
funds were not used carry government favor for the businesses that donated, much
like Stevenson and Sparkman had done when the initial allegations against Nixon
came to light. Nixon’s goal was to achieve transparency in both campaigns, but he
selfishly hoped that either Stevenson or Sparkman would have handled their
federal finances immorally, in which case the Republican campaign could easily
exploit their opponents. Even the slightest hint of impropriety would have worked
to the advantage of the Republican campaign.
Eisenhower was not as quick to release his own financial records as
Nixon, Stevenson, and Sparkman, but Ambrose presented a very believable
argument that Eisenhower felt that his running mate had put him into a situation
in which he had no choice. The Republican nominee waited a long time to release
his records, feeling that that his family finances were not of any business to the
general public, but he eventually did release them in order to ensure transparency
with the American voters. The New York Times explained that it potentially would
have been more destructive to the Republican campaign if the Democrats and his
own running mate had released their personal records.255 Eisenhower knew that he
had managed his funds properly; he simply did not feel that what a general chose
to do with his personal finances was any business of the American public.
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Beyond describing his personal finances in his national address, the paper
trail of the Nixon fund was also made public. When the records of the funds
became public, it was made clear that California businessmen had donated
amounts varying from an average of $250, to as high as $1,000. Time Magazine
stated that businessmen had established the fund because Nixon was viewed as
the best statesman against socialism or government control over business.256 That
position did not necessarily present a conflict of interest as long as the donations
were based on Nixon’s existing beliefs, rather than an attempt to sway votes in the
favor of the donors. There was no further discussion of how Nixon was spending
the funds, indicating that many voters accepted Nixon’s description of the fund’s
purpose presented to them in his speech.
Following Nixon’s address and the official release of funds, Eisenhower,
rather than dismissing Nixon, allowed the American people to decide for
themselves what they felt was true. This decision indicated Eisenhower’s desire to
appeal to the electorate rather than submit to his personal opinions. After Nixon
addressed the largest television audience to date with his speech, the voters began
to notify the Republican National Committee that they supported Nixon.257
Women responded favorably to Nixon’s speech, many crying while watching he
and his wife on television and believing that he maintained the image of a
younger man simply trying to support his family. The reaction of women within
the electorate was a clear indication that the address strengthened the Republican
ticket in states where they had previously been polling poorly. This speech made
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him appear more human to the American public, creating Republican ticket that
the electorate found relatable. James Hagerty reported in the New York Times that,
“generally, persons who heard or saw Nixon deliver his speech expressed
sympathy and admiration for his courage.”258 This report indicated that the speech
rallied American voters in support of Nixon, and with that advocacy, Eisenhower
made his support for his running mate clear. The public empathized him, so
Eisenhower would not remove him from the ticket. Removing Nixon would be a
risk the General was unwilling to take, because removing him would risk
alienating the voters who found Nixon relatable.
The Republican ticket began to seem unstoppable as Nixon became more
popular with the American electorate. Eisenhower was the victorious WWII
general who appeared to be a sweet grandfather figure before the American
people, while Nixon was the young WWII veteran who was trying to provide the
best possible life for his young family, making him relatable to the American
people. Governor Stevenson was slowly losing the battle of image in the eyes of
the American voters, and the Korean War became the final nail in the coffin of the
Democrats efforts to maintain control of the White House.
Eisenhower believed that the War in Korea had been dragging on without
improving. As a general, Eisenhower expressed his belief that the only way to end
the war would be to apply across the board controls, meaning that Congress
would have to provide an official declaration of war and allow the United States
to engage in full scale involvement rather than the uncertain attempt to prevent

James A. Hagery,”Nixon’s Speech ‘Shot in Arm’ to the GOP,” The New York Times (New York, NY,
September 29, 1952), 1.
258

142

the spread of communism with ground troops that was currently taking place. In
asking for Congressional authorization, Eisenhower expressed, “I do not believe
that the Soviets would in their own best interests, deliberately provoke global war.
I believe that war is possible; moreover I believe that we can expect a continuance
of various kinds of satellite conflicts in certain of our sensitive areas.”259 In short,
this statement indicated Eisenhower’s opinion that if an administration were able
to end the conflict in Korea, the Soviets would not create another global conflict.
They may fan the flames of other smaller conflicts, but it was unlikely that the
Soviets would initiate any new conflict directly. This view appealed to much of
the American electorate who sought to end satellite conflicts, especially involving
American troops.
Eisenhower was openly critical of the Truman administration’s foreign
policy, blaming them for the loss of China, the fall of many Eastern European
nations to Soviet control, and the “bungling” War in Korea, which the
administration had no plan for ending. The New York Times presented
Eisenhower’s views of the Truman administration as a simply content with a
containment policy that was not working.260 This depiction by the press was
accurate, as Eisenhower was known for his aggressive military victories.
Eisenhower was critical of simply containing communism, and he sought to show
the people behind the Iron Curtain that the free world was thriving. Eisenhower’s
ultimate goal for the nations under communist control was to someday have the
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ability to choose their own government without Soviet influence.261 Eisenhower
presented noble goals, but he failed to articulate his plans to reaching them
throughout the campaign. His reputation led the electorate to simply overlook the
lack of specific plans set forth by Eisenhower.
The New York Times reported on Eisenhower’s views of Truman and
Korea. The General did not believe that Korea was “Truman’s War.” He
recognized that once the communists began to show aggression the U.S. had no
option but to intervene with troops. The intervention is where things went wrong,
and Truman made “really terrible blunders” once they were involved.262 While
Eisenhower viewed Korea as unavoidable, he also believed that the Truman
administration operated in an atmosphere of fear when developing foreign policy,
where Eisenhower believed the free world should not be frightened of anyone.
While Eisenhower accused the Truman administration of fearing communists, he
projected an image that he, along with an international coalition, would push back
at the communists and eventually defeat them. In addition to essentially running
scared, Eisenhower also believed that Truman’s administration had not made their
goals clear to American allies, or even his own people.263
Eisenhower argued that the most effective way to set a clear goal for
American allies was to limit American involvement on the ground in Korea, along
with the rest of the United Nations. Instead, the American and UN forces should
train the South Korean military to fight for themselves. In a letter to Richard
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Nixon, Eisenhower told his running mate, “I have several times pointed out that
there is no simple way of getting out of the “Soviet mouse trap.” The early and
important thing to do is organize, train, and equip South Koreans and other
Asiatic non-Communist nations to defend their own front lines and thus minimize,
if not eliminate, the drain on Western manpower.”264 Eisenhower’s letter
emphasized his desire to instill a sense of self-determination in the South Korean
troops, providing them the opportunity to take responsibility for their own fate, so
long as they did not fall to communism. In a letter to Basil Brewer, Eisenhower
explained that, “my information is that ROK soldiers have proved excellent
fighting men and are fired with patriotic resolve. Our political leadership has
failed very badly to work out a better solution for America in Korea.”265 This
letter is a clear expression of Eisenhower’s view, which was that American and
the United Nations troops should be working in support or reserve roles in Korea,
not providing active ground forces. Eisenhower used both personal letters and
public addresses to argue that training the Koreans to protect their own troops
would not only benefit the UN forces and the US troops, but also the South
Koreans who want to defend their own homes.266
On October 24, 1952, Eisenhower delivered a campaign address in Detroit
that rallied the support of the American population in favor of the great general
who helped defeat the Germans. In this speech, he pledged to go to Korea
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himself. Eisenhower used his Detroit address to critique the Truman
administration, stating, “It has been a sign, a warning sign, of the way the
administration has conducted our world affairs.”267 Eisenhower expressed his
intentions to correct the mistakes made by the Truman administration in
explaining that he would handle foreign affairs differently from the way in which
Truman and the Democrats had handled them. According to Eisenhower, the
Korean War was taking place because “free leadership failed to check and turn
back communist ambition before it savagely attacked us. The Korean War,
perhaps more than any other war in history, simply and swiftly followed the
collapse of our political defenses.”268 Eisenhower’s words indicated that he
believed the Truman administration had been weak on communism, especially as
they allowed it to spread. As China fell to communism and the iron curtain
dropped over Eastern Europe, Eisenhower determined that the Truman
administration had failed to manage the threat of communist expansion in an
effective manner. Eisenhower emphasized his opinion that the Democrats had
simply allowed the issue to grow and develop until the U.S. was so defenseless
that the military ended up in a stalemate in Korea trying to simply hold back
communist forces, and there was no progress being made to defeat them. These
statements were left open to the public to interpret, but Eisenhower’s intentions
were clearly to make the American voters believe that his unexplained plans
would help to end the war in Korea in a more effective manner than the
Democrat’s plans.
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In his Detroit address, Eisenhower echoed one of his campaign television
spots, informing voters that he learned how to manage dictators from different
nations while serving in WWII. In contrast to Eisenhower’s diplomatic skills, the
speech alluded to the fact that the Truman administration had failed to relate to
world leaders and provided fuel to the communist leaders by hesitating to act,
which allowed them to gain a more firm footing in regions like Korea.
Eisenhower openly accused the Truman administration of ignoring
warnings from General Albert Wedemayer as early as 1947, when General
Wedemayer warned the administration that if the American troops left South
Korea, either Soviet Forces or the Soviet trained forces in North Korean forces
would move in to fill the power vacuum left by the United States. Eisenhower
explained the differences of opinions in 1947 to his Detroit audience, including
differences amongst Republicans. Republican Congressman John Lodge believed
that the Korean Government could fill the vacuum left behind if the US removed
their troops in 1947, while Republican Congressman Walter Judd argued that
even leaving behind a small battalion of American troops would deter any Soviet
aggression in Korea. Eisenhower was clearly inclined to agree with Congressman
Judd, exclaiming, “What a tragedy that the administration shrugged off such an
accurate warning!”269 Eisenhower was driving home his own views, and the
American electorate was inclined to trust him because of his strong military
record.
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Three years after these warnings were ignored, communist North Korean
forces made their move. Eisenhower told the voters, “When the enemy struck, on
that June day of 1950, what did America do? It did what it has always done in all
its time of peril. It appealed to the heroism of its youth.”270 As the Truman
administration ignored the warnings regarding Korea in the three years leading up
to the war, it reacted by counting on the younger generation to step up and defend
Korea and the Democratic principles. Eisenhower was presenting this younger
generation with the option to elect a leader who would end the war in Korea,
bringing them home rather than forcing them to fight. Eisenhower pledged that,
“The first task of a new administration will be to review and reexamine every
course of action open to us with one goal in view: to bring the Korean War to an
early and honorable end. That is my pledge to the American people.”271 This
pledge was a clear indication of Eisenhower’s intention to end the stalemate in
Korea that the American voters largely did not support.
Eisenhower pushed his military image further by expressing that the
conclusion of the war would begin when he, as president, would be “forgoing the
diversions of politics and concentrating on the job of ending the Korean War until
that job is honorably done. That job requires a personal trip to Korea. I shall make
that trip. Only in that way could I learn how to best serve the American people in
the cause of peace.” Who would be able to argue with the general who was
credited with bringing the end to WWII in Europe by coordinating the Normandy
invasion on D-Day? Even without laying out specific details of how he would end
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the war, Eisenhower promising to go to Korea and develop a plan resonated with
the American people because of his popular image as a victorious general.
Eisenhower concluded this address, following his pledge to go to Korea himself,
by stating that, “For a democracy, a great election such as this signifies a solemn
trial. It is the time when, to the bewilderment of all tyrants, the people sit
judgment upon their leaders.”272 The General was attempting to convince the
American voters that the communist leadership did not know how to handle a
nation who selected their own leaders, but that the voters should take advantage of
their opportunity to contribute to a change in leadership, electing Eisenhower to
be tough on the communists.
Historian Martin Medhurst refers to Eisenhower’s “I Will Go To Korea
Speech” as one of the “most effective campaign speeches of all time,” and cites
four other historians who support his analysis. However, Medhurst goes beyond
the fellow historians that he mentions in arguing that Eisenhower’s Korea speech
would not have been nearly as effective if the early Cold War had not been taking
place, if there had not been a growing international discussion regarding foreign
policy fueling political arguments in the United States, or if the Korean War was
not viewed by much of the electorate as such a challenge for American
politicians.273 Medhurst is accurate in his statement that Eisenhower’s speech was
particularly successful because of the context in which it was delivered. Much of
the American electorate feared the spread of communism, and they also feared the
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growing threat of war. Eisenhower used this particular address as an attempt to
convince the American electorate that he was the best candidate to bring security
to the nation and an end to the war in Korea.
Medhurst also asserts that the Cold War created a general feeling among
the American population that democracy and communism were black and white,
and the context of the Cold War eliminated the option of a gray area.274 This view
seems a bit extreme, as the concept of containment is inherently a gray area.
Allowing communism to exist in whatever location it held and simply not to
spread is in itself a compromise, and the elimination of communism is black and
white. Eisenhower’s promise to go to Korea himself, even though containment
was a shade of gray, was a black and white promise to the American electorate,
and one that the majority of the voters supported.
Governor Stevenson countered Eisenhower’s beliefs on the Truman
administration’s management of the conflict in Korea. Stevenson believed that the
administration had made some mistakes but had overall helped to end communist
aggression in Korea and limited the spread of communism in Europe. He argued,
“perseverance, discipline, and sacrifice are the only answers to the communist
threat.”275 Stevenson indicated his belief that Americans should continue to make
the necessary sacrifices to push forward in Korea until the communists were
defeated. He explained to voters in Grand Rapids, Michigan, “If we had not
chosen to fight in Korea, sooner or later we would have had to fight a bigger war
somewhere else. The memory of Munich is still fresh. The quicker aggression is
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stopped the better. And, as it is, even with all the heartbreak and suffering and
cost of Korea – even with the frustration of the long stalemate over the armistice –
it is quite possible that our action in Korea may have headed off World War
Three.”276 Stevenson’s address indicated that the war in Korea was a requirement
in order to prevent a larger global conflict, and Stevenson supported the decision
to bring American troops into the conflict.
Stevenson opposed Eisenhower’s position that Americans should simply
train Koreans and leave them, asserting that the General had said Asians should
be fighting Asians, and that was not the solution in Stevenson’s eyes. Stevenson
believed that the communist attack in Korea was directed at America as a threat,
meaning American troops should be involved.277 This speech indicated that
Stevenson’s view of the war was one in which the Soviets could demonstrate their
threat of communist expansion without directly attacking the United States, and
that the U.S. must work to contain communism. Stevenson told voters in San
Francisco that, “I believe in time we may look back at Korea as a major turning
point in history – a turning point which led not to another terrible war, but to the
first historic demonstration that an effective system of collective security is
possible.”278 In witnessing the United Nations forces working with American
forces and South Korean forces, collective global security was thriving in
practice. Stevenson was making it clear that leaving the South Koreans alone to

276

Address In Grand Rapids, MI, September 1, 1951, in The Papers Of Adlai E. Stevenson, ed. Walter
Johnson (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1973), III: 67.
277
James Reston, “Stevenson Says Korea Policy Helps Avert a World Conflict,” The New York Times
(New York, NY, 17 October 1952), 1.
278
Address in San Francisco, September 9, 1952, in The Papers Of Adlai E. Stevenson, ed. Walter Johnson
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1973), IV: 84.

151

fight the communist forces would not be an effective solution. They would not or
could not defend themselves from communist aggression, and as international
cooperation developed, these organizations should work to help the Korean
people defend themselves.
Stevenson justified the war in Korea, and the Truman administration’s
involvement in the conflict, with his personal beliefs regarding the war. He
believed that if the U.S. troops were not fighting in Korea, a war would have
appeared somewhere else, and he made that opinion loud and clear for the
American electorate to hear. Stevenson told young Marines that, “fighting which
must inevitably be faced, somewhere in the world, so long as the Soviet Union
pressed its purpose to subjugate the free peoples of the earth, and so long as the
United States and the free peoples of the earth retained their purpose to resist.”279
Stevenson’s address demonstrated his position on Korea, which was not to
quickly end the war, in contrast to Eisenhower, but to eliminate the communist
threat, even if that meant fighting a ground war in Korea.
The discussion of the Korean War, especially with the Detroit address so
close to Election Day, became the final nail in the coffin of the Stevenson
campaign. The victorious WWII general was supported from all angles, from
members of congress to everyday voters. One of Eisenhower’s most vocal
supporters was Senator Irving M. Ives, a Republican seeking reelection. He spoke
to the American people on television over the Columbia Broadcasting System,
stating that if Eisenhower were elected “We can end the war and end it
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victoriously.”280 While he was involved in his own re-election campaign, he also
shared the views of the Eisenhower administration with many voters across the
nation.
As previously mentioned, The New York Times interviewed voters in the
streets in the days leading up to the election. In addressing the War in Korea, the
voter interviews clearly favored Eisenhower. Clyde Pemberton, a restaurant
owner from Cleveland, was quoted in the New York Times saying, “The big issue
is the Korean War. I don’t think that the Democratic administration knows what
to do. I think Eisenhower does.”281 This comment demonstrated that one voter had
confidence in the general, and while Eisenhower seemed weak on McCarthy and
his tactics, he was viewed as forceful and strong regarding the war in Korea; a
more concerning issue to many voters. Another individual from Cleveland,
insurance salesman Edward Spencer told The New York Times that, “Eisenhower
is the best bet to avoid another world war. With this new flare-up in Korea, it is
imperative that we put a military man in the White house.”282 Defeating
communist forces in Korea and preventing another war were clearly on the
forefront of American minds, and having a proven military leader in the position
of commander in chief held greater appeal for much of the electorate.
As Election Day approached in November of 1952, the images of
Eisenhower and Stevenson were heavily scrutinized, along with their running
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mates. With the exception of a stumble by Richard Nixon, Eisenhower emerged
as the superior candidate in public image. His television spots, public addresses,
and, most importantly, his promises regarding the Korean War, were enough to
push him to a victory over Stevenson and win him the White House. Eisenhower
became the first Republican President in two decades.
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Conclusion:
From the very early stages of 1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower was a strong
candidate. Both parties attempted to court him, but he eventually chose to run on the
Republican ticket. Both parties recognized that Eisenhower’s strong reputation and public
image would propel him forward in 1952. The members of both parties who chose to
court the General during his military service were proven correct. In a nation that feared
communist expansion and sought an end to the Korean War, voters were drawn to
Eisenhower throughout the campaign cycle, eventually selecting him as their next
President.
Eisenhower’s victory is considered a landslide by many historians, and in
examining the Electoral College, they are correct. The general election resulted in Ike
receiving 442 electoral votes, while Stevenson took 89. However, the popular vote paints
a different picture. Eisenhower claimed 55% of the popular vote, while 44.5% voted for
Stevenson, a much closer margin than the Electoral College numbers would lead
historians to believe.283 These popular vote numbers depict a campaign that was
incredibly heated and competitive, and the largest divisions were founded in the
importance of different issues. Stevenson emerged victorious when challenging
McCarthyism, while Eisenhower presented the superior position in discussions of the
Korean War. The level of competitiveness and the time of the campaign began to make
Americans question how the campaign process was shifting and what it was becoming.
Eisenhower’s victory can be attributed to the fact that he won over populations
who had voted Democrat in recent elections. Eisenhower won the majority of German,
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Polish and Irish voters, as well as women, people over 50 years old, and farmers outside
the south, all of whom were reliable democratic voters in FDR’s elections. The
unpopularity of Truman combined with the prestigious reputation of Eisenhower caused
these voters to reexamine their selections, and the heated campaign cycle provided that
opportunity. Eisenhower also captured the urban vote in large Midwestern cities and the
American middle class. Wealthy voters had been reliably republican strongholds, while
poor voters reliably selected democratic candidates. The middle class was its own
battleground, one in which Eisenhower prevailed. Stevenson’s strengths came from the
Jewish, Italian, and black vote, but it was not enough to push him to victory over
Eisenhower.284
In the days following the election, the New York Times published an article
examining the negative impacts related to the new style of campaign that emerged in
1952. Journalist James Reston told his readers, “The method of electing a president is
getting out of hand… candidates are saying things which they do not always mean, which
divides the nation, misleads its allies and its enemies, and thus makes the winner’s task of
governing more difficult when he finally reaches the White House.”285 He was examining
the fact that both Eisenhower and Stevenson, while making big statements and claims,
were not being as open and honest with the American voters as previous presidential
candidates. This is most evident in the Eisenhower “I Will Go To Korea” speech, in
which no specifics were provided to the voters. Eisenhower was a great general, but he
did not articulate a plan that the American voters could hold him to; there was not any
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clear plan to end the war. In an increasingly international culture following WWII,
American allies were paying more attention to potential American leaders. Eisenhower’s
statements could be perceived as either confusing or terrifying by allies who had a stake
in the outcome of the Korean War.
Both candidates, as well as the American voters, recognized that the new methods
of running presidential campaigns were not in the best interest of American politics, but
they did not know how to stop or change the transition. Reston told his readers, “The one
thing on which both the winner and the loser were agreed during and after last Tuesday’s
vote was that this was the most exhausting election on record and that there must be a
better way to do the job.” The three complaints that most election observers had were that
campaign lasted too long, it cost too much money, and it did not use television to expand
the candidate’s ability to reach people, television was simply added on top of the already
grueling campaign schedule.”286 All of these complaints increased as future campaign
cycles unfolded, and the 1952 election was simply the first time that the new challenges
were recognized.
Reston also accused candidates of making claims or promises that did not even
come from them. As candidates were so busy campaigning over such a long period of
time, they did not write their own speeches and instead began parroting the words of
other men who wrote those speeches for them.287 Eisenhower was known not to write any
of his own speeches, while Stevenson attempted to write for himself early in the
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campaign but lost that ability by the end of the election cycle. This transition further
fueled confusion in both the American electorate and in the eyes of American allies.
These varying claims, coming from the candidates or their advocates, were unable
to be challenged by voters in the changing election cycle. Reston demonstrated this
challenge in dramatic fashion by using Senator McCarthy as an example. In past elections
candidates could not make outlandish claims without risking a challenge from the
electorate. By 1952, the system of American presidential elections had reached a point
where Joseph McCarty can “get on a nation wide television hook up and blast the
candidate of the other party, while one voter in the audience who had courage enough to
stand up in protest is arrested and hauled from the room by police.”288 This became an
indication of the American political system that was to come in future elections. Any
dispute of what a candidate said was quickly shut down, and that continued all the way
into modern election cycles.
In addition to changing the way in which American elections functioned,
Eisenhower also brought together a fragile coalition across races, ethnic groups, social
classes, and religions to support the Republican Party. He tripled the voter turnout in the
state of New Hampshire. He formed a delicate alliance with Taft during the 1952
campaign that created support for him within the old right, but that support quickly began
to dissolve after Taft’s death in 1953.289 Eisenhower held office for 8 years and became a
rallying point for Republicans, but his moderate Republican position was not to last.
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Eisenhower went on to be one of the most commonly remembered figures of
American history. Stevenson lost the election of 1952, but he opened the door of the
Democratic Party to young voters who had never shown an interest in politics before. His
campaign demonstrated that politics did not have to be corrupt.290 The Stevenson
campaign helped pave the way for JFK’s New Frontier and LBJ’s Great Society. He
brought new life to the Democratic Party.291 Eisenhower and Stevenson may have been
two men who did not want to be part of the national political system, but they engaged in
one of the most fascinating and influential elections of American political history.
Eisenhower found victory in his strong military image during the onset of the
Cold War, but as Americans settled into a new world order of internationalism and proxy
wars, they began to find a polarizing political system again. Following Eisenhower’s two
terms, Democrats retook the White House with John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson.
When voters finally selected another Republican President, strong conservatism had
reemerged within the Party. Richard Nixon, the man selected as Eisenhower’s Vice
Presidential candidate in order to balance the ticket and bring the support of the old right
to Eisenhower’s 1952 campaign, emerged victorious in 1968. Nixon’s election brought
an end to the reign of the moderate Republican, but was an early step in the
internationalist version of the Republican Party.
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